STAFFDEL VISIT ILLUMINATES ELECTION REFORMS,

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 HARARE 001157 SIPDIS SENSITIVE NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVELLE, D. TEITELBAUM LONDON FOR C. GURNEY PARIS FOR C. NEARY NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER ¶E. O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ZI VIP SUBJECT: STAFFDEL VISIT ILLUMINATES ELECTION REFORMS, ATMOSPHERICS REF: (A) HARARE 1110 (B) HARARE 1067 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Staffdel comprised of Majority Professional Staffperson Joan Condon and Democratic Party Professional Staffperson Pearl-Alice Marsh of the House International Relations Committee and USAID Congressional Liaison Susan Williams met with a host of interlocutors during a June 29-July 5 visit to Zimbabwe. GOZ officials charted parameters of recently proposed electoral reforms but were vague on how such reforms might address difficult issues such as politically motivated violence and access to media. Opposition MDC leaders and representatives of civil society generally recognized that the proposed reforms offered some opportunity for positive change but were pessimistic on prospects for adjusting fundamental flaws in electoral environment and administration. ACTION REQUEST follows in paragraph 32. END SUMMARY. Election Commissioner: Unresolved Issues -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In a meeting in his office June 30, Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) Chairman Sobuza Gula-Ndebele told the staffdel that he had yet to see a formal draft of the proposed electoral reforms reportedly approved by the ZANU-PF Central Committee June 25 (reftel). However, he said that he had been told that the approved version adopted in most respects confidential recommendations made by the ESC. The elements reported in the official press substantiated this. He noted that his commission had recommended the Chief Election Officer be appointed by an independent body, not the president as reportedly designated in the reported reform package. He predicted this would be the source of additional debate, and asserted that in any event the integrity of the appointment(s) could overcome the manner of selection if tenure and resources were secure. ¶3. (SBU) Gula-Ndebele confirmed that the changes were expected to be implemented in time for parliamentary elections currently scheduled for March. Timing would present a quandary, however - a constitutional amendment would be required in order to establish a truly independent commission with powers contemplated by the reported reforms. Passing the law and effecting a constitutional amendment in 
time to prepare for an election by March would be "a tall order" regardless of political will. He was unaware of a set date for implementation but had heard it would be in August. Difficulties might require postponement of the election by a few months, a delay to which the parties might agree. He said study was being given to establishment of a new commission under existing law, but such an approach would be "untidy" and could yield a commission of inadequate authority and compromised independence. ¶4. (SBU) The Chairman emphasized that sanction power reportedly being accorded the new commission would distinguish it positively from his ESC. He said that the new commission could pursue complaints filed by any party or pursue matters on its own initiative. The Chief Election Officer would have administrative authority but could not overturn any decision of the commission, which would report to the Parliament, not the President. He expected that the new commission would be able to draw from a range of sanctions, including "deduction of votes" for violations by a party. He said that announced electoral reforms did not explicitly address "environmental" issues such as suppression of political violence and access to media but asserted that the new commission would have authority to act on such issues. The Chairman said he favored as inclusive an approach as possible with respect to international observers, although he conceded that others in the GOZ disagreed. He noted that deep ruling party suspicion of donor-funded NGOs was driving efforts to consolidate voter education efforts under supervision by the ESC or a new commission. ¶5. (SBU) According to Gula-Ndebele, the new commission would still have to rely on police to carry out some of its enforcement orders. He expected that electoral courts mentioned in media reports would likely not be standing courts but would be composed of existing High Court and/or Supreme Court judges and sit on an ad hoc basis. Commitment of adequate resources to support operation of the contemplated mechanisms would be a key test of the government's political will and central to their effectiveness. ¶6. (SBU) Gula-Ndebele lamented Zimbabwe's highly polarized political climate, for which he asserted each party bore its share of blame. He expressed hope that the parties, civil society and the international community would give the new commission a fair chance to gain the confidence of all. Mutasa: No American Observers (and an Aside on Food) -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) In a July 2 meeting in his office at ZANU-PF Party Headquarters (where he is Party Secretary for External Affairs) Minister for Anti-Corruption and Anti-Monopolies Didymus Mutasa underscored the great attention being given electoral reforms by the party