BHUTANESE REFUGEES: MILITANCY IN CAMPS GROWS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000594



SIPDIS



DEPT FOR SA/INS, PRM/ANE; LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY; NSC FOR

MILLARD; GENEVA FOR PLYNCH



E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2014

TAGS: PREF, PTER, NP, BH, Bhutanese Refugees

SUBJECT: BHUTANESE REFUGEES: MILITANCY IN CAMPS GROWS



Classified By: DCM Robert K. Boggs for reasons 1.5 (b,d).



1. (S) Summary. According to Bhutanese refugee human rights

leader, Ratan Gazmere (please protect),the newly-elected

camp secretaries and many refugee youth are now advocating

taking up arms against the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB)

and are requesting financial "donations" to purchase arms and

ammunition for the movement. The relationship between the

camp secretaries, political parties, and radical

organizations remains unclear, although some connections

apparently exist. The growth of militancy in the refugee

camps, a dangerous response to years of frustration and

repeated disappointments, will seriously hurt the refugees'

chances at repatriation. At the same time, nascent militancy

increases the urgency of resolving this long-standing issue.

End Summary.



(S) On March 31, UNHCR Protection Officer Giulia Ricciarelli

(please protect) expressed "extreme concern" over reports

that newly-elected leaders in all seven Bhutanese refugee

camps in eastern Nepal are advocating a militant solution to

the refugee problem. On March 29, Ricciarelli met with

refugee leader Ratan Gazmere (please protect),who had just

returned from Jhapa District in eastern Nepal where he had

attended a meeting on March 27 called by the seven camp

secretaries. (Note. In late February, Camp Management



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Committee elections were held in each of the 7 camps. End

Note.) According to Ricciarelli, Gazmere indicated that, at

the meeting, the camp secretaries and unidentified refugee

youths threatened him and other leaders of refugee-run NGOs

with a 7-day ultimatum for providing financial support to the

Bhutanese Democratic Liberation Force (BDLF) for the purchase

of arms and ammunition to be used against the Bhutanese

government. After ascertaining its purpose, Gazmere

reportedly attempted to walk out of the meeting, but was

prevented from doing so. He is now "in hiding," Ricciarelli

said. On March 31, PolOff spoke by telephone with Gazmere

and received a similar account.



2. (S) On April 1, PolOff obtained a copy of the letter given

to Gazmere by a group of five young men who followed him home

from the March 27 meeting. The letterhead reads "Bhutan

Democratic Liberation Front" and "Sarpang, Bhutan." The

poorly-worded letter, signed by Bishal Rana, President of the

BDLF, contains the following excerpts.



BEGIN EXCERPTS



"The BDLF in the form of political organization was put

forward by the handful of cadres, very much exploited,

patriotic and sacrificing with the view of establishing

democracy in Bhutan. We believe that success comes after

action. We believe in deeds than in words. Therefore, we

spent our precious four years of time in providing training

to our 35 cadres.



Now the crucial hour has come for steps. The already set 200

cadres on training need to be facilitated with provisions and

arms and ammunitions until the completion of their training.



As such, I would cordially like to request you to extend the

support of NRs (handwritten) 50,000 (Fifty Thousand only) to

enhance our program."



END EXCERPTS



3. (S) On March 29, PolOff received an email, which was also

addressed to UNHCR, from an anonymous individual reporting on

the March 27 meeting in Jhapa. Similar to Gazmere's account,

the author complained that at least two of the camp

secretaries, who are prohibited from political affiliation,



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are in fact active members of the Bhutan People's Party

(BPP). (Note. The Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB)

reportedly branded the BPP as a "terrorist" organization

after the party led mass demonstrations against the

government in 1989-1990. End Note.) The author noted that

the camp secretaries are "overlooking the problems of the

camps" and "holding meetings camp by camp to incite people,

especially the youth, for armed struggle inside Bhutan."



4. (S) Ricciarelli has tasked the senior protection officer

in UNHCR's field office in Jhapa District with corroborating

Gazmere's account. She added that UNHCR Country Director

Abraham Abraham was currently in Jhapa and would discuss this

issue with Government of Nepal officials and the refugees.

Fearing the repercussions of increased militancy in the camps

on UNHCR and the bilateral process, Ricciarelli noted that

many refugees have expressed dissatisfaction with UNHCR's

plans to phase-out care and maintenance in the camps and have

suggested that, as a result, they may have to "take their

lives into their own hands."



5. (S) Connections between the camp secretaries and the

Bhutanese Democratic Liberation Front (BDLF) remain unclear.

The BDLF has in the past year distributed flyers in the camps

and, according to the letter, claims to have been training

militant cadre over the past four years. Connections between

BDLF and the Bhutanese Communist Party (BCP) -- a group that

allegedly has ties with Nepal's Maoists -- are also unknown.

In an earlier meeting with refugee leader S.B. Subba, PolOff

learned that the BCP has been recruiting and now allegedly

has 2,000 - 4,000 supporters in the refugee camps. Although

neither of these organizations is based in the camps,

Ricciarelli suspects that many refugee youths who are absent

from the camps have joined one of the two movements. Both

Gazmere and the anonymous author indicated that some of the

camp secretaries have ties with the Bhutan People's Party

(BPP). Ricciarelli has also heard allegations that the BPP

has ties to the BDLF, although she has also heard that the

BDLF has threatened and attempted to extort money from BPP

leaders.



6. (S) Comment. The rise of militancy within the ranks of

democratically-elected leaders -- who in theory have

broad-based support -- in the Bhutanese refugee camps, if

true, could have grave repercussions on finding a durable

solution for this refugee problem. We give credence to

Gazmere's assertion that the secretaries do not have wide

support among the refugees, but were elected through bribery,

intimidation and political machinations.) Although this is

the first time that open advocacy of armed struggle has

arisen in the camps, we have witnessed growing discontent and

radicalization over the past 9 months -- since the May 2003

announcement of Khundunabari Camp's verification results,

followed by the rejection of appeals and repeated delays in

repatriation, and finally the harsh conditions described by

Bhutanese officials in December 2003.



7. (S) Comment Continued. The degree and level of support in

the camps for an armed struggle against Bhutan remains

unclear. The possible connection between UNHCR's

announcement of phased withdrawal from the camps to growing

discontent and increased activism is further reason for UNHCR

to amend its position and reassure the refugees that they

will not be abandoned. The specter of radicalism in the

camps will have a very negative impact on the RGOB's

willingness to repatriate a significant number of refugees.

However, the prospect also increases the necessity for

Bhutan's friends, but especially India, to urge Bhutan to

move quickly to begin repatriation and resolve this

potentially explosive issue. End Comment.

MALINOWSKI