(S) JALAHMA TRIES TO SHOW HE'S NOT SUCH AN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 001731 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/ARP, S/CT, INR/NESA RIYADH FOR TUELLER TEL AVIV FOR DCM LEBARON TUNIS FOR NATALIE BROWN E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2014 TAGS: PTER KISL PGOV PREL KJUS PINR KU SUBJECT: (S) JALAHMA TRIES TO SHOW HE'S NOT SUCH AN EXTREMIST REF: A. KUWAIT 1661 ¶B. KUWAIT 1500 Classified By: CDA FRANK URBANCIC; REASON 1.4 (D). ¶1. (S) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: In a two-and-a-half-hour conversation with PolChief June 01, Kuwaiti Islamist extremist Jaber Al-Jalahma (ref A) denied ever having been a member of Al-Qaeda and ever having funded men of violence. He expressed ambivalence about 9/11 and similar attacks: good in principle but wrong to the extent they victimized innocents. He allowed that Americans in Iraq are far better than the former Baathist regime, declared that there is no legitimate jihad today in Iraq or Afghanistan (because jihad requires a degree of popular support that is lacking),and said he advises young hotheads not to go to Iraq. He claimed to have saved the lives of Westerners during the Iraqi occupation, and to have extracted a promise from Usama Bin Laden (UBL) before 9/11/01 to leave Kuwait alone. He admitted that he had been wrong to call the Failaka killers "martyrs" without explanation; he had subsequently explained in court that he meant their intention was sincere even though their action was wrong. He repeatedly accused the USG of choosing violence as its first resort and of rejecting dialogue with Islamists -- "even with Bin Laden it could have worked." He accused Kuwait State Security (KSS) of torturing and raping young Islamists, thus driving them to do terrible things such as the Failaka attack. ¶2. (S) The meeting, organized through the Foreign Ministry, was held at the home of Jassim Boodai, editor-in-chief of Al-Ra'i Al-Aam newspaper, a distant relative of Jalahma's. Boodai indicated that Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed was the driving force behind the meeting: he said the PM had approached him after hearing DNSA Townsend single out Jalahma by name as an extremist who needed to be stopped (in reply, the PM had sought to reassure her that the GOK had Jalahma under control -- ref B). The Prime Minister's Media Advisor Madi Al-Khamees sat in on the meeting ("as a friend," according to Boodai). Jalahma came and went accompanied by Majed Al-Ali of Al-Ra'i Al-Aam. All parties agreed to keep the meeting strictly confidential. The possibility of future meetings was held open, not necessarily in the same format. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. ¶3. (S) Boodai welcomed PolChief into his home at noon. Khamees was already there; Jalahma and Al-Ali had gone to the mosque to pray. Boodai explained that he had long known Jalahma, a distant relative. His deputy at Al-Ra'i Al-Aam, Yusuf al-Jalahma, was "a direct cousin" of Jaber's. Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah had personally approached Boodai after his May 4 meeting with DNSA Townsend, "annoyed" at her mention of Jalahma: was Jaber up to no good, or were the Americans misinformed? After some persuading, Jaber had agreed to speak directly with someone from the US Embassy to clarify his position. ¶4. (S) Jalahma arrived shortly, accompanied by Majed Al-Ali (no relation to Islamist extremist Hamed Al-Ali). He shook hands with Khamees and embraced Boodai, but exchanged only a brief nod with the American, never coming within arm's length. Throughout the meeting, Jalahma spoke in Arabic, PolChief spoke in English, and Boodai interpreted as needed. Jalahma appeared to understand only a little English. Both PolChief and Khamees openly tape-recorded the meeting, Jalahma having no objection. The discussion began with an exchange clarifying that Jalahma was willing to talk but did not have any specific "information for the US Embassy," as MFA had put it. He wanted to be able to travel. (Afterwards, Boodai stressed this point to PolChief: Jalahma had recently been detained in Yemen, Syria and Dubai; in all cases, the authorities had told him they were acting at the behest of the USG. The Syrians had shown him a file on him, which they said had been provided by Kuwait State Security (KSS) at the request of the Americans.) ¶5. (S) In reply to questions, Jalahma (whom Boodai addressed as "Bou Mohammed") said he had never been a member of Al-Qaeda, had never given allegiance to it nor been asked to. He knew UBL ("Shaykh Usama") from Afghanistan, where he had gone several times during the Soviet occupation to deliver aid collected from mosques and "popular committees" (lajan sha'abiya). At that time, the Kuwaiti and Saudi Red Crescent Societies had an official presence in Afghanistan. The aid he had provided was purely humanitarian, never to armed groups or individuals. He had stopped going to Afghanistan and broken contact when, after the Soviet withdrawal, trouble erupted among various tribes and groups. His last trip was before 9/11/01; Al-Qaeda was threatening Kuwait as a potential target, so he met with UBL in Kandahar and extracted a promise to leave Kuwait