NEPAL: CPN-UML GEN SEC MADHAV NEPAL ON POSSIBLE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001552

SIPDIS

NSC FOR GREEN/DORMANDY, LONDON FOR POL-GURNEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MOPS MARR NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: CPN-UML GEN SEC MADHAV NEPAL ON POSSIBLE
PEACE PROCESS, IRAQ

REF: KATHMANDU 1479

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons 1.4 (a, b, d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) During their first meeting on August 5, Madhav Kumar
Nepal, CPN-UML General Secretary, sought the Ambassador's
approval of secret exploratory peace talks in a third
country. The UML leader wants the King and parties to
present a unified front to the Maoists and determine Maoist
intentions. If the Maoists are not bona fide in the
negotiations, the government can expose that fact to the
people, according to Nepal. Elections may then still take
place. The Sec was negative about the prospect of Kathmandu
providing forces to protect U.N. troops in Iraq.

POSSIBLE PEACE TALKS
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2. (S) CPN-UML General Secretary Nepal briefed the
Ambassador on attempts by the Maoists, the palace and the
government to pursue secret talks in a third country. The
GenSec stated that peace talks should start soon, the sooner,
the better. He saw an eagerness on the part of the Maoists
to sit in a dialogue. The Maoists seem to be sincere about
the talks and have "packed their bags." Nepal expressed
frustration about the Prime Minister's delay in talking with
the King and getting the green light to begin talks.
Different party leaders should eventually be on the
government's team, Nepal stressed. He wants to get the
message out to the people that the government is really
starting to talk with the Maoists. He also wants to create
an atmosphere to put pressure on the Maoists to solve the
problem at the negotiating table. The GON needs to keep a
certain level of military pressure on the Maoists until they
realize they cannot win with guns and need to take
negotiations seriously, according to Nepal. If it turns out
there is no real desire on the part of the Maoists to succeed
at negotiations, that would be exposed during the course of
the talks. Nepal wants to make that clear to the people to
allay their suspicions of the government. At the same time,
he recognizes that the government needs to be cautious about
sharing what the government's bottom-line is; they would only
provide a general outline to the populace. The Ambassador
told Nepal that the USG has no objections to talks in a third
country and talks out of the limelight make sense. Likewise,
the US has no objection to any organization/individual/
country that can play a useful role in facilitating talks.


3. (C) The Ambassador asked Nepal about the role of the
National Congress (NC) party, and in particular, GP Koirala.
While wary about Koirala's role, Nepal emphasized the
necessity of a common understanding among all the legitimate
political forces. He said that even if Koirala did not join
the government, there should still be some joining together
for the peace process. He said the coalition partners need
to take Koirala into confidence and work in channels so they
can have a clear vision of the steps ahead.


4. (C) When dealing with an insurgency that has the goal of a
one-party country, there are some fundamental positions the
government must keep in mind, Nepal noted: no compromise on
multi-party democracy; no curtailment of people's rights;
some role for the King in a constitutional monarchy, and
retention of an open, pluralistic society. The Maoists would
need to agree on these positions for the talks to succeed.
Key to peace would be disarmament of the Maoists and the
reintegration and rehabilitation of the armed insurgents.

ELECTIONS
--------------


5. (C) Nepal laid out his vision of a possible way ahead if
the preliminary talks result in a certain framework for
future rounds. Before further talks, the coalition partners
would use roundtable conferences to engage with all elements
of Nepalese society. There would also be international
involvement, preferably the UN or other INGOs. Nepal
stressed that the Maoists would have to submit their arms
under the custody of the UN or other observers before the
formation of an interim government or holding of elections.
He indicated flexibility on constitutional issues - either a
constituent assembly or interim government or parliament
could amend the Constitution. But the process should not
trample over the Constitution. If a referendum were needed,
that would be acceptable. A series of elections would be
less expensive than the cost of the war.


6. (C) Agreeing with Nepal that the Maoists need to lay down
their arms to have free and fair elections, the Ambassador
asked what the UML people in the field believed were Maoist
intentions. Nepal admitted that there was not uniform
information. There seemed to be a split between the
political level, who wanted to go to a negotiated settlement
as a final solution, and the military level, who believed
they could win militarily and did not see a need to
compromise. They just wanted to continue to strengthen their
position. Nepal reiterated that after the armed wings were
decommissioned and demobilized a political solution would be
possible.

7. (C) The Ambassador asked Nepal about the PM's statement
that elections would be held next April even if there were no
agreement with the Maoists. Nepal replied that if the
government tried its best in the peace process, but the
Maoists were the hurdle, then there would be no other choice
but to have elections. But he restated his hope that the
Maoists were sincere about talks. He went on that if the
King were the hurdle to the peace process, then there would
be no elections because they would be meaningless. Nepal
expressed distrust regarding the intentions of both the King
and the Maoists. His main concern was retaining the
multi-party system, even if the King had to lose some of his
power and become a 21st century monarch.

PEACE BUREAU PLUS A PARALLEL MILITARY ADVISORY BODY
-------------- --------------


8. (C) The Ambassador and Nepal discussed how a Peace Bureau
could fit into the process. The Ambassador explained the US
wants to support a Peace Bureau that would be apolitical and
act as a thinktank to advise the politicians. Nepal accepted
the idea of a working secretariat composed of experts, but
thought there should also be a parallel advisory body that
would include representatives from the political parties.
The decision-makers would thus get an apolitical take and a
political take from party advisors.


9. (C) Nepal then suggested that the government needed
something similar to the Peace Bureau, but on the military
side. The country lacked an expert team that could analyze
events and assess incidents. He saw a need for an
organization similar to our J5 that focused on Strategy and
Plans, however, he saw it as having experts not only from the
RNA, but also the Armed Police Force, the civil police, and
intelligence. Nepal said that unlike the Peace Bureau, which
should be discussed in the press, this military body should
be kept quiet.

NEED FOR MILITARY REFORM
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10. (C) In addition to the military needing to incorporate
counter-guerilla warfare and tactics, Nepal stressed the need
for military reform. The RNA leadership needed to take
strong steps against those who had committed serious crimes;
rape being the most serious. Military personnel should be
publicly punished in such cases. To boost the morale of the
people, the RNA needed to take steps to show it was
addressing abuses. Nepal realized, however, the need to use
certain methods to extract information and saw some room for
maneuver in those cases.


NEGATIVE ON TROOPS FOR U.N. PROTECTION IN IRAQ
-------------- -


11. (C) The Ambassador pressed Nepal to support sending
Nepali troops to Iraq to protect the UN presence and help
stabilize Iraq. Nepal said that while he understood the US
desire to have many countries involved, Kathmandu had to
consider the serious crisis it is facing here. At this
stage, when people suspect that Nepal could become a failed
state, it would not be wise. He voiced an additional concern
that it would be hard to find consensus on this issue and
another controversy was not what the government needed now.
The Ambassador pushed back. Reminding him that Nepal has done
great service to the UN, the Ambassador said he would
appreciate the General Secretary keeping an open mind.


MORIARTY