SRI LANKA: LTTE HEROES' DAY ADDRESS SOFTER THAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 001920 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS NSC FOR DORMANDY E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2014 TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS CE LTTE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: LTTE HEROES' DAY ADDRESS SOFTER THAN EXPECTED REF: A. UNCLASS EMAIL TO SA/INS 11/29/2004 ¶B. COLOMBO 1897 ¶C. COLOMBO 1913 Classified By: James F. Entwistle, Deputy Chief of Mission. 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary. On November 27, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader Velupillai Prabhakaran delivered his 16th annual "Heroes' Day" address from an undisclosed location in LTTE-controlled territory in Sri Lanka. In the speech, Prabhakaran criticized Sinhalese political parties and the President for impeding the peace process by insisting on peace talks based on a permanent solution to the conflict--and not on the interim solution the LTTE is demanding. He also asked all southern parties to publicly declare their position on "the Tamil national question." Expressing his impatience with the current pace of the peace process, the Tiger leader called on the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) to return to talks based on the LTTE's Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) or the Tigers will "...have no alternative other than to advance the freedom struggle of (their) nation." Sources in the diplomatic community said they expected a much "sharper tone," and did not find the speech particularly worrisome. While some press reports indicated that the GSL would reply to the LTTE speech on November 29, it has not released a statement-- possibly because it was busy cajoling coalition partner Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) not to make its own independent statement. Prabhakaran's annual policy speech fell short of the sabre-rattling rant many feared it might have been, given the killings and hartals which racked the north and east in the week preceding the speech. That said, the message did not sound the conciliatory note many had been hoping for. The comparative lack of vitriol aimed by Prabhakaran at President Kumaratunga offers the one slightly encouraging hint of a possible opening, however narrow, back to the negotiating table. End Summary. -------------- Prabhakaran's Annual Address -------------- ¶2. (U) On November 27, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader Velupillai Prabhakaran delivered his 16th annual "Heroes' Day" address from an undisclosed location in LTTE-controlled territory in Sri Lanka. Clad in camouflage and flanked by the LTTE flag and a map of "Eelam" (portions of Sri Lanka the LTTE considers the Tamil homeland), Prabhakaran delivered what many people in Sri Lanka consider the most important LTTE policy address of the year. The speech received widespread print media publicity, and excerpts were shown on government- and privately-owned television stations on November 28. ¶3. (U) In the speech (text sent to SA/INS via unclass email),Prabhakaran criticized Sinhalese political parties and the President for impeding the peace process by insisting on peace talks based on a permanent solution to the conflict--and not on the interim solution the LTTE favors. He also asked all "southern" parties to publicly declare their position on "the Tamil national question," arguing that unless these parties have consensus in their approach to the peace process, there is no point in talking about a permanent solution. The Tiger leader expressed his impatience with the current pace of the peace process and called on the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) to return to talks based on the LTTE's Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) or the Tigers will "...have no alternative other than to advance the freedom struggle of (their) nation." ¶4. (U) Highlights of the speech follow: -- Prabhakaran 's speech provided an LTTE-slanted recap of selected failures of the nearly three-year old cease-fire agreement (CFA) between the GSL and the LTTE. The Tiger leader recalled the six rounds of peace talks in 2003 which "turned out to be futile," rehabilitation-focused sub-committees which he described as "non-functional," and the GSL's participation in the February 2003 donor's conference in Washington, which he claimed undermined the LTTE's "status as equal partners in the peace process." Prabhakaran also noted President Chandrika Kumaratunga's actions to take over several ministries in November 2003 days after the LTTE released its proposed ISGA proposal as "punitive action that plunged the southern polity into a crisis." -- Prabhakaran criticized southern political parties, but especially Kumaratunga's coalition partner Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). The Tiger leader described the April 2004 parliamentary election as paving the way "for the hegemonic dominance of Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinistic forces in the southern political arena." Prabhakaran lambasted the JVP as "an anti-Tamil political party steeped in a muddled ideology of racism, religious fanaticism and orthodox communism," and criticized the President's United People's Freedom Party (UPFA) coalition as "constituted by an unholy alliance of incompatible political parties articulating antagonistic and mutually contradictory views and policies on the Tamil national question." The Tiger leader asserted, "There is no clear, coherent policy orientation, or a consensus approach within the political parties of the coalition government. Since she has aligned herself with political parties drenched in anti-Tamil racism, militarism, and Sinhala-Buddhist hegemonies, the President cannot advance the peace process based on a coherent, consistent strategy and policy." -- Prabhakaran cited the humanitarian needs of the Tamil people as