leadership. He did not elaborate on details of the reforms but advised that they would be consistent with African standards. ¶8. (SBU) The Minister asserted that Zimbabwe was one of the most democratic of African nations by any standard and criticized the USG for applying a double standard against Zimbabwe. He noted that the same day the USG condemned a Zimbabwean parliamentary by-election (Zengeza) during which one person was killed, it accepted the results of a Nigerian election in which more than two hundred reportedly were killed. Mutasa said that Zimbabwean voters had "wised up" to the opposition's ineffectualness and subservience to the West and predicted a clean sweep for the ruling party in free and fair elections in March. ¶9. (SBU) Mutasa reported that the GOZ no longer intended to submit its elections to Western scrutiny and would not include "British and Americans" among those invited to observe its March elections. He proffered an article that reported U.S. senators calling for regime change in Zimbabwe as evidence of malign USG intentions. When pressed by Marsh on the issue of American observers, he chuckled that he would make an exception only for her. ¶10. (SBU) When questioned about Zimbabwe's food security, Mutasa said that the GOZ was confident it had enough production to meet domestic demand for food. He conceded that estimates could prove wrong, however, and urged that the international community be prepared to respond quickly should the country later find itself unable to meet its food needs. The Speaker: Give New Commission a Chance -------------- ¶10. (SBU) At a meeting July 5 in his office at ZANU-PF Headquarters (where he is Party Secretary for Administration),Speaker of the Parliament Emmerson Mnangagwa opened with a long and familiar exposition on the history of land reform and bilateral relations. He acknowledged that "mistakes had been made" in the implementation of land reform but that the GOZ was working hard to redress injustices and maladministration identified by the Utete Commission report. The country was not in the process of consolidating gains and focusing on restoring production levels through support to new farmers. ¶11. (SBU) Turning to elections, Mnangagwa emphasized that Zimbabwe had always conducted its elections in timely manner and accordance with the Constitution. He conceded that the MDC had presented ZANU-PF with a serious challenge in the last national parliamentary elections but that the ruling party had responded well. After recovering four parliamentary seats in by-elections since then, the party was confident it would do better this time. Blair's statement on the floor of Parliament that exposed his government's collaboration with the MDC would hurt the opposition's prospects. Mnangagwa asserted that reversal of the country's economic decline would further boost the ruling party's prospects. ¶12. (SBU) The Speaker briefly described anticipated electoral reforms that were consistent with the package described by Gula-Ndebele. He said that the government had adopted the proposals, which would be forwarded to the appropriate parliamentary portfolio committee before being considered by the full legislature. The committee would conduct public hearings on the proposals, on which all stakeholders would get an opportunity to offer input. ¶13. (SBU) Mnangagwa conceded that there had been security problems in the conduct of some elections, particularly since the rise of the opposition in the late 1990's. Even so, elections were much more peaceful than those in the early days of independence. He expressed confidence that electoral reforms would address such problems. The independent election commission would deal with environmental issues like media access and an election court would thresh out disputes fairly and quickly. He urged that the new system be given a chance. He observed that many Zimbabwean families had members from both major parties and predicted that Zimbabwe would eventually achieve a non- polarized polity like America's, given time. Opposition: Borrowed Election Reforms Inadequate -------------- --- ¶14. (SBU) In a July 1 meeting in the Ambassador's office, MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai and Deputy Secretary General Gift Chimanikire briefed the staffdel on the opposition's situation and posture with respect to elections. Tsvangirai judged that the election's outcome was predetermined, regardless of reforms. The imploding economy, a compromised judiciary, inadequate access to media, and a government defiant to national and international opinion stacked the deck against the MDC. ¶15. (SBU) According to Tsvangirai, the government's announced electoral reforms were an admission that the existing framework was unfair. He noted that many of the reforms were taken from the MDC's playbook. Nonetheless, the proposals appeared not to address fully the five conditions laid out in the MDC "RESTORE" election demand document: rule of law (disbanding of militia, de- politicization of police); independent election commission; restoration of basic rights (repeal of AIPPA, POSA); popular confidence in system (adjustments to voting process; and integrity of voting secrecy. The party would continue to mobilize domestic and international support for implementation of SADC standards. Tsvangirai reiterated that participating in elections without the MDC's conditions being met would be futile, and the party would reserve decision on a potential boycott. In