(C) SCENESETTER FOR NEA A/S BURNS'S VISIT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000143

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP
CAIRO PLS PASS TO A/S BURNS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2014
TAGS: PREL MARR ETRD PHUM PGOV IZ KU
SUBJECT: (C) SCENESETTER FOR NEA A/S BURNS'S VISIT

REF: A. 03 KUWAIT 5539

B. KUWAIT 69

Classified By: CDA FRANK URBANCIC; REASON: 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Welcome back to Kuwait. We are requesting meetings
for you with Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed, Foreign
Minister Shaykh Dr. Mohammed Sabah al-Salem, and Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Defense Shaykh Jaber Mubarak
al-Hamad al-Sabah, for the afternoon of January 14. Given
your later arrival, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed
us today, January 13, that an evening meeting with the
Foreign Minister is likely, and that a meeting with the
Defense Minister is not possible. We are checking on the
Prime Minister's availability now. We have canceled Charge's
reception, in order to make time for Dr. Mohammed.


2. (C) There have been significant changes since your last
visit in June: Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed, who had been de facto
head of government due to the Crown Prince's permanent
incapacitation, was promoted to Prime Minister in July
following regularly-scheduled National Assembly elections.
The regime was much criticized for vote-buying and for
condoning illegal tribal primaries; independents made gains
at the expense of both the liberals and the largest organized
bloc of Islamists, which has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.
Kuwaiti political discourse is much more inward-focused now
that we have removed the existential threat posed by Saddam
Hussein's regime. Shaykh Sabah's stated agenda includes
economic reform (a TIFA will be signed when USTR's schedule
permits) and steps towards political rights for women, who
now can neither vote nor run for national office.


2. (C) On Iraq, the GOK remains one of our most committed
and optimistic allies. It knows it needs us to succeed at
least as much as we do, and it trusts our ability and
determination more than most. The capture of Saddam Hussein
and the agreed timetable for restoration of Iraqi sovereignty
bolstered Kuwait's sense of vindication for siding with us.
The GOK has close and cordial ties with the Iraqi Governing
Council and Ministers, and helped them gain acceptance in the
Arab League and OIC. Kuwait says it has spent about a
billion dollars already in support of Iraq and has another
half-billion to go.


3. (S) That's the good news. The downside is that the
Kuwaitis feel taken for granted. Some of this is inevitable:


- We are a huge country with more global responsibilities
than any other, and our top officials only have 24 hours in
their day. It will never be possible to give this small
country as much attention as it craves. Shaykh Sabah's
successful trip to Washington in September did much to soothe
feelings hurt by the President's decision not to include
Kuwait in his visit to the region.

- Our way of fighting a war is massive and expensive.
Kuwaitis know it gets results, so they let us do things our
way, but it is exhausting and costly to them:

-- as the main launching pad for OIF, Kuwait turned over more
than half its landmass to us in the run-up to the invasion,
and allowed us extensive use of scarce facilities (e.g.
airport, ports),to the detriment of its own economy;

-- it has borne hundreds of millions of dollars-worth of
costs ostensibly in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, much
of it Assistance-In-Kind (AIK) fuel for our forces (currently
running at USD1.2 million per day).

-- our requirements for security support, especially before
and during major combat operations in Iraq, stretched Kuwaiti
capabilities beyond sustainable limits.

-- we are beginning our largest troop rotation since Vietnam,
which will last nearly half a year.


4. (C) Several bilateral irritants need to be addressed:

- AIK Fuel: The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces has
repeatedly indicated that he cannot afford to continue
providing the current level of support, and has cut back on
participation in military exercises and training. The
Minister of Finance sent the Embassy a letter seeking
reimbursement of nearly USD 85 million for fuel provided to
our forces since the declared end of major combat operations.
We have asked that the bill be nullified because Shaykh
Sabah had assured Ambassador Jones the fuel aid would
continue. Dr. Mohammed has requested that we engage in an
inter-agency dialogue on our strategic cooperation in the
near future. The GOK has given us two weeks from January 10
to begin an interagency discussion on where we go from here.
- Humanitarian Fuel: The GOK and a private Kuwaiti company,
Altanmia, spent millions in order to be able to provide large
quantities of refined fuels to Iraq through a KBR contract.
The quantities actually ordered have been much smaller, and
Kuwait has been accused in the newsmedia of overcharging
because similar products were being delivered through Turkey
at much lower prices. (The fact is -- and our U.S.
contractor acknowledged this in a press release -- that there
are practical reasons for the apparent discrepancies in the
price fuel from Kuwait: the route is longer and so dangerous
that the truck convoys require coalition security escorts;
these are not always available, which leads to delays that
increase costs; the download points in Iraq lack adequate
equipment, which adds to the delays; Kuwait is a net importer
of refined fuels and has had to buy on the spot market at
times to meet demand. Reftels)

- Kuwait Airways Aircrew: The Transportation Security
Administration has informed Kuwait Airways that six of its
aircrew members are no longer permitted to fly to/from the
US, but provided no justification. Some of the individuals
named hold positions of conspicuous trust: one is the Amir's
co-pilot, another once flew former President Bush back to the
US; another is the brother of a State Security officer. If
we have a reason for believing these individuals pose a
threat, the GOK would like to know what it is.

