Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04COLOMBO1997
2004-12-15 10:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

CO-CHAIR AMBASSADORS ASK PRESIDENT TO REIN IN

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER CE LTTE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001997 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS
PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER CE LTTE
SUBJECT: CO-CHAIR AMBASSADORS ASK PRESIDENT TO REIN IN
JVP'S ANTI-PEACE PROCESS CAMPAIGN

REF: A. COLOMBO 1948


B. COLOMBO 1980

C. STATE 254578

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reason 1.4 (B, D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001997 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SA/INS PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2014 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER CE LTTE SUBJECT: CO-CHAIR AMBASSADORS ASK PRESIDENT TO REIN IN JVP'S ANTI-PEACE PROCESS CAMPAIGN REF: A. COLOMBO 1948 ¶B. COLOMBO 1980 ¶C. STATE 254578 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reason 1.4 (B, D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Three Tokyo Co-chair Ambassadors (US, Japan and Netherlands) met President Kumaratunga December 14 to raise anti-peace process and anti-Norway campaign of government coalition partner JVP and to ask President to take action against JVP. Kumaratunga agreed JVP behavior regarding Norwegians was unacceptable, but did not see them as a threat to the peace process. The problem was not the JVP, but the inflexible position of the LTTE. Ambassador said the JVP campaign was actively undermining the peace process and the Norwegian role, and government needed to counteract it. President said she personally was building support for the peace process. Kumaratunga predicted LTTE might unilaterally declare independence or an interim self-governing administration. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) As stated in reftels, three Tokyo Co-chair Ambassadors (US, Japan, and Netherlands) met with President Kumaratunga evening of December 14 to discuss the anti-Norway and anti-peace process campaign of the Janata Vimukta Peramuna (JVP),the second-largest component of the governing alliance. Fourth Co-chair Norway did not participate in the meeting since it would discuss in part Norway's role. Kumaratunga was accompanied by Foreign Minister Kadirgamar and Peace Secretariat head Jayantha Dhanapala. SIPDIS JVP Problem -------------- ¶3. (C) Japanese Ambassador Suda led off meeting by presenting points as stated in ref b, specifically, that: --The Co-chairs are grateful for the President's commitment to the peace process. --They are very disturbed by the JVP's actions, including Orchestrated campaign against the peace process. Actions in Trincomalee that led to increased tensions and violence. Attacks on Norway's role and threatening demonstrations against Norwegians. --At the same time no organized campaign by Government in support of peace process. --Urge President to address this issue. --Impression created is that peace process is being held up by internal Sri Lankan politics. In such
a situation, Co-chair interest will decrease, attention will shift elsewhere. GSL should not assume Co-chairs and others will be ready to re-engage at some point in the future. --Co-chairs high-level officials may meet in mid- January. It would be useful if there were some progress before then. Attacks on Norway Bad, but JVP Not Against Peace -------------- --- ¶4. (C) Kumaratunga responded that the JVP attacks on Norway's role and demonstrations at Norwegian Embassy were unacceptable, and that she had told the JVP so. The Government, in the form of the Foreign Minister, had also defended the Norwegian role in Parliament. She stated, however, that the JVP was not against the peace process. They accepted it, but insisted that negotiations should not be resumed based solely on the LTTE's Interim Self- Governing Administration (ISGA) proposal. That position was no different from her government's. Kumaratunga then discoursed at length on the various proposals to get the peace talks going, and complained that the LTTE had showed no flexibility at all. ¶5. (C) Kumaratunga detailed the various excesses which the LTTE had committed since the cease-fire agreement went into effect: construction of illegal camps around Trincomalee, abduction of child soldiers, and killings of political opponents. The "Norwegian-led" Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was doing nothing about these violations, she said. Any self-respecting government, she continued, would insist that these problems be rectified before talks started. In Northern Ireland, she said, the IRA had been required to decommission its arms, but the LTTE had not given up a single weapon. Nonetheless, the Government was willing to go ahead with talks--but the LTTE had to show some flexibility. The Government might have a new proposal "in a week or two" to try to break the stalemate. Kumaratunga said that the LTTE used the JVP as an excuse not to come to talks. If that excuse disappeared, the LTTE would find another excuse. ¶6. (C) Ambassador interjected that we were under no illusions about the brutal nature and inflexible negotiating stance of the Tigers, and that we knew--and had stated publicly--that she had shown flexibility. The subject we had come to discuss, however, was not the LTTE, but the JVP and their negative effect on the peace process. Our impression was that the JVP did not accept the process; in