NEPAL: INFO MINISTER MOHSIN ON THE PEACE PROCESS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001758 SIPDIS LONDON FOR BELL INR FOR JNOYON E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2014 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KMDR PINS NP GON SUBJECT: NEPAL: INFO MINISTER MOHSIN ON THE PEACE PROCESS, BLOCKADE REF: A. KATHMANDU 1745 ¶B. KATHMANDU 1698 ¶C. KATHMANDU 1688 ¶D. KATHMANDU 1667 ¶E. KATHMANDU 1658 ¶F. KATHMANDU 1644 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ======= SUMMARY ======= ¶1. (C) Minister of Information and Communication Mohammad Mohsin outlined for the Ambassador on August 31 the structure of the newly-announced Peace Secretariat. Mohsin hoped the new body would help prepare the government for any eventual peace process with the Maoists, as well as build trust between and among the parties, the palace and civil society. Mohsin was flabbergasted by the international reporting of the "blockade" of Kathmandu (reftels). END SUMMARY. =============================== PEACE SECRETARIAT AND PROSPECTS =============================== ¶2. (C) Just after briefing the press on the structure of Nepal's new Peace Secretariat on August 31, Minister for Information and Communication Mohammad Mohsin told the Ambassador that he was hopeful that the new body would help rebuild trust in Nepal's political landscape. Lamenting the state of the relationship between the palace, parties and civil society, Mohsin emphasized the need for the political forces to unify, to trust each other, and to solve the country's most important issue, the insurgency. The new peace structure would have a political committee (to include the Prime Minister, Mohsin and the heads of the other three parties in the coalition -- M.K. Nepal, Pashupati Rana, Badri Prasad Mandal),but the secretariat itself would be led by Nepal's Chief Secretary (the country's most senior civil servant). The four political parties would also give policy advice to the political committee through a separate channel. Sub-committees of the Peace Secretariat would include constitutional law experts, security and conflict management experts and civil society members, along with a policy analysis division, a conflict victims' relief and rehabilitation division and a peace talks assistance division. ¶3. (C) Prospects for successful peace talks with the Maoists were less clear, Mohsin believed. It seemed as if the political wing of the Maoists might be ready to talk, but it was unclear if the Maoist military commanders would accept compromise. After all, the Maoists wanted to create a one-party state, and the government was unwilling to give up on democracy. Moreover, Mohsin added, while the ultimate role of the monarchy might be less than clear, at this point in its history, Nepal needed the King as a symbol and force for unity. Musing on possible paths to peace, Mohsin mentioned that the GON might be willing to accept UN mediation, but not until the Maoists demonstrated that they were serious about peace, by forswearing violence and giving up their arms. ============================= BLOCKADE?? WHERE'S THE BEEF? ============================= ¶4. (C) Mohsin expressed his surprise at the exaggeration by the foreign media of the Maoist "blockade" of Kathmandu. Explaining that he had done everything he could to convince the journalists of the reality in Kathmandu over the period (that there were no physical roadblocks, that the army had given convoy protection for trucks and buses),the Minister mentioned that he had even taken a call from the New York Times and invited them to send a team to Kathmandu to verify his information. Still, he explained, despite his best efforts, the foreign media, including the Indian media, had misread reality. Actually, Mohsin argued, the "blockade" and the exaggeration by the foreign media created two significant benefits for the GON: first, the Nepali media reported the story accurately, which had built trust between them and the GON; and, secondly, the blockade, the over-reporting and the killing of journalist Dekendra Raj Thapa (murdered after several months in Maoist detention) had built a sense of solidarity between the GON and the local media against the Maoists. In any case, Mohsin added, if American media visited Nepal, he would gladly meet with them. ======= COMMENT ======= ¶5. (C) Mohsin, the senior of two palace appointees in the cabinet (and only Muslim),is an important and influential figure, representing the King within the government. At first blush, the Peace Secretariat appears to contain the necessary elements to provide the government technical and policy information to prevent repeats of past mistakes. There was, perhaps, no way to avoid heavy involvement of the parties in the peace process. Fortunately, it appears that a structural wall will separate the political and technical sides. ¶6. (C) It is hard to disagree with the Minister's take on the foreign press coverage of the blockade. While the foreign media was discussing airlift operations or even foreign military intervention to "break the blockade," the Nepali media did a credible job of reporting the situation on the ground. As one Embassy interlocutor shrugged and explained, "It's hard to blame them (the foreign press). The last real siege they could report on was Stalingrad." END COMMENT. MORIARTY