- Border: At this writing, we have concluded negotiations
for an MOU between the US military and the GOK regarding
procedures at crossing points on the Iraqi border. Already,
interim procedures put in place have resulted in the
successful interdiction of contraband. Implementation of the
full MOU will further assuage Kuwaiti fears of smuggling
associated with coalition convoys. A signing ceremony at the
border will occur late in January. The full deployment of
the planned equipment and facilities will top USD 15 million
and provide a state-of-the-art border control regime. We
plan to offer this as a model for use by other states
bordering Iraq.

- Contractor Entry: At the beginning of Eid al-Fitr, airport
immigration officials briefly stopped allowing CPA
contractors to enter the country on their DOD Common Access
Card (CAC),insisting they present a passport and visa (the
legal requirement and the procedure in force before the
build-up to OIF). Because the GOK has not required -- or
been equipped to require -- that personnel transiting to/from
Iraq be stamped in/out every time, it has no way of knowing
how big a problem there may be of contractors living in
Kuwait without proper documentation. In close coordination
with CFLCC, we are very close to finalizing a strategy for
negotiating sustainable procedures with the GOK. This is
another achievement that you can justifiably highlight in
your meetings.

- Compensation: The GOK understands that, in the face of
opposition within the UNSC, we defended the principle of
Iraqi responsibility to pay compensation for the destruction
and plunder of its 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait. That said,
UNSCR 1483 reduced the UN Compensation Commission's take of
Iraqi oil revenue from 25 percent to 5 percent. Public
opinion tends not to understand our constructive role, and
therefore to see the GOK as too feckless to get us to respect
its interests.

- Cargo/Port: CFLCC has become aware that some cargo has sat
at the airport for months, and it has addressed the issue.
The US military and the Embassy are actively engaged with the
GOK and the Kuwaiti private sector to secure US access to
Kuwaiti ports while causing the least amount of disruption to
commercial operations. A steering committee that includes
the Kuwait Ports Authority, the Public Authority for
Industry, Kuwaiti companies active in the port, the Embassy,
and the US military, meets every two to three weeks to
discuss longer-term plans for port access. The US military
meets with the harbormaster and Kuwaiti companies each week
to review berth schedules and to ensure that US access to
pier space is not unduly harming commercial interests.
However, the relative lack of port facilities in Kuwait --
combined with the current troop rotation, US plans to remain
in Kuwait in the longer term, and the anticipated increase in
commercial port activity associated with the booming Kuwaiti
economy and Iraqi reconstruction -- signals that port access
issues will become more contentious. One company has already
alleged that the military has caused it to lose money by
denying it pier access, although the U.S. military refutes
that allegation.


5. (C) Iraqi Debt: Presidential Envoy Baker plans to come
January 20-21. The Kuwaitis will be interested in what he
has to say, but on debt (and compensation),they want to be
the ones to make any concession -- they do not want us or
anybody else to make it for them -- and they do not want to
take any action until there is a sovereign Iraqi government
to negotiate with, and they want to work within the framework
of the Paris Club.


6. (C) TIP: Thanks to the Secretary's mention of
Trafficking-In-Persons concerns when he received the current
Foreign Minister last April, the GOK showed just enough
commitment to fighting abuses to stay off Tier 3 in 2003.
However, at most levels the GOK still does not really believe
it has a trafficking problem, because those we are most
concerned about (female domestic servants) are not brought to
Kuwait under false pretenses, and existing law theoretically
affords them some protection. We continue to try to drive
home the message that they need to take this matter seriously
-- as others in the GCC are doing -- or face embarrassment.
A word from you would help.


7. (C) MEPI: It would be useful for you to encourage your
interlocutors to seize the opportunity of partnership with us
to promote reform, and ask them where they see the greatest
scope for help from us.


8. (C) ARTICLE 98: Kuwait signed on June 18 during U/S
Bolton's visit. After FM Dr. Mohammed told Ambassador Jones
that he saw no need for parliamentary ratification, the
agreement was submitted to the National Assembly, where it
remains. (NB: Kuwait has not acknowledged publicly having
signed such an agreement with us, so we treat the existence
of the agreement as classified.)
URBANCIC