European Commission Proposes Changes to Stability

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 FRANKFURT 008337 SIPDIS SENSATIVE STATE FOR EUR PDAS RIES, EB, EUR/AGS, AND EUR/ERA STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD STATE PASS NSC TREASURY FOR DAS LEE TREASURY ALSO FOR ICN COX, HALL PARIS ALSO FOR OECD TREASURY FOR OCC RUTLEDGE, MCMAHON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EFIN EUN SUBJECT: European Commission Proposes Changes to Stability Pact: Rules and Reality T-IA-F-04-008 This cable is sensitive but unclassified. Not/not for Internet distribution. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: On September 3 the European Commission initiated a discussion of possible changes to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The Commission is seeking to find a balance between flexibility that accommodates individual country circumstances and strict rules that instill necessary budget discipline. The initial reaction of Finance Ministers was to welcome an examination of ways to strengthen the SGP, but to rule out any changes to the Treaty while keeping any regulatory changes to an absolute minimum. The discussion will continue at the November Ecofin Council session. Any final outcome is unlikely until the first half of next year. ¶2. (SBU) On balance the Commission's suggestions are useful and arguably could be adopted without changes to the regulations. Agreeing to changes in implementation of the SGP could provide the Commission a way out of the dead end in which it has found itself since last November when its interpretation of the rules differed from that of Council's. More rules, however, would not guarantee better implementation of the SGP. Key decisions on excessive deficit procedures (EDP) still will be political and taken by the Council. In a match up of rules versus reality, reality wins. End Summary. Commission Launches Debate -------------- ¶3. (SBU) On September 3 the European Commission issued a "Communication" that commenced a debate on possible changes to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The Pact is composed of provisions from the EU Treaty, Council Regulations, and a Council Resolution. The Commission states that tensions have accumulated in the application of the SGP leading to a "loss of credibility and ownership and institutional uncertainty." ¶4. (SBU) The Commission's proposals are for a "strengthened" SGP and a Code of Conduct containing specific economic-analytical tools to allow consistency in budgetary surveillance. According to a senior Commission official, the Commission is seeking to strike a balance between rules that can take into account each country's unique economic circumstances and those that are sufficiently strict to instill necessary budgetary discipline. Another theme, according to this official, is to place more emphasis on "preventative" measures, e.g. taking steps to reduce deficits in good economic times, rather than only concentrating on "corrective' measures. Key Elements of Commission Proposals -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The Commission proposes to (a) refocus the SGP; (b) better coordinate budgetary policies; and (c) improve enforcement. ¶6. (SBU) With respect to refocusing the SGP the Commission suggests: i. Placing more focus on government debt and sustainability. The Commission suggests making the debt criterion of the Treaty operational (e.g. initiate an "excessive debt procedure" when the debt exceeds the 60% reference value) and clarifying the basis on which to ass a "satisfactory pace" of debt reduction, including an assessment of debt sustainability that takes into account pensions, contingent liabilities, and assets. ii. Allowing for more country-specific circumstances in defining the medium-term deficit objective of "close to balance or in surplus." A country with a higher debt level, for example, would be subject to a more stringent interpretation of the notion of "close to zero or in surplus" over the medium-term than a country with a lower debt level. iii. Considering economic circumstances and developments in implementation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). One option would be to redefine the "exceptional circumstances" clause that can be invoked to avoid an EDP by adding the notion of "prolonged economic downturn" as such an "exceptional circumstance." Another approach would be to allow country-specific deadlines for action rather than the standard ten months after the date new budget data is released, thereby seeking to better reflect a country's cyclical development and debt level. iv. Ensuring earlier actions to correct inadequate budgetary developments. Under this approach the Commission would issue early warnings directly to member states when deficits are close to 3% (a point on which Ministers have agreed in the Constitutional Treaty) but also in good times if a government is not moving close to balance or surplus. The Commission also could issue recommendations under the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG). ¶7. (SBU) On coordination budgetary policies, the