fact, it was working actively to undermine it. The JVP's attacks on the Norwegians did not just call into question the Norwegian role, but also the integrity of the process itself. We observed the JVP campaigning actively against the peace process around the country, but there did not seem to be a counter-campaign by the Government to build support for the peace process. ¶7. (C) The President seemed a bit put out by this. She responded that she personally was building up the process wherever she spoke, but she had told the other Ministers not to discuss it. That was how things are done in Sri Lanka, she said. Ambassador noted the irony that US and other donors had active programs to build understanding of and support for peace process among civil society, but that the Government did not. LTTE Plans -------------- ¶8. (C) Japanese Ambassador asked President what she thought of Prabhakaran's Heroes Day Speech and specifically his comment that the LTTE would resume the freedom struggle if the ISGA was not implemented. Kumaratunga said she did not think the LTTE intended to resume the war. However, they might issue a "Unilateral Declaration of Independence" (UDI) or a "Unilateral Declaration of ISGA." They would then blockade the Sri Lankan military bases in the North and East, which would put the GSL in a difficult spot, and probably result in the resumption of hostilities. This could also happen even if the talks resumed. After several fruitless rounds, the LTTE would walk away and go for one of these options. ¶9. (C) Ambassador thanked the President for seeing the group, and said that we remained convinced that the JVP did pose a threat to the peace process which needed to be dealt with. Foreign Minister Kadirgamar responded that the JVP issue was a "red herring," i.e., that the JVP was just an excuse for the LTTE, and the LTTE behavior was the problem. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) The President and Kadirgamar accepted that JVP behavior and comments regarding the Norwegians had been unacceptable, but seemed to regard that as a past issue. The Government's lukewarm endorsement of the Norwegians does not really address this issue. Kumaratunga was not willing to acknowledge that the JVP's current behavior is a threat to the peace process. It is true that JVP actions may be an excuse for the LTTE. It is also true that JVP actions--and Government unwillingness to insist that the JVP stop them--can also convince the LTTE that the Government does not have a single agreed policy or, worse yet, that the President is allowing the JVP to carry on in order to sabotage the process. Moreover, the JVP campaign can have a negative effect in the South, raising doubts in the minds of Southerners about the peace process. If the President does want to get back to negotiations or put forward new proposals, she may find that the JVP has cut the ground out from under her. ¶11. (U) As stated ref (B),Japanese Embassy issued following press release morning of Aug 15. We have posted it on our website with Tamil and Sinhala translations. BEGIN TEXT The representatives of three of the four Co-chairs of the Tokyo Donors Conference (Japan, EU and US) called on Her Excellency President Kumaratunga on December 14. The Co-chair representatives reaffirmed their support for the President's efforts to resume peace talks. They expressed deep concern about the ongoing JVP-led actions against the peace process in Sri Lanka and the Government of Norway's efforts as facilitator of that process. The representatives expressed bewilderment that a member party of the UPFA could engage in such a campaign in absolute contradictions of the clearly stated position of the President and the Government that they endorse and support the Norwegian role. The representatives urged the President to address this problem. The representatives reiterated to President Kumaratunga their full support for the peace process in Sri Lanka and Norway's efforts as a facilitator. ATMOSPHERICS -------------- ¶12. (C) It is difficult to convey the atmosphere of this meeting, but we will try. Originally set for 5 p.m., Ambassadors were told to wait and then to come at 7 p.m. President arrived at 8:15, apologizing that she was in an emergency meeting to deal with flooding in North and East which had left 120,000 people homeless. Meeting then lasted until 10:30, interrupted at various points by arrival of fresh-roasted cashews, glasses of wine (President Kumaratunga prefers red) and cheese toasts. This seemed to be the President's dinner. The President's golden retriever "Cookie" was not interested in either the cashews or the cheese toasts. Kumaratunga seemed content to chat all evening, but Ambassador broke the meeting up at 10:30. DISCUSSION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER -------------- ¶13. (C) Ambassador phoned Foreign Minister Kadirgamar following day, December 15, to reinforce points. Ambassador said that we did not consider the JVP behavior a "red herring". An outside observer would see the JVP make one statement on the peace process and the Norwegians and the Government make a contradictory statement. The result would be an impression that there is no consensus in the ruling coalition. Kadirgamar acknowledged this, but said that he had been working with the JVP on a common position on the peace process. This had almost been completed, but had been stalled when JVP elder statesman Somawansa Amarasinghe had emergency heart bypass surgery. LUNSTEAD

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