Campaign Snapshot: President sacks all non-

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000242

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA, SA/PD

NSC FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/14
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS PINR PHUM CE
SUBJECT: Campaign Snapshot: President sacks all non-
cabinet ministers; Key Minister Moragoda resigns

Refs: (A) FBIS Reston Va DTG 111032Z Feb 04

- (B) Colombo 226, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) In this message, Mission reviews the following
items revolving around Sri Lanka's parliamentary
election campaign:

-- In transparent bid to circumscribe GSL's powers
before election, President Kumaratunga fires junior
ministers;

-- Protesting that move, key Minister Milinda Moragoda
resigns from office, but will contest election;

-- Ambassador urges campaign restraint in separate
meetings with key presidential adviser and President's
brother;

-- Tamil tea estate workers' party agrees to run joint
campaign with Prime Minister's UNP party; and,

-- "The Flavor of the Campaign": The battle of party
symbols and colors begins.

====================================
President Fires all Junior Ministers
====================================


2. (U) Late February 11, President Chandrika
Bandaranaike Kumaratunga sacked 27 non-Cabinet ministers
and 12 deputy ministers. Only those ministers who are
part of the 34-member Cabinet retained their positions,
including Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, Foreign
Minister Fernando, and Finance Minister Choksy. The
sacked ministers and deputy ministers have also been
ordered to return their official vehicles. According to
Janadasa Peiris, presidential media spokesman, President
Kumaratunga herself now is in charge of all the non-
Cabinet ministries. Practically speaking, day-to-day
decision-making will probably devolve to the level of
the secretaries (the chief civil servants) in each
ministry.


3. (C) COMMENT: The President's move appears to be
legal under the terms of Sri Lankan law and it was not a
surprise: there have been reports from her office since
elections were called on February 7 that she planned to
cut the PM's ministerial cohort down. That said,
although cost-cutting was cited as the rationale, her
move was quite transparent in its political intent: the
President is clearly trying to circumscribe the Prime
Minister's ability to distribute largesse and favors
ahead of the April 2 election. For his part, the PM
publicly complained on February 12 that the President's
action undermined the peace process and made it
impossible for the GSL "to fulfill its responsibilities"
under the terms of the February 2002 ceasefire accord
with the Tigers. END COMMENT.

=================================
In response, Key Minister Resigns
=================================


4. (U) In response to President Kumaratunga's move to
sack the junior ministers, Milinda Moragoda, Economic
Reform Minister and a key adviser to the PM, resigned
his ministerial positions late February 11. Moragoda's
sudden resignation came in protest of his removal, per
the order by the President earlier in the day, as Deputy
Minister of Policy Development and Implementation. In
tendering his resignation to Prime Minister Ranil
Wickremesinghe, Moragoda said in a letter: "Given the
current situation, I do not think it would be possible
in anyway for me to contribute to the progress of the
country and the welfare of our people." In his letter,
Moragoda added that he looked forward to running for
Parliament from his Colombo electoral district on the
Prime Minister's United National Party (UNP) ticket.


5. (C) COMMENT: Moragoda was clearly taken aback by
the President's decision to remove his deputy
ministerial portfolio. He told the Ambassador on
February 12 that he did not feel he could do any useful
work in his Economic Reform portfolio under the current
circumstances. A very proud man, Moragoda apparently
decided in a fit of pique to take the opportunity to
clear his slate clean. His resignation is not a
surprise, however: On several occasions since he took
office in December 2001, Moragoda has threatened to
resign due to presidential and other slights. Though he
is now out of office, Moragoda appears set to continue
to serve the PM as an adviser on foreign policy and
peace process issues, as well as all-round
troubleshooter. END COMMENT.

