DJIBOUTI AND PROPOSED COUNTER-TERRORISM FORCE

S E C R E T DJIBOUTI 000815 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF, AF/E, AF/RSA AND S/CT E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2014 TAGS: PREL MARR MASS MCAP MOPS PTER DJ SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI AND PROPOSED COUNTER-TERRORISM FORCE REF: A. STATE 122629 ¶B. DJIBOUTI 549 ¶C. STATE 112122 Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARGUERITA D. RAGSDALE. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (S) This cable reflects the views of the Ambassador, Office of Regional Affairs, Regional Security Office, United States Liaison Office and the Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). ¶2. (S) Post appreciates the Department's concern outlined in Ref A and wishes to clarify any misunderstanding created by Ref B. Under the Ref B proposal, all counter-terrorism (CT) programs in Djibouti are not being placed under the military. Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training and programs under the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) will continue as currently operating. Additionally, no new programs are envisioned or requested by Post. The Djiboutian military has requested, and will receive, two Blanket Order Training (BOT) cases as part of its Border and Coastal Security programs. Post will use these BOT cases to purchase a variety of training that supports the stated goals of the Border and Coastal security programs. Post would not, and could not, direct the Djiboutian Government (DJG) to pursue any particular course of action. ¶3. (S) That said, the Djiboutian military (including the Gendarmerie, which falls under its jurisdiction) has approached Post and CJTF-HOA on several occasions outlining the need, and the current lack of capacity within the Djiboutian military, to support and augment other agencies of the Djiboutian government in the event of a terrorist act. Post and CJTF-HOA have advised the DJG that specific training on CT for the military cannot be pursued until the role of the Djiboutian military in CT activities is clearly defined. A recent ATA program review noted that the single greatest inhibitor to effective CT operations in Djibouti was lack of coordination among the various security agencies at the national level. We have stated to the DJG the importance of clearly defining the roles of its military organizations in support of CT operations. With such coordination, and a clear delineation of roles, the military could receive training that would be in support of current U.S.-sponsored CT programs. ¶4. (S) Post emphasizes that Ref B is not a request for additional programs or monies. BOT cases are standard tools of the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) system and Djibouti's BOT cases will be used to support the goals of the East Africa Counter-terrorism Initiative as they are currently stated. Post agrees with the Department that greater coordination among elements involved in CT activities is valuable. If the DJG creates a national CT Task Force that includes portions of the Djiboutian military, post will inform the Department. RAGSDALE