PAKISTAN BAN ON DRIVERS TO IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 003547



SIPDIS



FOR NEA/ARPI WORMAN, INR KIRSCH, S/CT MILLER



E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2014

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, KU, PK, IZ

SUBJECT: PAKISTAN BAN ON DRIVERS TO IRAQ



REF: KUWAIT 03465



Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron. Reasons 1.5 (b) AND (d).



1. (C) SUMMARY. Post was informed the evening of October 12

that the Pakistani Embassy had requested that the GOK prevent

Pakistani drivers from entering Iraq, and was immediately in

touch with CFLCC regarding the situation. It remains unclear

whether the ban will be enforced by the Kuwaitis, who are

torn between their support for the coaltion (and Kuwaiti

contractors) and their desire to accommodate third country

concerns. If enforced, the ban will seriously impact the

coalition's ability to supply materiel, as Pakistani drivers

account for 90 percent of the fuel haulers under contract and

15 percent of drivers overall. Ambassador contacted the

Pakistani Ambassador in Kuwait, who claimed the decision had

come from Islamabad and suggested that an approach be made

there. Meanwhile, Ambassador asked that the Pakistani

Ambassador transmit back to Islamabad our grave concerns

about this action. END SUMMARY



MFA Senior Officials Surprised

--------------



2. (C) The MFA Chief of Protocol, who has been handling

issues surrounding expat drivers for Iraq convoys, called

Ambassador evening of October 12 to inform him that the MFA

had received a request for GOK assistance in instituting a

ban on Pakistani drivers working in Iraq. The official

stated that the note containing the request had not been

immediately seen by senior MFA officials, and had been

transmitted by lower levels of the MFA to the Ministry of

Interior for action. Ambassador made it abundantly clear

that the USG would prefer that this ban not come into force.

The Chief of Protocol said in a conversation on October 13

that he had managed to obtain a 24 hour delay, pending

further review of the issue.



3. (C) As of noon on October 13th the ban had not been

enforced, and Pakistani drivers were entering Iraq unimpeded

at the Kuwait-Iraq border crossing. The CFLCC General in

charge of Movement and Distribution, Brigadier General

Johnson, advised Embassy that such a ban would have a serious

effect on convoy capability as Pakistani drivers account for

more than 15 percent of the total driver workforce and 90

percent of the fuel haulers going into Iraq. There are

currently over 350 Pakistani drivers under contract for the

convoys, making them the third largest nationality after the

Egyptian and Turkish drivers.



Pakistani Ambassador: Acting on Instructions

--------------



4. (C) Ambassador spoke to Pakistani Ambassador to Kuwait

just before noon on 13 October to ask for clarification of

the request by the Pakistani Embassy to the Kuwaitis to halt

the flow of Pakistanis between Kuwait and Iraq. Amb. Niazi

said the decision, (as reflected in an October 5 note to the

Kuwait MFA from the Pakistani Embassy),had been taken in

Islamabad. It had been decided in response to situations in

which Pakistani drivers complained that they were being

forced to drive to Iraq by Kuwaiti contractors, and they then

asked the Pakistani Embassy for refuge and repatriation.

Eventually they were repatriated. When asked, the Ambassador

said about twelve drivers were involved in this repatriation.

(Note: out of hundreds of drivers.) The Pakistani Ambassador

also said that Pakistani drivers had failed to heed a

Pakistani travel advisory which warned against travel to Iraq

and this had been another factor in the GOP decision to ask

the Kuwaiti Government to prevent them from entering Iraq.

The Ambassador said that he had visited his Consular Section

this morning and found four drivers who were complaining

about the decision and who wanted freedom to pursue their

livelihoods through driving to Iraq. He said he sympathized

with them but said the decision was not his.



5. (C) Ambassador LeBaron asked that the Ambassador convey

to Islamabad in the strongest possible terms that 1) we would

have appreciated some advance warning of this decision in

order to do contingency planning, 2) this decision has the

potential to be very disruptive for our supply chain to Iraq,

especially since many of the drivers are driving fuel trucks,

and 3) we would like to see this decision reversed,

postponed, or delayed. The Ambassador seemed to be

sympathetic to our arguments, and not relishing facing more

angry truck drivers forced out of work. Ambassador LeBaron

also reminded Amb. Niazi that we had passed considerable

information to him in September on treatment of drivers, as

supplied by CFLCC Gen. Speer. Niazi said he had passed this

back to the Pakistani MFA. (Ambassador subsequently shared

the content of the conversation with the senior Kuwaiti MFA

official who first alerted us to this problem.)

Comment

--------------



6. (C) Post has been in touch with Embassy Islamabad earlier

in the day to provide advance briefing, and understands that

clarification is being sought in Islamabad.

LeBaron