(U) INDIA AND THE PHILIPPINES IMPOSE BAN ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 002425 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/ARP, SA/INS, DRL/PHD, DRL/ILA, G/TIP STATE FOR CA/OCS/ACS/NESA, M/P FOR JAY ANANIA TUNIS FOR NATALIE BROWN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2009 TAGS: MOPS ETRD EAID PREL PHUM IN IZ KU SUBJECT: (U) INDIA AND THE PHILIPPINES IMPOSE BAN ON CITIZENS' TRAVEL TO IRAQ REF: A. NEW DELHI 7175 ¶B. BAGHDAD 541 ¶C. KUWAIT 1598 ¶D. NEW DELHI 2808 ¶E. NEW DELHI 2795 ¶F. NEW DELHI 2766 ¶G. NEW DELHI 3175 ¶H. KUWAIT 1683 ¶I. KUWAIT 1834 ¶J. KUWAIT 1835 ¶K. KUWAIT 2006 Classified By: EconCouns Stephen Carrig; Reason: 1.5 (b and d) ¶1. (U) Action request at para 11. ¶2. (C) Summary. MFA reports that the Embassies of the Philippines and India, responding to a deteriorating security situation, requested GOK assistance on 3 August in banning travel of their nationals to Iraq. MFA, reportedly in order to provide USG an opportunity to propose additional security assurances, asked MOI to "make haste slowly," in implementing the ban. Embassy of India confirmed for us 3 August that a travel ban had been requested on the instruction of New Delhi to remain in effect until the situation in Iraq stabilizes. Embassy of the Philippines did not respond to our calls requesting clarification. Coalition forces are heavily dependent on Filipino and Indian drivers and other logistical support personnel for the humanitarian fuels, military food supply and other mission-critical programs in Iraq. Contractors and U.S. military report that a fully enforced travel ban would cripple these operations. There are no readily implemented short-term workarounds to ameliorate the effect of a travel ban. Should Department concur, Embassy proposes to collaborate with CFLCC in providing the concerned missions here in Kuwait a detailed security briefing and written assurances. We would note that none of the kidnap victims in Iraq was taken from a military-escorted convoy and request that a waiver be granted on the ban for individuals who are in Iraq under the protection of Coalition forces. Embassy requests that Department initiate similar demarches at capitals of third country nationals working in support of OIF. End Summary. ¶3. (C) MFA Consular Affairs Department Deputy Director Abdul Aziz Al-Reshaid told EconCouns on 3 August that Kuwait's Ministry of the Interior (MOI) had requested MFA guidance on how to respond to informal requests from the Governments of India and the Philippines that their citizens be prevented from traveling to Iraq via Kuwait. Al-Reshaid reported that he requested MOI "make haste slowly" in implementing the ban in order to give the Coalition time to react. ¶4. (C) The Indian request of MOI reportedly was made by telephone on 3 August, following up on a press release dated 31 July that was faxed to MFA on 1 August and to Embassy Kuwait the evening of 2 August. Responding to recent kidnapping in Iraq, the press release notes that the decision to "ban deployment of Indian nationals to Iraq" was taken "on account of the security situation." The press release admonishes that "All Indian nationals in Kuwait are requested to note this and strictly refrain from traveling to Iraq for any purpose whatsoever (and that the Indian Embassy) requests the cooperation of sponsor companies/individual sponsors/Government agencies in the implementation of this ban." There was no diplomatic correspondence supporting the press release, or the telephone call. The Philippines' request of MOI, also on 3 August, was, according to Al-Reshaid, even less formal and made by telephone without any press release or note requesting a ban on travel. ¶5. (C) Al-Rashaid was our principal interlocutor in Embassy efforts resolving the earlier Indian ban on travel to Iraq (Refs C, H, I, J and K). Today, he volunteered that the Governments of India and the Philippines might -- given that no formal, written request to ban travel had been provided -- be amenable to whatever immediate assurances USG might offer them regarding enhanced security procedures for their citizens traveling in Iraq in support of OIF. It was for that reason, he said, he had asked MOI not to impose the ban effective immediately. ¶6. (C) Al-Rashaid's message tracks with information provided EconCouns in telephone conversations 3 August with Embassy of India DCM Kanawal Jit Singh Sodhi. Sodhi reported that the ban was a "temporary consideration" and would be lifted immediately upon "an improvement in the situation in Iraq." He said the negotiations in Iraq over release of three kidnapped Indian employees of the local firm "Kuwait and Gulf Link Transport Company" (KGL) -- purportedly held by members of the so-called "Holders of the