SPAIN: DCM WITH SPANISH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001867 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2014 TAGS: PGOV PREL SP NATO SUBJECT: SPAIN: DCM WITH SPANISH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ AND ICC ROLLOVER RESOLUTION REF: A. STATE 111287 ¶B. STATE 111359 ¶C. STATE 12355 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission J. Robert Manzanares for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: DCM Manzanares met with Spanish President Zapatero's national security advisor Carles Casajuana May 20 to brief him on our request for increased Spanish support for ISAF, urge the GOS to vote in favor of the UNSC ICC rollover resolution and share USG's initial thoughts on the UNSC Iraq resolution (refs a-c). Casajuana said that the GOS was aware that it needed to come forward with a more robust program of troops and resources for Afghanistan, but said the GOS likely would not be able to fulfill all of our requests. He said that Zapatero would not likely make any decision on this issue until after the June 13 European Parliamentary elections, as he and his party want to ensure a big victory for Socialist candidates and do not want to confuse public opinion by authorizing an increase in troops to Afghanistan just as Spanish troops from Iraq return. He noted that NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer would visit Madrid June 4, but said no decision would be made by then. Casajuana said that Spain wanted to abstain on the ICC resolution, unless the USG did not have the votes to win (which he thinks we have). On the Iraq resolution, Casajuana said he was aware of our thinking, having been briefed by Dr. Rice in Berlin. He said Spain would play a positive role in seeking consensus on the resolution. End summary. ¶2. (C) In his initial call on new national security advisor Carles Casajuana, DCM Manzanares, accompanied by PolCouns and Poloff, expressed appreciation for the welcome given to Assistant Secretary Burns earlier that week, including a meeting with Casajuana. Manzanares noted that all of our encounters with officials from the new government in various ministries and at all levels have been very pleasant, and all officials had expressed their desire for good relations with the United States. Manzanares said the USG wanted to put meat to the bones of this sentiment by building concrete examples of US-Spain support and cooperation. ¶3. (C) One important area for cooperation, DCM noted, is Afghanistan, where the NATO Secretary General had identified significant needs that must be met by the NATO Summit in 
Istanbul to ensure that ISAF succeeds. DCM reviewed each of the six requests for Spain, detailed in ref a, and left talking points as a non-paper. DCM stressed the need for a decision by May 26 in order to properly prepare for the Istanbul summit and noted we are seeking an appointment for the Ambassador to present our request to Defense Minister Bono. Casajuana was aware of our requests, as we had briefed MFA earlier in the day (septel) and he had heard from Spain's NATO channels. ¶4. (C) Casajuana replied that Zapatero was aware that Spain needed to provide more than symbolic augmentation of Spain's presence in Afghanistan and that proposals were currently under consideration. Spain wants to show it remains committed to the fight against terror, particularly in light of its Iraq pullout. However, Zapatero, who would be the final decision-maker, would probably not make any decision on this matter until after the June 13 European Parliamentary elections, which the Socialist party was intent on winning big. He said Zapatero believes that authorizing a significant increase in Spain's military presence in Afghanistan now would confuse public opinion as Spanish troops return from Iraq, making it appear that Spain was trading its pullout from Iraq for increased troop presence in Afghanistan. ¶5. (C) Casajuana acknowledged Afghanistan was different from Iraq in that Spain considered it an authorized international operation directly related to Spain's own counter-terrorism needs. Nonetheless, the Socialist party was intent on avoiding any controversy that could reduced their chances for a strong victory on June 13. Casajuana said that the next three weeks would be difficult for all of us, as the Socialists essentially remained in a campaign mode with all of the attendant rhetoric. DCM said he hoped the rhetoric would avoid using the USG as a campaign target. (Comment: The Socialists want the June 13 elections to vindicate their March 14 electoral victory. They remain stung by criticism that their victory was a result of the terrorist attacks). ¶6. (C) Casajuana said that while the GOS likely would increase Spanish presence in Afghanistan (and had already decided to double their presence as a result of their participation in EUROCORPS),it likely would not be able to meet all of the requests we put forward. Casajuana noted, however, that the GOS could easily market provision of a medical facility to the Spanish public, simply on a humanitarian basis. He said Spain's increase likely would focus on the Kabul battalion. He seemed a bit taken aback by the request for a 1000 troops for the Combined Afghanistan Forces to rout out the Taliban, but acknowledged that this activity was in Spain's own counter-terrorist interest. Casajuana noted that Spain was also looking at participating in a Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) with perhaps in conjunction with Italy, but did not want to take on a PRT alone, as that would indicate responsibilities and resources for the long term that Spain was not prepared to undertake. ¶7. (C) DCM also took the opportunity to review USG thinking on elements of a draft UNSC resolution on Iraq. Casajuana was aware of our thoughts following his discussions with Dr. Rice in Berlin. Casajuana raised the issue of the two-conference proposal put forward by the Russians. We noted A/S Burns' comment that the idea had not yet caught fire and that we wanted to focus on areas of consensus as we pursue this resolution. Casajuana said Spain was concerned about an open-ended mandate for the Multinational Force (MNF) and might want to have the resolution provide a one-year, renewable mandate for the MNF. In any case, Casajuana averred that the GOS would play a positive, constructive role in developing the resolution, and did not want to make trouble for the US. He said the US and Spain share the desire for stability and democracy in Iraq. Casajuana confirmed the GOS would fulfill its monetary commitments made at the Madrid Iraq Donors' conference and would continue its participation in the Iraq Core Group. ¶8. (C) Comment: On Afghanistan, we expect Spain eventually to agree to augment the Kabul battalion by some 200 or more troops. They may also provide the medical facility. We doubt they will offer 1000 Spanish troops for the CFC-A. Given the Socialists' desire to avoid any controversy that might hurt their changes in the June 13 elections, Zapatero will not likely announce Spain's increased participation in Afghanistan until after the elections but, we expect, still before the Istanbul Summit. ARGYROS