INDONESIAN DEFMIN SUDARSONO ON EAST TIMOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 012319


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2009
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PHUM TT ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN DEFMIN SUDARSONO ON EAST TIMOR
ACCOUNTABILITY, MILITARY REFORM

Classified By: AMBASSADOR B. LYNN PASCOE. REASON: 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary. In a December 13 introductory call by the
Ambassador, Indonesian Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono said
the GOI was working on a proposal to form a Commission for
Humanitarian Reconciliation to address human rights
violations perpetrated in East Timor in 1999. The commission
would consist of representatives of the GOI and East Timor,
with the possibility of United Nations participation.
Sudarsono candidly addressed the challenges he faced in
imposing civilian control over the Indonesian military and
bringing the military's revenues on-budget. End summary.


2. (C) Minister Sudarsono noted that in a 1997 trip to
Washington, he had given a speech at Georgetown University
entitled "Managing the Strained U.S.-Indonesian Bilateral
Relationship." The theme was still relevant. Ambassador
Pascoe replied that in general, Washington perceptions of
Indonesia were straightforward: the U.S. recognizes the
importance of a stable and prosperous Indonesia to the
Southeast Asia, and the significance of Indonesia as a large
and successful Islamic democracy. However, the U.S. has two
requirements for normalized military-to-military relations:
accountability for the East Timor human rights violations in
1999, and transparency in the military budget. Ambassador
noted that it was difficult to provide assistance to an
organization whose real budget and needs are unknown.

East Timor Accountability
--------------

3. (C) Sudarsono said he had recently met with President
Yudhoyono and Foreign Minister Wirajuda to discuss East Timor
accountability. The GOI, he said, was seeking a "legally
sound and practically feasible" approach to the problem, and
is now considering forming a bi-national humanitarian
reconciliation commission with members of the East Timor
government and perhaps some representation by the United
Nations. Sudarsono conceded that the Indonesian judicial
system could not meet international standards of credibility
on human rights issues due to administrative, logistical, and
financial shortcomings. These had resulted in bad verdicts
in human rights cases in East Timor and Aceh. Moreover,
witnesses were often uncooperative due to their fear of
judges and prosecutors. Sudarsono noted that any intended
inquiry into East Timor would face vociferous opposition in
parliament (DPR). Ambassador suggested that a UN role on the
commission would be appropriate, given the promise by
Indonesia to the UN that it would maintain the security of
the 1999 referendum. He said he understood that any
commission had to be pitched to the DPR as helping Indonesia
overcome its own concerns about 1999.

TNI Transparency
--------------

4. (C) Turning to TNI reform, Sudarsono said that although
the new military law foresaw a five-year period for bringing
all military revenues on-budget, he thought that eight years
was a more practical timeframe. He said that the GOI had
taken a comparative approach to the issue, looking at how
China, Thailand, the Philippines, India, and Pakistan had
dealt with the matter. Sudarsono said he hoped to secure
"fast-track" authority from the Ministry of Finance to
convert larger TNI-owned business into "semi-state-owned
enterprises" with the government as a partial shareholder.
Over the longer term, the TNI's budget must be increased to
make up for the resulting shortfalls in revenues. Ambassador
Pascoe noted that presenting a credible plan for military
budget transparency and beginning its implementation would be
very helpful in assuaging concerns about the TNI's budget
process.


5. (C) Procurement, Sudarsono said, was another challenge.
Unlike in the past, there are now many in the military with
the ability to make procurement deals, creating "a room with
many doors." Many up-and-coming younger officers now were
eager to take advantage of these lucrative opportunities. He
was working to bring this process under control.

Civilian Control Over the Military
--------------

6. (C) Sudarsono turned to the challenge of consolidating
civilian control over the military. Indonesia had a
successful election, but is still in the process of
transition to democracy. The civilian government would have
to put its house in order before it could establish supremacy
over the military. Although he had a "road map" to complete
this over a three to four year period, the task might require
fifteen years, he said. It was difficult, he noted, to "add
substance to the notion of democratic accountability."
Resistance on the part of the Army was particularly stiff, he
said. Dealing with the other services, he said, was somewhat
easier. Part of the problem, Sudarsono noted, was that both
the Minister of Defense and the Commander of the Armed Forces
sat in the Cabinet on an equal legal basis. Moreover, while
the President had direct authority over deployment, the
Minister's authority was confined to "coordinating control"
over budgetary, strategic, and logistical matters. He said
he was working with his friends in the DPR to amend the
recently passed TNI law to strengthen civilian control.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) Sudarsono candidly outlined the challenges he faces in
consolidating civilian control over the military and bringing
its revenues on budget. In both instances, he freely
acknowledged the formidable hurdles posed by ingrained
institutional culture and generational attitudes, and
conceded that the time frames designated in the TNI bill
might not be adequate. On East Timor accountability, we are
encouraged by Sudarsono's willingness to break from the
oft-heard official insistence on purely national or bilateral
mechanisms and his implicit acknowledgement that the GOI must
seek a new way to meet international standards of
accountability. This was in contrast to the Coordinating
Minister for Policy, Legal and Security Affairs later the
same day (septel). End comment.


PASCOE