CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: PRESIDENTIAL CHIEF OF STAFF

C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 001288 SIPDIS FOR EUR DAS CONLEY FROM THE AMBASSADOR E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2014 TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC PHUM CH FI EUN SUBJECT: CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: PRESIDENTIAL CHIEF OF STAFF AGREES THAT CALL TO HALONEN WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED REF: A. HELSINKI 1281 ¶B. STATE 208511 Classified By: Ambassador Earle I. Mack for Reasons 1.4(B) and (D) ¶1. (C) I spoke today with Jaakko Kalela, President Halonen's chief of staff. I noted news reports over the past few days that a cache of weapons, mostly handguns, had been seized in Finland. Just today Finnish customs officials have reported that these weapons were transiting Finland, from China to Estonia. I told Kalela that if the EU's China Arms Embargo were lifted, with a consequent increase in the arms trade with China, we might very well see more such incidents. I also stressed the negative effect lifting the embargo would have on regional stability in East Asia, especially if tensions increase in the run-up to Taiwan's elections. Lifting the embargo now would be seen as a validation of China's human rights policy, or at least a sign that the EU believes the policy is headed in the right direction. ¶2. (C) Kalela told me he agreed conceptually with the points I had made. He said, however, that the Finns believe the embargo has become outmoded, and something updated should take its place. I replied that we do not believe the 1998 Code of Conduct is enforceable, and do not believe it could be made effective. I underlined that lifting the embargo would evoke a very negative reaction in the U.S., including on the Hill. Kalela assured me he does not want to see a strain of that sort in the trans-Atlantic relationship. In any case, he said, he did not think any substantive action would take place at the upcoming GAERC meeting. He assumes the Ministers will defer this for later action. ¶3. (C) I mentioned my conversation with Under Secretary Laajava (Ref A); Kalela said he was aware of it. I used that opportunity to mention that Laajava had suggested a call from the Secretary to President Halonen may help make the case for retaining the embargo. I asked Kalela for his advice regarding such a call. I said we would not want to embarrass President Halonen by putting her in a position where she would be uncomfortable with the call. Kalela in response was a bit more positive than Laajava, who had been a touch guarded about the merits of such a call. Kalela said he thought a call from the Secretary would be well received, although -- like Laajava -- he did not want to guarantee that it would change Finnish views. ¶4. (C) We still have the sense that the Finns would prefer to see the embargo lifted, but would not take the lead for doing so. There have been times in the past, however (such as the ICC debate in 2002),when they have been strong advocates within the EU for working with the U.S. to find an outcome acceptable to all. It might be worthwhile for the Secretary to telephone Tarja Halonen and ask for her assistance in this case. MACK