ELECTIONS JEOPARDIZED BY ARMY REFORM PROBLEM, SAYS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001759

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2014
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL MARR MOPS CG
SUBJECT: ELECTIONS JEOPARDIZED BY ARMY REFORM PROBLEM, SAYS

S. KIVU GENERAL

Classified By: Poloff Edward Bestic for Reasons 1.5 B and D


1. (C) SUMMARY: Gen. Budja Mabe, Kinshasa's senior officer
in South Kivu, told the Ambassador Sept. 8 the Congo needs
outside help with military reform in order to be able to hold
elections. The FDLR, rebel Congolese officers, and
neighboring countries are the chief threats to security, and
the non-Banyamulenge of Uvira are not keen to see the
Banyamulenge return--a problem that has deep roots. Mabe came
across as intelligent and articulate, if not completely
forthcoming, and likely with the sense to tailor his message
to his USG audience, qualities lacking in many FARDC
officers. He appears to want to engage with the USG. END
COMMENT.


A Motley Collection of Forces
--------------

2. (C) 10th Military Region commander Gen. Felix Budja Mabe
told the Ambassador Sept. 8 he has made some progress on
military integration, but that the Congolese need outside
support for further reform. Without an effective army, there
will be no security and therefore no elections. His troops
include elements from the former government, RCD-Goma, local
defense forces, Mudundu-40 and the Mai-Mai. On the plus
side, he claimed Kinshasa authorities are providing
consistent (but small) salary payments, discipline is "sixty
percent there," and people are beginning to respect the chain
of command. Incompetence is a major problem, however,
especially among the Mai-Mai. Mai-Mai groups are organized
by clan or locality, and their untrained leaders do not
deserve their rank. It would be best to wait until after
elections to begin demobilizing them, he advised, because
most Mai-Mai are unqualified to serve in the regular army and
could become a source of instability when they are cut.


Military Threats
--------------

3. (C) Mabe said the major threats to South Kivu are the
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR, aka
ex-FAR/Interahamwe),neighboring countries, renegade former
RCD-Goma officers Laurent Nkunda and Jules Mutebusi, and
"the 8th Military Region." (Comment: This is probably a
reference to Goma-based 8th Military Region commander Gen.
Obedi Rwibasira, who is widely believed to have supported
Nkunda and Mutebusi in their recent revolt. End Comment.)
In Mabe's view, many if not most FDLR fighters are willing to
disarm voluntarily and return to Rwanda, but a hard-core
minority--including most of the senior leaders--restrains
them. Overall FDLR strength in the Congo is probably five
brigades, he estimated, a maximum of 15,000 troops if they
were at full strength. Mabe spoke little about Nkunda, other
than saying the latter's troops attacked government forces
2-3 days earlier but failed to reach their objectives, the
areas of Kalehe and Kavumu.


Longstanding Tensions in Uvira
--------------

4. (C) Discussing the situation at Uvira, Mabe said that
after the Banyamulenge community there fled across the
border, squatters moved into their homes. This, plus the
fact that many non-Banyamulenge long felt that the
Banyamulenge had "tried to dominate them," means that those
remaining in Uvira are "not excited" about the prospect of
Banyamulenge refugees returning to the city. Tensions
between Banyamulenge and other Congolese in South Kivu also
stem from long-running land disputes, Mabe explained, because
the Banyamulenge living in the Haut-Plateau area have had a
tendency to settle in the mid- and lower Plateau areas as
well. There have fights over this since as early as 1964;
Mobutu had seen fit to station a full battalion of troops in
the area to quell violence.


COMMENT
--------------

5. (C) Mabe came across as an intelligent, articulate
military officer with a good understanding of political
dynamics--a contrast with many other Congolese officers. He
conveyed the appearance of wanting to engage with the U.S.,
and indeed increase future cooperation. He was not fully
forthcoming, however, claiming that his troops are being
regularly paid (they are not). Nor did he mention impending
military action within a short time of this meeting,
apparently designed to move FARDC troops under his command
further toward boundaries with the neighboring 8th Military
Region, reclaiming ground controlled by dissident rebel
General Nkunda. Instead, he implied that all current clashes
result from Nkunda initiatives. Mabe was direct in
characterizing Interahamwe forces in his military district as
a major security threat to the region and the resident
population, asserting that he fully intended to maintain
operations against Hutu extremists (e.g. FDLR, Interahamwe).
He also avoided any inflammatory language regarding RCD-Goma
or Banyamulenge (South Kivu Tutsi) troops. Mabe has
certainly been identified, however, as a major problem by
RCD-Goma and some Congolese Tutsis, as well as by Kigali, so
how much of his presentation was constructed for his USG
audience and how much reflects true personal feeling is
difficult to assess. Whatever his actual feelings about the
current military environment in the Kivus, Mabe's comments
about the need for external assistance for Congolese military
reform are on the mark. While increased pressure is needed
to force the Congolese parties to further significant
military integration moves, it is also true that current
external support appears inadequate and not well coordinated
between key parties, including South Africa and Belgium. END
COMMENT.
MEECE