NEPAL: FACEOFF BETWEEN PARTIES AND PALACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KATHMANDU 000693 SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/INS LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY NSC FOR MILLARD E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2014 TAGS: PGOV PINR PTER PREL NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: FACEOFF BETWEEN PARTIES AND PALACE REF: A. 03 KATHMANDU 652 ¶B. 02 KATHMANDU 838 ¶C. KATHMANDU 585 ¶D. KATHMANDU 612 ¶E. KATHMANDU 637 ¶F. KATHMANDU 651 Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI. REASON: 1.5 (B,D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) April traditionally is a month of political ferment in Nepal. This year, with all three of the country's politcal actors--the parties, the King, and the Maoists--in apparent overdrive, promises to be particularly interesting. Some commentators have expressed concern that the anti-government actions by the parties and the Maoists seem to be coinciding, at least in part, thereby stepping up pressure from both sides on the Government of Nepal (GON) and the Palace. While neither the constitutional monarchy nor the commitment to multi-party democracy seems in danger of imminent collapse, the lengthy and increasingly bitter standoff between the Palace and the parties poses growing costs to the vitality of both institutions. Popular faith in the monarchy and in democracy risks being steadily eroded by the inability and/or unwillingness of the Palace and the parties to resolve their differences. Sustained, consecutive protests and general strikes, moreover, increase the potential for civil disorder and general violence, offering a ready avenue to Maoist provacateurs hoping to polarize further the constitutional forces. Despite these obvious dangers, we see little sign of compromise from either the King or the political leaders. The Ambassador's upcoming round of farewell calls offers an excellent opportunity for him to underscore to them the urgency of the situation and the need for an immediate resolution. End summary. -------------- SEASONAL POLITICS -------------- ¶2. (U) April traditionally is a month of political ferment in Nepal, primarily for meteorological, rather than ideological, reasons. Protests are almost a springtime ritual here, and the scent of spring flowers in the air is typically accompanied by the smell of burning tires, as the warmer, pre-monsoon weather draws various groups out into the streets to vent assorted grievances. For example, in April 2003 student groups aligned with the major political parties launched a series of nationwide protests and strikes against petroleum price hikes. Some of the protests turned violent; one student was killed when police fired on stone-throwing students (Ref A). Later in the month, nationwide general strikes, or "bandhs," called by competing student groups paralyzed business, closed schools and halted transportation repeatedly (April 20; April 23; April 28; and April 29). The previous year the Maoists staged a five-day bandh (April 23-27) that effectively shut down the country for much of its duration (Ref B). April also proved the most critical month in the 1990 pro-democracy movement; a series of protests that killed dozens culminated in then-King Birendra's decision to lift the ban on political parties on April 9. ¶3. (U) This April promises to be especially active, with all three of Nepal's political forces--King Gyanendra, democratic parties, and Maoist insurgents--apparently planning to take full advantage. The King just completed a 17-day program of visits to provincial capitals all over the country (Ref C); the five parties agitating against the King have pledged to continue the "decisive" protest launched April 1 (Ref D); and the Maoists enforced, through their customary intimidation and violence, a three-day general strike April 6-8 (Ref E). (Note: The agitating parties have launched approximately 35 such "decisive" protests against the Palace since September ¶2002. End note.) Although protests and political grandstanding historically are more common in April than in other months, some commentators have expressed concern that the anti-government actions by the parties and the Maoists seem to be coinciding, thereby stepping up pressure from both sides on the Government of Nepal (GON) and the Palace. On April 2, for example, Maoist leader Prachanda issued a press statement welcoming the "initiatives and efforts taken by the five political parties" and claiming "a historic responsibility" for "all real patriots and democrats to defeat the feudalistic and despotic system" of monarchy. The parties, however, so far have not issued a reciprocal welcome to the Maoist statement. Nepali Congress (NC) President and frequent Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala publicly dismissed the possibility of joining hands with the insurgents unless they renounce violence. -------------- NEPALI DEMOCRACY: DELAYED DEVELOPMENT -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Nepal's young democracy has experienced some painful and severe delays in its development. The nation has had as many democratic prime ministers (14) as actual years of democracy--a reflection of the constant in-fighting, persistent jockeying for advantage, and deep-rooted aversion to cooperation and compromise that most observers consider characteristic of the political leadership. The popular perception is that democracy--at least as it is practiced in Nepal--has failed to satisfy popular expectations of improved living standards, more evenly distributed socio-economic development, and a more equitable and efficient administration of justice. While these expectations may be unrealistic--Nepalis tend to compare their democracy with the U.S. and France, rather than more appropriate regional examples like Sri Lanka or Bangladesh--the pervasive sense of disillusionment nonetheless is quite real. That said, most Nepalis seem to identify deficiencies in individual political leaders, rather than deficiencies in democracy as a system of government, as responsible for the shortfall. Despite rampant criticism of the political parties' stewardship of democracy over the past