alone. Jalahma assessed UBL as a fallible human who had made mistakes, "not a prophet." ¶6. (S) Jalahma stated openly that he had been happy when the 9/11 attacks occurred, because the US "needed a lesson:" it relies on violence as its first resort, and rejects dialogue with Islamists -- "even with Bin Laden, dialogue could have worked." At the same time, his joy had been perturbed by the killing of innocents. Human beings have feelings, he remarked: they feel sorry even when they accidentally run over a cat. Jalahma emphasized at length that Islam prescribes limits to violence: it is forbidden to target civilians, and even to target soldiers outside a battle zone. He cited the recent Madrid terrorist attacks: getting Spain to withdraw troops from Iraq had been a good idea, but killing all those civilians was wrong. ¶7. (S) He would only consider himself at war against the US if it were an invader/occupier, which is not the case in Kuwait. He had helped save Westerners' lives as a member of the resistance during the Iraqi occupation. When reminded that he had praised as "martyrs" the two young Kuwaitis who killed a US Marine and wounded another on Failaka island in October 2002, Jalahma admitted that he had been wrong to say that without explanation: some impetuous youth could have interpreted it as a license to go out and kill more Americans. He had subsequently clarified his position in court, and Al-Ra'i Al-Aam had published it: the violent action had been wrong, but the intention righteous; the young zealots' feelings had been aroused by television images of Israeli brutality towards Palestinians, overwhelming their reason; they had failed to seek guidance from mature spiritual authority. ¶8. (S) Jalahma complained that KSS routinely subjects young Islamists to unspeakable tortures including sodomizing them with a stick; this leaves them severely damaged and can drive them to do terrible things, as was the case of Anas Al-Kandari who led the Failaka attack. The US Embassy should tell the GOK to end such practices. Near the end of the meeting, Jalahma said he wanted to hear PolChief condemn the Abu Ghrayb abuses. In reply, PolChief said those abuses violated American values and specific military regulations; the President and the Secretary of Defense had both apologized publicly; investigations were continuing to determine the full extent of the problem; even before the story made headlines, an internal Army investigation had resulted in a scathing report, not a cover-up. ¶9. (S) On Iraq, Jalahma said the US is "better by far" than the former Baath regime. He insisted that he has provided no aid to anyone in Iraq to oppose the US, and when young hotheads seek his advice, he tells them not to go to Iraq. That country is "a mess," but there is no proper jihad there now: jihad requires the support of the people, which is lacking. Iraqis should rule themselves, and it is acceptable for Sunnis to share power with Shiites and Kurds. In Afghanistan, he had supported the Taleban regime, seeing it as the choice of the people, but after its fall, there was no more proper jihad there either. In his view, the transitional government of Afghanistan possesses provisional legitimacy, and the prospective elections could lead to a satisfactory result. ¶10. (S) Jalahma said he derived his understanding of Islamic principles from reading ancient sources, which he respected far more than modern ones. He bemoaned Sunni Islam's current lack of eminent spiritual authorities. While Shiites can turn to recognized "marajea" ("references," i.e. spiritual guides),"we Sunnis are all marajea, and that's our problem." He recalled that during the Iraqi occupation, the late Saudi Shaykh Abdul-Aziz Bin Baz had ruled that Saddam was not a Muslim and it was permissible to fight against him alongside the infidel Americans. Shaykh Al-Albani, on the other hand, had ruled that because the Iraqis were Muslims, if the US bombed Iraq all Muslims had the duty to fight against the Americans. Today, he said, the situation is even worse: the Saudi and Egyptian muftis just approve whatever their respective governments want. ¶11. (S) At the end of the session, Jalahma hoped the USG would now have a more accurate understanding of his position. PolChief replied that he had come to listen; he disagreed with much that Jalahma had said, but had refrained from responding in order to hear Jalahma out. He did have responses, however, and would be willing to meet again to have more of a dialogue rather than today's monologue. It was his job to be familiar with all currents of thought; he had met with everyone from whisky-drinking liberals to Scientific Salafis. The format of a follow-up meeting need not be the same. Jalahma indicated a vague willingness to meet again, but did not provide any direct contact information or make any commitment. ¶12. (S) COMMENT: From his own words, it is clear that Jalahma is deeply anti-American and, under some circumstances, would be perfectly happy to support violence against Americans, and even carry it out personally. The minimum point he seemed to be trying to convey -- both to the USG and the GOK -- was that he is not advocating violence in Kuwait or against Americans anywhere at the moment. URBANCIC