ZIMBABWE AND THE SADC ELECTION AGENDA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001313 SIPDIS NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVELLE, D. TEITELBAUM LONDON FOR C. GURNEY PARIS FOR C. NEARY NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2009 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ZI SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE AND THE SADC ELECTION AGENDA REF: (A) PRETORIA 3339 (B) HARARE 1250 (C) HARARE 1157 (D) HARARE 1067 (E) HARARE 751 Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5 b/d ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A proliferation of meetings relating to election standards in the run-up to next month's scheduled SADC summit in part reflects Zimbabwean and regional efforts to lower domestic and international tensions associated with Zimbabwe's political crisis. Central to the effort are draft "SADC Principles and Guidlines Governing Democratic Elections", which draw from a host of other sources. The latest draft (faxed to AF/S) is very general in terms of affirmative responsibilities imposed on member governments and lacks specific prescriptions for correcting gross imbalances in Zimbabwe's electoral playing field. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) According to press reports, SADC foreign and defense ministers approved principles for free and fair elections at a two-day meeting that ended July 23 in Sun City, South Africa. The document reportedly would be forwarded to heads of state for adoption at the SADC summit scheduled to be held next month in Mauritius. ¶3. (U) The Sun City gathering followed on the heels of the sixth general meeting of the SADC Election Commission Forum (ECF) in Victoria Falls earlier that week. In an address to the conference given front page coverage by the official media, President Mugabe emphasized that democracy "could not be transplanted from one country to another because each had its own distinct historical, cultural and socio-economic conditions." He warned against being misled by Western countries and urged SADC members not to accept foreign funds for election administration. He reportedly maintained that elections alone were not sufficient in developing democracy because although they could contribute to conflict resolution, they could also exacerbate conflict. "Does democracy exist when powerful nations seek to influence political events in our countries by supporting opposition parties or by deliberately sowing seeds of discontent? Does unconstitutional regime change constitute a democratic process?", he asked the conference. Press reports indicate that the meeting addressed the possible establishment of a 
permanent ECF secretariat to replace the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA),a donor-funded body that currently serves as an interim secretariat. ¶4. (U) On August 2-3 in Victoria Falls, EISA and the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) will sponsor a conference "Regional Initiatives for Electoral Reform in SADC: Strengthening Democratic Transformation Through Identified Benchmarks in the Region." The event is scheduled to be opened by Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Patrick Chinamasa, with the keynote addresses to be delivered by Speaker of the Parliament Emmerson Mnangagwa and Speaker of the Lesotho National Assembly Nthloi Motsamai. The conference program is slated to feature sessions on electoral processes in the SADC region, existing benchmarks for elections in the region, best practices, and electoral reforms. Polchief and USAID Mission Director plan to attend the EISA/ZESN event. ¶5. (SBU) We have not seen a copy of the instrument approved by ministers in Sun City but have obtained a copy of the "2nd zero draft 9 June 2004" that we understand served as the departure point for discussions in Sun City. We are unaware of significant changes made to the document or of the focal points of debate there. The draft is notable for the brevity of obligations placed on member states in the conduct of elections. In Section Two, members pledge to adhere to seven "principles": full participation of the citizens in the political process; freedom of association; political tolerance; equal opportunity for all political parties to access the state media; equal opportunity to exercise the right to vote and be voted for; independence of the judiciary and impartiality of the electoral institutions; and voter education. Section 5.4 commits member states to "safeguard the human and civil liberties of all citizens including the freedom of movement, assembly, association, expression, and campaigning." The instrument elaborates on obligations and treatment of election monitors and observers but on its face only contemplates monitoring/observation by SADC. Indeed, the document devotes more space to constraints governing monitoring/observation of elections than it does to member state obligations in the conduct of elections. The instrument stands in stark contrast to the SADC-Parliamentary Forum's "Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region", a much lengthier document that contained much more detailed prescriptions on how member states were to achieve free and fair elections. Signed on behalf of Zimbabwe by Speaker Mnangagwa, the SADC-PF norms and standards have since been vehemently rejected by the GOZ as an instrument of neo-colonialists and imperialist puppets (ref E). ¶6. (C) According to ZESN Chairperson Reginald Matchaba-Hove, the new SADC principles were drawn from the SADC-PF document, the Principles of Election Management, Monitoring, and Observation (PEMMO) instrument adopted by SADC election commissions last November, and related AU principles. He indicated that South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania had been most engaged in the drafting of the new instrument. ¶7. (C) Matchaba-Hove confirmed that the GOZ had been closely engaged in the SADC deliberative process. His own communications with Chinamasa had suggested that the GOZ wanted to stake out a fairly maximalist position on domestic electoral reforms in "testing the waters" but intended to have them align at least nominally with SADC principles. He said that Mugabe clearly was opposed to reforms, but had been pushed effectively by SADC counterparts and ZANU-PF "mavericks", such as Mnangagwa, Party Secretary for Information Nathan Shamuyarira, and Politburo member Dumiso Dabengwa. (Note: These three "mavericks" are all old guard, but are motivated in part by a desire to reduce Zimbabwe's isolation and to counter the influence of younger hard-liners (i.e. Information Minister Jonathan Moyo) who currently share Mugabe's confidence and more repressive inclinations. End note.) ¶8. (C) According to Matchaba-Hove, both the SADC standards and Zimbabwe's reforms were still being worked out. SADC's Section Two principles could be expanded further before the Mauritius Summit. Nonetheless, it was critical that the benchmarks not be set high enough to scare off the GOZ or other more reticent members. Better to have a generally framed document that could be fleshed out and strengthened over time. ¶9. (C) As to the GOZ's proposed electoral reforms, Matchaba-Hove said they represented meaningful improvements, althought they did not yet address fundamental issues such as media access, unobstructed campaigning, and political violence. Of concern even on their own limited terms, the electoral reforms did not encompass delimitation, and did not include mechanisms to assure the true independence of the election commission. He thought these issues were negotiable. He urged the USG to be encouraging in its public assessments of the SADC principles and proposed GOZ electoral reforms, while recognizing the need to address the fundamental election environment issues. ¶10. (C) Matchaba-Hove indicated that the scope of outside observers was also open for discussion; Chinamasa had told him it would be decided by the independent election commission. (Note: This coincides with what Mnangagwa told us and contradicts suggestions by Mugabe and Politburo member Didymus Mutasa that the election would be closed to Western eyes (ref C). End note.) Matchaba-Hove noted that the likelihood that the proposed reforms would require a constitutional amendment offered the opposition MDC potentially significant leverage, which it could exploit to wrest concessions from the ruling party. (Note: MDC sources have advised that Chinamasa had approached MDC Secretary-General to enlist support for SIPDIS passage/implementation of electoral reforms. End note.) ¶11. (C) COMMENT: The GOZ and its fellow SADC members share an interest in regularizing Zimbabwe's relations with the outside world. The prospective conduct of Zimbabwe's parliamentary election in accordance with SADC standards for now is a central means to this end -- in large part through an exercise in image management. From the perspective of the GOZ and its sympathizers in the region, the establishment of relatively easy benchmarks is crucial: first, to assure GOZ accession, and next, to offer prospects of an an election that can be judged somewhat positively, if not completely. Our assessment continues to be that the ruling party will not concede anything that will meaningfully reduce its control over the March election results, notwithstanding its interest in burnishing its image abroad and in offering SADC cover to recognize the election results. We recognize some potential utility in getting the GOZ to accede to a set of meaningful standards but foresee risk in a scenario that offers the region cover to approve what is expected to be a sham election regardless of conformity to some SADC standards. We would welcome reports from other SADC capitals on host governments' objectives, expectations, and engagement on the SADC election standards and Zimbabwe. ¶12. (C) COMMENT (CONT'D): The GOZ's electoral reform strategy is related to the NGO Bill currently under discussion (ref B). Some observers characterize the NGO Bill as the means by which the GOZ would negate any balancing effect putatively afforded by electoral reforms. In fact, the NGO Bill conforms to the GOZ's well-documented comprehensive effort to hamstring or eliminate all sources of dissent in the country; the reforms may serve as no more than window dressing or distraction. The NGO and diplomatic communities here are energized and coordinating significantly on both issues. We understand that they will be engaging their counterparts in other SADC countries. The NGO Bill has not been officially released and circulated, so official comment on it would be premature. However, we will be working with NGOs, diplomats and the local UNDP office to convey concern about the apparent direction of events and to seek to nip the bill's progress in the bud. WEISENFELD