Commission would like to reinforce the link between BEPG, budget programs submitted under the SGP and national budgetary processes. BEPG address recommendations to member states on structural policies, such as health care and pension systems and labor and capital markets. The Commission believes that economic and budgetary policies need to set the "right priorities toward economic reforms, innovation, competitiveness and strengthening of private investment and consumption, thereby contributing toward achieving the economic objectives of the Lisbon strategy." ¶8. (SBU) The Commission suggests that Stability and Convergence Programs should define the medium-term budget strategy at the beginning of a country's budget cycle. At present all Stability and Convergence programs are submitted to the Commission in early December, regardless of a country's own budget cycle. Synchronizing national and EU level budget exercises would allow a member state to reflect the Commission's and Council's assessments of its proposed national budget as well as the BEPG's in its national deliberations. Such sequencing would increase the interaction between European and national levels to include national parliaments in the debate. ¶9. (SBU) With respect to enforcement, the Commission suggests improving the quality, timeliness and reliability of fiscal statistics, the effectiveness of peer pressure (naming, shaming and blaming),and greater transparency and accountability on budgetary policies (including reports to the European Parliament and greater involvement of national parliaments). These would complement a change already agreed to by Ministers in the context of the Constitutional Treaty, namely that the Commission be authorized to send early warnings directly to countries without securing Ecofin's approval. Finance Minister's Take -------------- ¶10. (SBU) At their informal meeting in the Netherlands on September 10, EU Finance Ministers issued a short statement reflecting on the Commission's ideas. The thrust of these comments is toward strengthening, or at least improving the implementation of, the SGP. Ministers ruled out changing the Treaty (i.e. 3% deficit and 60% debt reference values to remain) and want only minimum changes to the regulations, "if necessary at all." Specifically, the Ministers asked the Economic and Finance Committee to work out elements on the following issues: ¶1. Strengthening the preventative arm of the SGP by having budget discipline in good times to gradually achieve budgetary surpluses, practicing peer pressure, and having transparent budget figures and growth assumptions. ¶2. Enhancing the focus on debt and its sustainability by having debt over the reference value diminish at a satisfactory pace, taking into account the future costs of aging and implications of pension reforms. ¶3. Drawing a distinction between measures taken and economic forecasting errors when assessing compliance with Council decisions; and ¶4. Having budgetary policies set the right priorities towards structural reforms, innovation, and competitiveness in support of the Lisbon agenda to promote economic growth and employment creation. Some Views: To Modify or Not to Modify -------------- ¶11. (SBU) A German Finance Ministry official noted that the informal Ecofin seemed to concentrate on areas that would strengthen the rules, an outcome he suspected was driven by the Dutch Presidency that has taken a strict line in implementing the SGP. A Commission official explained that the Ministers' statement reflects areas on which there was consensus. This official suspects that some member states would support more flexibility. According to a senior Bundesbank official, some of the new member states' central bankers and finance ministers are none too pleased with contemplated changes to the rules that they have been required to use in drawing up their medium-term budget programs. ¶12. (SBU) Another German official speculated that the Economic and Finance Committee would not suggest any changes to the regulations. This position was supported strongly by European Central Bank President Trichet at his September 22 hearing before the European Parliament. A senior Bundesbank official, however, was not sanguine that this position would hold. The Dutch, Austrians and Nordics continue to toe the line against changes, but Germany, once the leader of this pack, is no more, in his view. ¶13. (SBU) Three points in the Commission's proposals would require a change in regulations according to a Commission official. These would be to (a) modify the definition of "exceptional circumstances;" (b) provide for another timetable for sanctions to be taken rather than the 10 months from the date that new budget data is released; and (c) modify the timetable to correct the excessive deficit to reflect a country's circumstance rather than requiring it be done "a year after its identification." A senior Luxembourg Finance Ministry official believed that some of these changes would be necessary to bring more clarity in how the SGP is being implemented. In his view, these neither strengthen the SGP nor weaken it. ¶14. (SBU) A French Finance Ministry official generally supported the main ideas of the Commission's paper, but cautioned that the details could prove to be tricky. Tying national budget cycles to the EU-level Stability Programs or giving more weight to the BEPG are, in his view, unlikely. Next Steps -------------- ¶15. (SBU) The Economic and Finance Committee will flesh out Ministers' ideas with a view to having a first discussion at the November Ecofin. European Commission staff expect discussions to roll into the next year. After the Ecofin Council has concluded its deliberations, the Commission must present recommendations to the Council for approval. A Senior Luxembourg Finance Ministry official thought wrapping up the exercise in the first half of next year would be "fortunate." He hopes they can conclude the work during the Luxembourg Presidency. Observations -------------- ¶16. (SBU) According to a senior German official, the College of the European Commission agreed to taking the Council to the European Court of Justice over the excessive deficit cases of Germany and France provided that it also developed ideas for improving implementation of the SGP. This has positioned the Commission to devise new approaches to implementing the SGP. In doing so, it could provide a way out of the dead end it has found itself by sticking to a recommendation that the Council could not adopt last November (see septel). While this commitment was taken while Commissioner Solbes was in charge of DG Economics and Finance, the new Commissioner Alumina is more "politically savvy," according to this German official, and wants to find a compromise that member states can live with. The Commission has put its "cards on the table." ¶17. (SBU) We would agree with the Commission staff observation that most of their suggestions and those of the Finance Ministers could be implemented without any changes in the regulations. The Commission staff already examines cyclically adjusted balances as part of their overall assessment of a country's fiscal position. We would also argue that the "special circumstances" clause can be interpreted to make allowances for the timing of the adjustment path to correct the deficit. The German Finance Ministry has argued that the unforeseen, prolonged economic slow done is such a "special circumstance." On the other hand, expanding the definition of "exceptional circumstances" would allow countries to avoid any EDP and more intense budget scrutiny. This would not be helpful. ¶18. (SBU) Putting more focus on debt would be a welcomed change. After all, financing costs are driven, in part, by the stock of debt and its dynamics rather than the deficit of a single year. Seven of the Euro 12 (or nine of the EU 25) are over the 60% limit, three of the 12 are close to the 100% level (Italy, Greece and Belgium). The 60% limit was established in the 1990's when that was the average stock of debt for the prospective euro area. That number has gone up to 70% in 2003. In its latest World Economic Outlook, the International Monetary Fund confirms that the EU has demonstrated an "unsustainable deficit bias" since the creation of the European Monetary Union. ¶19. (SBU) Subjecting member states to peer review when budgets are in better shape also makes sense. The authors of the IMF report cited above note that a "key priority in the reform of the SGP should be to enforce greater fiscal restraint in good times" in light of the costs of aging populations that loom larger and closer. Deutsche Bank Research has calculated that a one percentage point increase in EU government deficits raises 10 year government bond yields by 36 percentage points. Rather than spending money on deficit financing it might be better be spent easing structural reforms or cutting taxes. ¶20. (SBU) Better forecasts and statistics (as in the case of Portugal and Greece) are very important. Uncritically accepting national budget forecasts is nice, but unhelpful in the budget surveillance process. A little tough love would be better. ¶21. (SBU) Providing better consistency between budget proposals and structural reforms, innovation and competition covered in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines make sense. The SGP should not be just a numbers game, but a discussion of economic policies designed to promote growth and employment. Deficit spending does not mean the money is spent wisely. Promoting such consistency would bring EU level macro efforts into the national arena, the purview of member states - a move many member states are likely to resist. ¶22. (SBU) One issue confronting the Commission is whether the rules should be drafted to reflect economic reality or whether it is implementation that is to reflect the reality. Drafting more precise rules will not solve the issue of political will. That, or the absence thereof, still will reside with the Council. ¶23. (U)This cable coordinated with Embassies Berlin, Luxembourg, Paris, The Hague and USEU Brussels. ¶24. (U)POC: James Wallar, Treasury Representative, e-mail wallarjg2@state.gov; tel. 49-(69)-7535-2431, fax 49-(69)- 7535-2238 Bodde