Black Banners" -- more involved "bargaining with criminals than anything political." He said the firm KGL, itself, had the lead in the negotiations, that no/no Government of India officials were involved in the process, press reports notwithstanding. He emphasized that the ban was a decision taken by the Government of India and could not be reversed at the local level. The Philippine Embassy did not return our calls for background regarding their decision to ban travel to Iraq. ¶7. (SBU) The GOK clearly wants to support Coalition efforts and is looking to us for guidance. At the end of the day, however, local authorities will have to comply if the Indians and Filipinos stick to their decision, a decision apparently taken in their capitals. It may be a bit harder to walk them back this time because the ban now is squarely linked to security conditions and kidnappings in Iraq, not to alleged OIF subcontractors' mistreatment of employees. The latter we have addressed with the active participation of CFLCC; the former is out of our near-term control. We are concerned also that a bandwagon effect may develop with other nations officially banning travel of their citizens into Iraq. ¶8. (SBU) Coalition forces are heavily dependent on third country national (TCN) drivers and other logistical support personnel. The Philippines and India supply the majority of these individuals so essential to OIF success. For example, Public Warehouse Company (PWC),the prime vendor for the supply of water and food to U.S. Forces in Iraq, confirmed on 3 August that fully 48 percent of the firm's 1500 drivers are Indian and that at least 10 percent more are Filipino. Defense Energy Support Center staff reported recently (Ref H) that more than 60 percent of their 1150 TCNs employed in the transport of humanitarian fuels to Iraq are either Filipino or Indian. The firms report that a ban on travel would cripple the humanitarian fuels and military food supply programs. Similar TCN ratios are said to apply for other firms with mission critical support functions in Iraq. ¶9. (SBU) Palliative alternatives to reversing the decision of the Philippines and India are few and unlikely to succeed. Embassy's 3 August straw poll of Kuwaiti and U.S. firms engaged in transport operations drew these observations: -- Hiring new drivers is a time-consuming and expensive process, especially so in Kuwait given the now-enforced visa, licensing and residency permit regulations. -- Bringing Iraqi drivers and trucks into Kuwait to pick up Coalition cargo certainly would encounter stiff commercial and political resistance, and trigger security concerns as well. -- Transporting cargo to near-by cities in Iraq, e.g., Basra, to be stored there pending pick up by Iraq-based transport assets offers no realistic short-term prospects. Storage facilities are limited; they are not refrigerated and, therefore, unsuitable for perishable reefer and other cargo. -- Trailer transfer at the border similarly offers little benefit. The coupling devices on tractors are not standardized regionally, so marrying compatible tractors and trailers could create a traffic management nightmare. Also, few are the Kuwaiti contractors who would trust to Iraqi firms to return with the trailer at the end of the delivery round trip. ¶10. (SBU) One alternative might be to expand on the present practice of transferring cargo from Kuwaiti to Iraqi trucks at the border. This would be time-consuming and provide no relief for perishable cargo requiring refrigeration, but containerized cargo and break bulk could be accommodated somewhat. Kuwaiti/U.S. firms here are working to identify Iraqi counterparts should this option prove necessary. ¶11. (SBU) Action Request. Embassy briefed CFLCC Deputy Commander MG Speer and staff on 3 August regarding developments in the ban on Indian and Filipino citizens' travel to Iraq. MG Speer reiterated MG Speakes' earlier concerns and offers of reassurance (Ref J) to the home governments of TCNs working in support of OIF. CFLCC will put these pledges into writing for Embassy's delivery in Kuwait to the missions of India and the Philippines, and the representatives of any other similarly concerned governments. We propose also, should Department concur, to collaborate with CFLCC in providing a security briefing for concerned missions here in Kuwait. We would note that none of the kidnap victims in Iraq was taken from U.S.-military escorted convoys and request that a waiver be granted on the travel ban for citizens of the Philippines and India who are in Iraq under the protection of Coalition forces. Embassy requests Department initiate similar demarches at capitals of TCN drivers. End Action Request. ¶12. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. TUELLER