the meantime, it would continue to collaborate on a platform with civil society, whose support he considered crucial. ¶16. (SBU) Tsvangirai recognized the potentially important role of churches in effecting change. He reported that the Mutare bishops troika had informed the party of ruling party plans on electoral reforms. The troika had acted as a conduit in conveying to ZANU-PF the MDC's election demands as set out in RESTORE. ¶17. (SBU) Chimanikire reported on a meeting the previous week in South Africa between MDC Secretary General Welshman Ncube, Vice President Gibson Sibanda, himself, and South African President Mbeki. The MDC delegation told Mbeki that there had been no movement on talks with ZANU-PF. They urged the need to have a joint parliamentary-presidential election and for Mugabe to commit to step down. (Note: The next presidential election is slated for 2008. End note.) Mbeki had told them he expected the ZANU-PF politburo by the end of June would authorize a negotiating delegation. ¶18. Tsvangirai asserted that Mbeki remained potentially crucial but lamented that Mbeki never used the personal channel established between them. He observed that Mbeki tended to use indirect means to communicate and had made misrepresentations in the past, leading to an "uneasiness" between them. Tsvangirai noted that the party would continue to reach out to other African leaders, and that Sibanda was seeking meetings with the leaders of Senegal, Ghana, Kenya, and the AU. He urged that the USG maintain pressure on Mbeki and others in the region, particularly with an eye to next month's scheduled SADC Summit in Mauritius. ¶19. (SBU) In a July 3 meeting with the staffdel in his home, MDC MP and Secretary for Legal Affairs David Coltart elaborated further on election themes. Some of the proposed election reforms would be helpful to the MDC but not decisively so. The party was very cash-strapped and handicapped by the ruling party's exploitation of state machinery for campaign purposes. Despite intimidation and other challenges, the MDC was remarkably healthy, albeit quiet for now. It was mobilizing for elections, and he reported that he had received 100 percent support in a local caucus to confirm his candidacy in the upcoming election. ¶20. (SBU) Coltart asserted that the ruling party had no intention of allowing the opposition to win more than a few token seats in March. According to Coltart, ruling party fears of retribution over massacres during the 1980s and vested interests accumulated during the past four years of land reform squelched any hope that the party could reform itself. He predicted that its pervasively oppressive character would not change regardless of the outcome of elections or the health of the opposition. Even government institutions such as the legislature and judiciary would remain incapable of exerting independent checks and balances. Only decisive internal and external pressure could force change. ¶21. (SBU) Coltart characterized ZANU-PF's election platform as built on four central lies: the economy was improving; a bumper harvest was in; the GOZ was attacking corruption; and the MDC was finished. He claimed that much of the international community had bought into some or all of these lies. He emphasized the importance of the international community remaining resolute in the face of growing stasis. Given the centrality of food manipulation to ruling party control of the populace, it was essential that donors planned an effective response to the inevitable GOZ plea for food aid once the elections were concluded to the ruling party's satisfaction. In this vein, Coltart recognized that the truly needy had to be supported but urged that donors use their leverage to force the GOZ to open their books, de- politicize food, and establish more effective and transparent political and economic policies. He noted that the generosity of countries like the United States had allowed the regime to survive to date. ¶22. (SBU) In closing, Coltart urged the USG to use United Nations organs to press the GOZ. He sought support for a "responsibility to protect" doctrine advocated by the Canadian Prime Minister at the most recent UNGA as a foundation for responsible humanitarian intervention. Civil Society: International Community Must Press -------------- -------------- ¶23. (SBU) At a lunch with the staffdel June 30 at USAID, a group of prominent NGO representatives offered perspectives on the upcoming elections. Many cast outside engagement as potentially decisive in balancing the electoral playing field and some credited South African pressure with ZANU- PF's proposed reforms. The upcoming SADC summit could prove pivotal to the ruling party's ability to sell its election to domestic and international audiences; as such, it offered the international community a point of leverage that should be exploited. Specifically, the USG should press individual SADC members to adopt meaningful standards in Mauritius. Of central importance was going beyond election administration to address environmental issues like media access, freedom to campaign, and political violence. ¶24. (SBU) One participant cited growing tensions within the party as contributing to some impetus for reform. Old ideologues who were not genuine reformists were supporting reforms for short-term political gain within the context of internal personality-driven power struggles. While Mugabe's supremacy was unchallenged, internal party elections and power