decade, most sources indicate an overwhelming preference for democracy over any other form of government--an "I love democracy; it's the democratic leaders I can't stand" attitude. ¶5. (SBU) While growing pains can be expected in any young democracy, Nepal, sadly, has had little grace period to develop the institutions needed to nurture this relatively new system of government. More than half of Nepal's age span as a democracy has been overshadowed by the insurgency. Eight years of Maoist violence against grassroots party activists and government officials has helped create a vacuum at the local level that leaves many Nepalis in rural areas with no democratic alternative to a "people's government imposed through fear and intimidation. In cities where party networks remain strong, internal party structures have not matured into truly democratic organizations that encourage breadth of vision, allow dissent, and award leadership roles to those demonstrating talent and genuine popular appeal. Instead, the parties are dominated by powerful individuals in tight control of all decision-making and promotions. In this system, advancement within the party hierarchy depends upon loyalty, longevity and family, rather than talent, intelligence or political acumen. Party Central Committees function primarily as rubber stamps for the leaders' fiats, and dissenters are routinely suspended from the party. Thus, ironically, after struggling for decades against the feudal, hidebound hierarchy of the Palace, the democratic parties have created autocratic fiefdoms of their own, perpetuating the same systems of patronage and privilege they had criticized in the royals. -------------- BANDHS AND BURNING EFFIGIES: LIMITED POST-DEMOCRATIC APPEAL -------------- ¶6. (C) The parties' hierarchical structure leaves them largely ignorant of popular concerns and, consequently, largely unable to frame a vision for Nepal's future that resonates with the electorate. Instead of developing a thoughtful, broad-based platform, the parties are reverting to the same old limited bag of tricks--protests/general strikes/more protests--in a bid to gain popular support for their movement. The parties's hope that the current agitation will regenerate the fervor and spontaneous mass support of the 1990 pro-democracy movement, however, has not been realized for a variety of reasons. First, the failure to broaden their message makes the agitation appear to the general public suspiciously similar to the same old self-interesed power struggles the parties have subjected the electorate to for more than a decade. Second, in 1990 democracy was a great and glamorous "unknown" that average Nepalis hoped would bring them higher living standards and greater security--a hope that all too plainly has not been met. Third, the overwhelming concern for most Nepalis--especially those outside the capital--is the insurgency. Battered by Maoist strikes and violence on one side, they have little appetite for pro-democracy strikes and violence on the other. Moreover, since the insurgency began under the not-so watchful eye of the same democratic leaders now clamoring to be returned to power, there is little public optimism that they have suddenly acquired the wisdom and ability needed to resolve the crisis. While the parties seem unable to persuade the public of their ability to govern, they are even less adept at making the case to the King. The intermittent calls for a republic that punctuate some of the protests--and which none of the democratic leaders has formally endorsed--likely reflect more frustration at the protests' lack of success--and their own failure of imagination in devising other means to drum up support--than a genuine wish to abolish the monarchy. -------------- RELATIONS WITH MILITARY: A KEY CONSTRAINT -------------- ¶7. (C) The Palace's use of the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) to attempt to suppress the pro-democracy movement in 1990 has had important and lasting repercussions. Strained, mutually suspicious relations persist between party leaders, many of whom were imprisoned, harassed or in exile during the struggle, and the Army. Unfortuantely, the advent of democracy has done little to ameliorate this situation. The 1991 Constitution gave the democratically elected Prime Minister and his Cabinet oversight over all vital Government organs with one important exception--the Royal Nepal Army (RNA). Although the Constitution gives the Prime Minister, as a member of the National Defense Council, nominal authority over the RNA, the King, as Supreme Commander, retains power over its mobilization and deployment. (Note: Former Prime Minister and NC President G.P. Koirala claims the King rejected his request to deploy the RNA against the Maoists in July 2001. The King later mobilized the Army--under a different PM--after Maoists attacked RNA installations four months later. End note.) While this separation of powers has kept the RNA insulated from Nepal's turbulent, bitterly partisan democratic politics, it has also inhibited the development of cordial relationships, based on trust and mutual interest, between the civilian and military leadership. Whether fairly or not, most politicians remain deeply skeptical of the RNA's commitment to democracy, while many senior Army officers are just as skeptical of the politicians' commitment to governing in the national interest. -------------- GYANENDRA THE "ACTIVE" MONARCH -------------- ¶8. (C) Poor governance, corruption, incompetence and self-absorption have clearly cost the political leadership much popular support over the past few years. But the parties' declining popularity does not necessarily translate into popular support for the monarchy, especially as an alternative to democracy. Just as the Nepali public seems to support democracy in principle--if not individual democratic leaders--so too do they seem to support constitutional monarchy as an institution--even if their views of this particular king are somewhat more ambivalent. The traumatic circumstances under which Gyanendra acceded to the throne in June 2001--following the assassination of his brother by the Crown Prince, who then killed nine other members of the royal