=====================================
Ambassador Presses Campaign Restraint
=====================================


6. (C) On February 11, Ambassador Lunstead met with
Lakshman Kadirgamar, key presidential adviser and the
newly appointed Minister for Information and Media
(Note: Additionally, Kadirgamar was Sri Lanka's foreign
minister from 1994-2001). The Ambassador also met
February 12 with Anura Bandaranaike, President
Kumaratunga's brother and a senior MP in her Sri Lanka
Freedom Party (SLFP). The Ambassador used both meetings
to underscore the point that the upcoming parliamentary
election campaign should not be a divisive one. The
Ambassador noted that attacks on the peace process
during the campaign could have a long-lasting negative
impact and he urged that the state media act with
restraint. Kadirgamar said he took the point, remarking
that he had issued instructions to state media outlets
to be fair. He added, though, that he could "not
control everything said during the campaign." The
Ambassador also expressed concern about the Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) -- now allied with the SLFP --
and its extremist policies, noting in particular its
comments on economic issues. Both Kadirgamar and
Bandaranaike responded that the JVP may use heated
rhetoric, but the group would not be in position to act
in a negative manner if the SLFP-JVP combine won the
election.


7. (C) COMMENT: Since taking over state media in
November (via sacking the then-information minister),
the President and her party have ensured that state TV
and the press hew a strongly pro-SLFP, anti-UNP line.
This line is mixed in with a dose of anti-peace process
rhetoric. For example, a newscast on state media on
February 8 referred to "the so-called peace process," a
point which the Ambassador raised with Kadirgamar and
Bandaranaike. If these trends are not reversed or, at
worst, continue to torque up, the tone of the campaign
will degenerate quickly and the peace process could take
a lot of hits. Regarding the JVP, Bandaranaike has
played a key role in the SLFP in working with the
radical group. He heard our message regarding
restraint, but it is as yet unclear whether he will act
on it. END COMMENT.

========================================
Tamil Estate Workers ally again with UNP
========================================


8. (SBU) In a boost for the Prime Minister, the Ceylon
Worker's Congress (CWC) has agreed to support the UNP in
the upcoming parliamentary elections. The CWC,
representing tea-estate Tamils from Sri Lanka's interior
highland region, supported the UNP in the previous
December 2001 parliamentary elections and is a current
member of the governing United National Front (UNF)
coalition. Joining the CWC will be V. Puthrasigamoney,
a SLFP MP from the tea-estate region, who broke ties
with the President's party after a series of public
disagreements in late 2003. (Note: The Upcountry
People's Front, another party representing tea-estate
Tamils, will likely give its support to the Tamil
National Alliance.)


9. (C) COMMENT: The UNP campaign organization has been
slow to get in gear. This has helped lead to a feeling
of seeming dejection among some UNP stalwarts. G.L.
Peiris, a key minister, for example, appeared to lack
confidence when he discussed the campaign with the
Ambassador on February 11. It is still very early in
the campaign cycle, however. The fact that the CWC -- a
party with solid backing in the tea estate region (and
which usually wins several seats in Parliament) -- plans
to remain allied with the UNP is a positive sign for the
Prime Minister. It is also important for the UNP that
the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) come on board. The
SLMC allied with the UNP in the last election, but has
not yet finally agreed to work with the UNP this time
around. END COMMENT.

============================================= ====
"The Flavor of the Campaign": Symbols and Colors
============================================= ====


10. (U) In our "flavor of the campaign" section: Party
symbols and colors are a large part of "brand
recognition" in Sri Lankan political campaigns and Sri
Lanka appears in for burst of sensory overload. In the
vibrant world of symbols and colors, the UNP plans to
retain its traditional elephant symbol and green color
motif. In the meantime, the United People's Freedom
Alliance (UPFA),the name for the recent SLFP-JVP
linkup, has already changed their symbol thrice from the
lotus to the butterfly to the betel leaf. Although the
betel leaf is green, the UPFA's colors are blue and red.
Most of the Tamil parties have agreed to unite under the
Tamil National Alliance/Tamil United Liberation Front
(TULF) "rising sun" symbol and accompanying yellow/red
color motif. The CWC is represented by a cockerel and
its color is dark green, while the Sri Lanka Muslim
Congress goes by a tree symbol with green and yellow
colors.


11. (SBU) COMMENT: In general, Sri Lankans love
election campaigns, and go all out in holding colorful,
loud rallies and marches (voter turnout is usually quite
high, hovering at about 70 percent). This campaign may
not be quite as popular as past campaigns because the
election was called years early and it is Sri Lanka's
fourth in under five years. Despite that, Sri Lankans
will probably go for the gusto this campaign, too, if
all the attention being paid to party symbols and colors
is any guide. END COMMENT.


12. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD