IRISH RESPONSES ON PRE-GAERC DEMARCHE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 001632 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2014 TAGS: PREL EUN SUBJECT: IRISH RESPONSES ON PRE-GAERC DEMARCHE REF: A. STATE 230353 ¶B. STATE 228399 Classified By: Poltical-Economic Counselor Mary Daly, Reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d). ¶1. (U) On October 28, Post delivered reftels' talking points to Gerald Keown, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) European correspondent. -------------- Iraq -------------- ¶2. (C) Keown noted that Member States' foreign ministers were preparing for November 2 discussions in Brussels on measures to support Iraq's transition process, with a view to presenting an agreed package to Prime Minister Allawi on November 5. The package, said Keown, would focus heavily on election assistance programs (per ref A),but would also include a recommendation to establish an Iraq-EU Forum. He added that Member States continued to explore possibilities for police training, whether in Iraq or Jordan, but it was unclear whether this training component would be ripe for inclusion in the package to be presented to Allawi. -------------- Iran -------------- ¶3. (C) Iranian negotiators had returned home to consider the proposals put forward in Vienna by the EU-3 (France, the UK, and Germany) in October 26-27 discussions on Iran's uranium enrichment activity, said Keown. He pointed out that the Iranians had referred to the proposals as "unbalanced," but had not rejected them, as some initial press reporting had implied. He noted that the EU-3 were planning a follow-up meeting (now set for November 5, according to October 29 media reports) with Iranian negotiators ahead of the November 25-26 IAEA Board of Governors meeting. -------------- MEEP -------------- ¶4. (C) EU views on the current situation in the Middle East were not significantly divergent from U.S. positions, said Keown. He noted that the EU had set forth three criteria to judge whether Prime Minister Sharon's planned withdrawal from Gaza would be consistent with the Roadmap: (1) the withdrawal must not lead to increased settlement activity in the West Bank; (2) the withdrawal must be orderly; and (3) the withdrawal must be conducted in consultation with the Palestinians. The EU hoped to avoid a worst-case scenario in which the withdrawal would create a political vacuum in Gaza, with the Palestinian Authority unable to assume governance in any meaningful way. Keown recalled that the EU had made clear its support for the Palestinian Authority in the withdrawal process during October 25 discussions in Brussels with Foreign Minister Sha'ath. ¶5. (U) In October 27 testimony before the Irish parliament's Joint Committee on European Affairs, Noel Treacy, Minister of State for European Affairs, said that the first item on the Irish and EU agenda with the new U.S. Administration would be a request for U.S. re-engagement in MEEP. The Joint Committee also passed a resolution the same day calling for continued action beyond the Gaza withdrawal to sustain the peace process. -------------- Russia -------------- ¶6. (C) Keown said that the November 11 EU-Russia Summit in the Hague would address four subject areas as agreed at the 2003 EU-Russia Summit in St. Petersburg: economic relations, security, justice and home affairs, and cultural/education/research ties. He cited EU hopes that the upcoming Summit would yield action plans on each subject and that this form of engagement would offer opportunities to address concerns on media freedom, civil society, counter-terrorism cooperation, and regional conflicts. Keown also pointed out that the centralizing tendencies apparent in Putin's administration have a deep historical basis. -------------- Sudan -------------- ¶7. (C) The EU had no differences with the United States on objectives for Sudan, particularly regarding the lead role to be played by the African Union (AU) in Darfur, observed Keown. The EU's continuing impression, he said, was that the AU had the political will and personnel for stepped-up deployment in Sudan, but lacked the required infrastructure. The AU had thus come to the EU with extensive requests for assistance, and the EU had responded with commitments on funds and material, including basic items like boots. Keown said he did not know whether the additional 80 million euros pledged by the EU on October 20 for Sudan would be in place by mid-November, but he noted the EU's intention to make the tranche available as quickly as possible. -------------- Somalia -------------- ¶8. (C) The EU welcomed recent progress in Somalia's reconciliation process as good news in the making, noted Keown. He added that, as the process moved forward, the primary challenge would be whether the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) headed by Abdullahi Yusuf, a leader from the northern Puntland, would be able to establish control in southern Somalia. -------------- Ukraine -------------- ¶9. (C) The EU, which was contributing a monitoring mission for the October 31 Ukrainian vote, shared U.S. disappoitment with failed attempts to promote a free and fair election process, observed. He expected that the EU would continue to seek consultations with the United States once the election results were known. -------------- Kosovo -------------- ¶10. (C) Keown explained that the EU was deeply engaged in efforts to support the economic viability of Kosovo, which was tightly linked to progress on political and security issues. Keown was unaware, however, of any specific progress on EU proposals to develop an economic development strategy, as called for in the Eide Report. He said that while the EU had welcomed the outcome of the October 23 Kosovo Assembly elections, the effective boycott of the polls by more than 85 percent of Kosovo Serbs had detracted from the outcome. The EU was now focused on the international community's mid-2005 review of progress made by Kosovo's elected officials in meeting standards of accountability. -------------- Cyprus -------------- ¶11. (C) It was unclear when there would be agreement within the EU on the regulation for direct trade with North Cyprus and on aid disbursements, acknowledged Keown. He observed that progress on these fronts had been slow due to political and legal constraints, not because of any cooling in the EU's commitment to support movement toward a settlement. These constraints derived from an unprecedented situation in which the EU was attempting to work with a region within a Member State that was occupied by a Candidate State. Keown explained that the EU's decision before the April referendum to earmark funds for disbursement "pending a future settlement" had also complicated attempts to disburse aid now. BENTON