family, including himself--have altered most Nepalis' traditional reverence for the monarchy as sacrosanct and inviolable. The prospect of Gyanendra's infamous son Paras as the next king, moreover, does little to refurbish the monarchy's bloodied image. (Note: Paras' involvement in two vehicular homicides while intoxicated (in 1997 and 2000)--for which he is shielded from prosecution by the Constitution--continues to provoke popular resentment. Although he has not killed anyone lately, his behavior is reportedly just as worrisome as ever, despite the King's best efforts to rehabilitate his son's image. End note.) ¶9. (C) Many Kathmandu insiders claim that Gyanendra had shown anti-democratic tendencies long before he became king and had been critical of his older brother, the late King Birendra, for yielding to the 1990 pro-democracy movement. It is difficult to determine to what degree these comments are colored by hindsight and to what degree they reflect actual reality, but Gyanendra's actions and statements since ascending the throne suggest some truth to these allegations. After replacing the democratically elected government of then-Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba with his own royally appointed Cabinet, the King has consistently failed to make sincere overtures to the parties to resolve the impasse. Instead, he has used his public appearances and statements to castigate the parties' past bad governance and portray himself as the true defender of democratic values. These harsh, often personalized attacks narrow the ground available on which the Palace can build future compromises with the parties and raise serious questions about the King's oft-repeated commitment to seeking a resolution to the impasse. More recently, the Palace has highlighted the King's 17-day visit to district capitals to tout an image of a concerned and benevolent monarch--in tacit but pointed contrast to the democratic leaders' own past neglect of these remote areas. But the large turnout at these these provincial "felicitation ceremonies," extensively covered by the state-owned press, is a better measure of the level of desperation in these remote areas than a valid indicator of the King's popularity. Curiosity and a lack of other forms of diversion or occupation--the local population cannot venture into the Maoist-affected no-man's land outside the district headquarters and is more or less a captive audience--likely account for most of the turnout. GON efforts to portray the crowds as demonstrations of public preference for the monarch only serve to antagonize further the political parties. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) The wrangling between the parties and the Palace is all the more unseemly when viewed against the backdrop of an increasingly violent insurgency. The Maoists are obviously benefiting from the prolonged impasse; as long as the parties and Palace are fighting each other the counterinsurgency effort will be weakened. The parties' poor performance over the last decade has already diminished public confidence in their capabilities; an "active" King that cannot resolve the crisis either runs the same risk of tarnishing his image. For now most Nepalis seem to be questioning the personal abilities of their democratic leaders and their monarch, rather than the institutions of democracy and monarchy themselves. If the stalemate persists, however, this view may change. The failure of the constitutional forces to resolve their differences in the interests of the nation over the past month can do more to undermine popular faith in multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy than all the Maoist propaganda of the past eight years. The sporadic calls for a republic notwithstanding, we believe the parties realize this and would welcome the chance to work out an accommodation with the Palace. The King, on the other hand, should realize that he needs the parties' support to procure a workable political settlement to the insurgency. Unfortunately, the harsh rhetoric and rigid public posturing on both sides make prospects for compromise increasingly dim. Helpful pressure from the international community might provide a face-saving deus ex machina to urge both sides out of their respective corners. -------------- PROPOSED TALKING POINTS -------------- ¶11. (C) As reported Ref F, the U.S., Indian and UK Ambassadors have decided to make another effort to urge the King and the parties toward reconciliation. The U.S. Ambassador could deliver the points as part of his farewell calls. Proposed talking points follow below: For the King: --As a good friend of Nepal, my government is gravely concerned by the deterioration in the political, economic and security situations in this country. --My government has provided substantially increased assistance to counter the insurgency and to improve the lives of the people here. The continued impasse between the Government and the political parties benefits the Maoists and does nothing to help the people. --We are concerned that the stalemate is undermining popular faith in both the constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy as institutions. --Resolving the impasse requires concessions and compromise on both sides. --The political parties' popular support should be reflected in a democratic government. --The parties have quietly indicated to us that they hope to resume dialogue with you. --We hope you will engage with the parties soon to resolve this deadlock for the good of the country. For the Parties: --As a good friend of Nepal, my government is gravely concerned by the deterioration in both the political and security situations in this country. --We are concerned that the stalemate is undermining popular faith in both the constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy as institutions. --Continued protests increase the risk of violence and offer the Maoists an easy foothold for their own anti-democratic purposes. --Resolving the impasse requires concessions and compromise on both sides. --Forging consensus among yourselves as party leaders is crucial. --We encourage you to resume dialogue with the Palace for the good of the country. MALINOWSKI