shifts could have a tremendous impact on the conduct of future elections and the health of civil society. That said, the ruling party lacked any genuine constituents for reform and the witch-hunt atmosphere prevailing under the party's counter-corruption efforts was chilling open discussion and fueling counter-productive posturing. ¶25. (SBU) Echoing Gula-Ndebele, some noted potential constitutional complications associated with the reform proposals. Postponement of elections until June - permitted by the Constitution and not without precedent - might be advisable. Representatives recounted a familiar litany of problems in the election environment: a climate of impunity for violent ruling party supporters, opposition's inaccessibility to media outlets, contraction of the independent media, Tsvangirai's outstanding treason trial verdict, and abuse of food. Placement of National Youth Service graduates ("Green Bombers") throughout the civil service and economy to spy on and intimidate the general populace was cited as a growing systemic problem. Domestic politics in South Africa presented an additional complication: the land issue's continued importance there and the fact that many South Africans regarded Mugabe as a "messiah" had to weigh heavily in any South African politician's calculations on policy toward Zimbabwe. Bishops: Still Engaged -------------- ¶26. At a dinner with the staffdel at the Ambassador's residence June 30, Bishops Trevor Manhanga and Patrick Mutume (Bishop Bakare, the troika's third pillar, was unable to attend) described their views on elections and related issues. They advised that ZANU-PF Party Chairman John Nkomo outlined for them the previous week elements of planned electoral reform essentially consistent with reported versions. They also met at length with ZANU-PF Information Secretary (and Mugabe confidant) Nathan Shamuyarira at SIPDIS length. Nkomo had conceded the procedural and timing difficulties presented by the apparent need for a constitutional amendment in order to establish an independent election commission. The bishops said any issue implicating a schedule for Mugabe's departure appeared problematic. ¶27. (SBU) The bishops concluded that the reforms were "serious" but said that Nkomo was unable to offer specifics on key issues, such as the commission's actual independence. "Chinamasa (Minister for Justice) is still working on them." The bishops were led to believe that current Registrar- General Mudede and Minister for Home Affairs Mohadi would have no meaningful role in implementing the reformed system. ¶28. (SBU) The bishops advised that they would seek to meet with Mbeki and Tanzanian President Mkapa in an effort to stimulate more pressure on Mugabe within the SADC community. They characterized Mbeki as frustrated; he realized that Mugabe did not view him as a peer. The bishops suggested that on a personal level, Mozambican President Chissano and Kenneth Kaunda would have better rapport with Mugabe. Mbeki remained a potentially pivotal player, however, and had suggested earlier that Mugabe agreed to move a Presidential election up to 2005. ¶29. (SBU) The bishops explained that the ruling party's proposed electoral reforms were intended principally for external consumption but could be complicated by succession politics within the ruling party. ZANU-PF remained a united party to the outside world but conflicting aspirations to the presidency were fragmenting and paralyzing it within. Other Meetings -------------- ¶30. (SBU) During their visit here, the staffdel also met separately with Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono (ref A); local directors of from World Food Program, World Vision, CARE, and Catholic Relief Services; displaced farm workers; representatives of Justice for Agriculture; members of the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN); and a bipartisan group of parliamentarians. They also visited a number of USAID-funded projects, including business opportunity centers, a center to support AIDS orphans, and a clinic that promotes the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV/AIDS. Comment -------------- ¶31. (SBU) The staffdel visit presented a timely opportunity to canvass major players on proposed electoral reforms that occupy center political stage here. The wide-ranging discussions confirmed our assessment that the government assembled its proposals without much formal input from the outside but drew significantly from outside ideas - indeed, the ESC, the MDC, and South Africa all appear to be in position to take some credit. The opposition and civil society appear prepared to engage seriously on the issues but are not optimistic that the playing field will be leveled. ¶32. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: We share the view that the ruling party's efforts in this area are geared largely to a regional audience. Treatment of election standards at the August SADC Summit in Mauritius appears to be a diplomatic priority for the GOZ and, as such, a potential point of leverage. In that vein, we would urge renewed USG efforts to engage SADC members to have SADC endorse the so-called SADC-PF election norms and standards and, either individually or as a group, to undertake efforts to press the GOZ to address election environment issues (media access, freedom to campaign, political violence) beyond the proposed electoral reforms. ¶33. (U) The staffdel did not have the opportunity to clear this message. SULLIVAN