Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04DJIBOUTI1596
2004-12-16 08:35:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Djibouti
Cable title:  

DJIBOUTI: SECURITY CONCERNS AT POST

Tags:  PTER ASEC ABLD DJ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T DJIBOUTI 001596 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY
FRANCIS X. TAYLOR FROM AMBASSADOR
ALSO FOR, DS/DSS, DS/DSS/IP, DS/IP/AF, AF/EX, AF/E, OBO/NEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2014
TAGS: PTER ASEC ABLD DJ
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: SECURITY CONCERNS AT POST

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARGUERITA RAGSDALE,
for reason 1.4 (D) and (G)

S E C R E T DJIBOUTI 001596

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY
FRANCIS X. TAYLOR FROM AMBASSADOR
ALSO FOR, DS/DSS, DS/DSS/IP, DS/IP/AF, AF/EX, AF/E, OBO/NEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2014
TAGS: PTER ASEC ABLD DJ
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: SECURITY CONCERNS AT POST

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARGUERITA RAGSDALE,
for reason 1.4 (D) and (G)


1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE, SEE PARAGRAPH 7.


2. (C) Since the inception of the U.S. Military's base (Camp
Lemonier) in 2002, Djibouti has gained international
notoriety as a staunch supporter of the Global War on Terror.
Although the arrival of the U.S. Military has brought with
it several tangential benefits, including increased economic
assistance primarily for education, health and infrastructure
development, it has also brought with it a greater threat of
terrorism from trans-national terrorist groups such as Al
Qaeda and Al Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI.)


3. (C) Embassy Djibouti has worked diligently to monitor,
report and mitigate the constant threat stream from the
region in an effort to prevent another Nairobi or Dar es
Salaam, or more recently, a Jeddah incident. Our efforts
have resulted in improved physical security and procedural
awareness for security purposes, but the reality remains that
we are far from being well protected.


4. (S/NF) RSO Djibouti continues to work closely with Host
nation police and U.S. Military personnel to provide an
adequate response mechanism for the Mission in a crisis
situation. Unfortunately, Host Nation Police are
inadequately trained, poorly equipped and highly unmotivated
for such a task. RSO is consistently addressing issues of
reliability and procedures with Police leadership, but
complacency, cultural challenges and extreme weather
conditions all result in an ineffective first line of
defense. Camp Lemonier is fifteen minutes away by road and a
contingent of Marines stand ready to assist the Mission, but
the measure will only be effective as a reaction to an
already devastating event. We firmly believe that if an
incident should occur, with a method of operation similar or
parallel to what took place at Consulate General, Jeddah, the
Djibouti Mission would suffer greater American and LES
casualties.


5. (S/NF) Djibouti remains a critical threat Post for
trans-national terrorism and continues to receive threat
information on a daily basis. The compilation of information
indicates, unequivocally, the potential for an attack to be
carried out against the Mission and/or Camp Lemonier. This
is an impending threat that cannot be ignored. The Camp
continues to harden its perimeter, security procedures and
internal structures and although the Embassy has made several
improvements, it remains the softer and more attractive
target for terrorists.


6. (S/NF) Our Mission has tripled in personnel since 2002.
Existing postage-stamp facilities on the Embassy compound are
no longer adequate to provide a secure work place for
American USG Officers and Locally Engaged Staff (LES)
commensurate with the threat environment. Office spaces, for
Americans and LES, are spread throughout the compound over
four buildings outside the Chancery the majority of which do
not meet Forced Entry Ballistic Resistant Standards (FEBR.)
Security features on these buildings have been improved, but
can easily be defeated by a well trained and equipped
terrorist or terrorist group.


7. (C) A solution to the security dilemma we face is
certainly to expedite development of the New Embassy Compound
(NEC) destined to break ground in 2007 with an estimated
completion date of 2010. A purchase agreement for a NEC site
was signed November 24, 2004 with the government of Djibouti.
The NEC will provide adequate and secure facilities needed
to protect personnel in accordance with USG standards. In
the interim, I request that the Department deploy a team
urgently to Djibouti to assess construction needs and cost
for necessary and essential security upgrades for Embassy
Djibouti with a view toward implementing these upgrades on an
urgent basis. Post's last technical and physical security
upgrade was completed almost 5 years ago and many of the
systems in place are now deficient or obsolete. Post cannot
handle any field expedient upgrades that are mandated given
our limited budget and lack of technical expertise.



8. (U) I am confident that you will provide a positive and
quick response to this request.


9. (U) My POC, for security, is RSO Marc Ramos at
253-35-39-95 or 253-35-26-73 (secure).
RAGSDALE

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