NEPAL: DEUBA PLANS ELECTIONS ABOVE ALL ELSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001418 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SA/INS NSC FOR XDORMANDY E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2014 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS PREF NP GON SUBJECT: NEPAL: DEUBA PLANS ELECTIONS ABOVE ALL ELSE REF: A. KATHMANDU 1080 ¶B. STATE 153894 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. During their first meeting on July 23, Prime Minister Deuba reiterated to the Ambassador Nepal's gratitude to the U.S., and especially to President Bush, for supporting Nepal's development and counter-insurgency efforts. Deuba emphasized the need for a coalition of democratic forces, to include the palace, to force the Maoists into genuine negotiations. However, despite many in the Nepali Congress party wanting to join the government, Koirala would not, Deuba feared. Secret negotiations with the Maoists could occur but no ceasefire would be offered, and phased elections would go forward even absent an agreement with the Maoists. While personally in favor of a Royal Nepal Army force to protect the UN in Iraq, the PM said he needed cabinet consensus for an affirmative reply. Finally, Deuba affirmed the need for Indian help to send the Bhutanese refugees home "with dignity;" he likewise affirmed Nepal's continued policy to allow Tibetans refugees to transit to India. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) As he did when called upon by the Charge on June 10 (Ref A),Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba began his meeting with the Ambassador by warmly thanking the United States for its development and counter-insurgency support to Nepal. Deuba, in particular, singled out his 2002 Oval office meeting with President Bush where he had heard the President's views on violence, and stated, "I was really impressed by him." Deuba asked the Ambassador to convey to President Bush his warmest regards. (NOTE: Deuba is the only Nepali Prime Minister to have met an American President at the White House, a source of significant pride for Deuba, and an important event in recent Nepali political history. END NOTE.) =================================== INSURGENCY - DEUBA'S WAY FORWARD... =================================== ¶3. (C) The Prime Minister believed it was important for the political parties and the King to form a bloc with a consensus position to face the Maoist threat to Nepal. However, despite his many meetings with the leader of the Nepali Congress Party (NCP),Girija Prasad Koirala, and despite the desire of many "friends" in the NCP to join the government, it did not appear Koirala would allow the NCP to join. Meanwhile, Koirala's public statements regarding his interactions with the Maoists were "inconsistent," according to the Prime Minister. =============== NEGOTIATIONS... =============== ¶4. (C) Deuba noted he was working to form a bottom-line consensus position among the parties and the King so he could move forward to test the Maoists' seriousness about negotiations. International pressure on the Maoists from all quarters was important to prepare the ground for productive negotiations. Increased pressure on the Maoists by the Nepali security forces would also help. Meanwhile, the government was close to completing an MOU with the UN Commission on Human Rights as well, to deal transparently with human rights criticisms leveled at the GON and Nepali security forces. ¶5. (C) Multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy could not be up for negotiation, Deuba cautioned, or the King would not accept it. Moreover, the Maoist call for a constitutional assembly was also not acceptable to the King. Noting he was caught between the parties and the palace, Deuba stated a strong preference for secret negotiations, and insisted that a ceasefire, which would allow the Maoists to regroup as they had done during previous ceasefires, would not be called. Meanwhile, the government had budgeted for a "Peace Secretariat," intended to improve the institutional knowledge and negotiation techniques of the government should negotiations come to fruition. The Ambassador stated that the U.S. would help wherever possible, but urged that the Peace Secretariat be as "apolitical" as possible, to prevent it from becoming a political football of the parties. ============ ELECTIONS... ============ ¶6. (C) Dialogue with the Maoists was the priority, Deuba stated. Nevertheless, uncertain about whether the Maoists really meant to lay down their arms and give up their one-party state vision meant the government must prepare for elections, peace or no peace. Repeating the Natwar Singh mantra of, "If elections could go forward in Kashmir, why not here?" Deuba stated he planned to talk to the security forces to develop a plan for phased elections starting no later than April 2005. Agreeing that the Maoists would try to prevent free elections from occuring, Deuba believed that security could be provided that would allow people to feel safe to vote freely. In any case, he noted, without an elected parliament it made no sense to have a Prime Minister. ==== IRAQ ==== ¶7. (C) Deuba stated that he was personally in favor of a Nepali Army force to help protect the UN in Iraq, but he would have to have consensus agreement in the cabinet for the decision to go forward. He would raise it in the cabinet, but also asked Ambassador Moriarty to help push a positive decision with the Prime Minister's coalition partners, especially the UML party members. (NOTE: The Ambassador will meet with the senior UML-party member of the government, Deputy Prime Minister/Finance Minister Bharat Mohan Adhikari, on July 26. END NOTE.) ======== REFUGEES ======== ¶8. (C) Deuba insisted that Nepal wanted to see the Bhutanese refugees return home to Bhutan "with dignity." To that end, the GON would do whatever it could to move the process forward. However, Indian encouragement of the GOB would help. Turning to Tibetan refugees, Ambassador Moriarty raised the importance of Nepali border officials being clearly informed of Nepal's "Gentleman's Agreement" to allow Tibetan refugees to safely transit to India. Deuba agreed, adding that GON officials should already know correct procedures. Despite pressure from China, Deuba insisted, Nepal was working in close cooperation with UNHCR. ======= COMMENT ======= ¶9. (C) Deuba, having successfully formed a four-party coalition government, now faces the difficult task of creating consensus between the member-parties and the palace, in an environment where little trust exists. While Deuba focuses on phased elections in a seriously questionable security environment, many other actors, such as the CPN-UML, appear solely focused on participating in talks with the Maoists in hopes of winning the role as successful peacemaker. While free and fair elections are unlikely to be attainable, all indications are that until the Maoists face more serious threats to their own well-being and ability to influence in Nepal, negotiations are also likely to be nothing more than a dead end. ¶10. (C) It was heartening to hear Deuba's reactions on both refugee communities in Nepal. Despite external pressures, the GON does appear committed to walking a tightrope between the West and China on the Tibetans; unfortunately, as with so many things in Nepal, a gap exists between the government's intentions and the practical realities on the ground. END COMMENT. MORIARTY