justification for peace talks based on the ISGA. Surprisingly, he added, "If some elements of our proposal are deemed problematic or controversial, these issues can be resolved through discussions at the negotiating table." -- Prabhakaran spoke about the need for an interim arrangement before a permanent one. He noted that once "an interim administrative authority is institutionalized and becomes functional, we are prepared to engage in negotiations for a permanent settlement..." He criticized President Kumaratunga's invitation to talks based on a permanent solution, citing her need to satisfy the JVP, her desire to impress the international community with her commitment to peace, and her desire to prolong peace negotiations indefinitely "by opting to talk on a most intractable and complex issue." Prabhakaran charged, "Whatever the real reason, we can clearly and confidently say one thing; it is apparent from the inconsistent and contradictory statements made by President Kumaratunga that her government is not going to offer the Tamil people either an interim administration or a permanent solution." -- Prabhakaran summarized the long-standing arguments for the Tamil people's right to secede, claiming that, "The Sinhala political organizations and their leadership, which are deeply buried in the mud of Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism, will never be able to comprehend the political aspirations of the people of Tamil Eelam... None... (are) prepared to accept the northeastern region as the historical homeland of the Tamil-speaking people, that the Tamils constitute themselves as a distinct nationalist and that they are entitled to the right to self-determination, including the right to secede." -- He called on other political parties (including the constituent parties of the UPFA and the opposition United National Party (UNP)),"... to declare publicly their official policy on the fundamentals of the Tamil national question, particularly on the core demands of the Tamils concerning homeland, nationality and the right to self-determination." The Tiger chief asserted that unless Sinhalese political parties have a "clear, coherent policy, a proper insight and a consensus approach towards the Tamil national question, there is no meaning in engaging in talks about a permanent solution," and asserted that the President's government is deliberately impeding the peace efforts by insisting that talks should be based on a permanent settlement. -- He called on the GSL to return to talks based on the LTTE's ISGA, warning, "There are borderlines to patience and expectations. We have now reached the borderline... We urge the government to resume the peace negotiations without conditions, based on our proposal on an Interim Self-Governing Authority. If the Government of Sri Lanka rejects our urgent appeal and adopts delaying tactics, perpetuating the suffering of our people, we have no alternative other than to advance the freedom struggle of our nation." -------------- - The Other Heroes' Day - Karuna and Balasingham -------------- - ¶5. (C) In a speech posted to his website Neruppu, and translated by the Asian Tribune (a on-line newspaper based in Bangkok, the provenance of which is murky),breakaway LTTE eastern leader Karuna, now leader of the TamilEela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP or People's Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) delivered a rival Heroes' Day speech on November 27, about hour and a half before Prabhakaran delivered his. Karuna demanded the GSL solve its problems with the Tamil people within two years, paid homage to LTTE martyrs, and criticized Prabhakaran for political killings and exploiting the Tamil people. In his speech, Karuna asked, "Does one expect to have a mass killer as the leader of Tamil Eelam? Are we not ashamed of such a person?" Karuna also asserted that given its close cultural and geographic proximity to Sri Lanka, India, rather than Norway, should facilitate the peace process. Kethesh Loganathan, a Director at the Centre for Policy Alternatives, opined that Karuna is trying to make his presence felt to Sri Lankan and diaspora Tamils, as well as to irritate Prabhakaran. Not surprisingly, Sinhala and English media carried reports of Karuna's speech, but Tamil media ignored it. ¶6. (C) Meanwhile, a pro-LTTE Tamil daily reported that LTTE political advisor Anton Balasingham had also given a Heroes' Day speech in London, which stated that Prabhakaran is ready for war and that the President must decide if she wants war or peace. Balasingham also noted that the peace process cannot be allowed to "drag on forever." Indian DCM Mohan Kumar told DCM that Balasingham's speeches historically are often tougher than Prabhakaran's, since his job, inter alia, is to keep the Tamil diaspora stirred up and in a money-giving mood. Kumar also opined that Balasingham has internal problems within the LTTE and thus needs to make clear he is still a firebrand. -------------- Donor Co-Chairs Reaction -------------- ¶7. (C) At a November 29 co-chairs meeting called by Japanese Ambassador Suda to discuss the growing JVP-led campaign against the Norwegians and the SLMM (septel), Norwegian Ambassador Bratskaar said he saw "positives and negatives" in the LTTE leader's speech. The language on "advancing the freedom struggle" was cause for concern but he thought it significant that the sentence had contained no timeframe or ultimatum. Bratskaar said he found quite encouraging Prabhakaran's stated willingness to discuss ISGA differences with the GSL although he had noted on the negative side of the balance sheet that there had been no reference to "internal" or "external" self-determination (internal self-determination is the longstanding LTTE codeword for federalism). Bratskaar commented that, in light of last week's provocations by the LTTE (flag raisings, etc.) and the Sri Lankan Army's clumsy responses, he had expected a "much sharper" speech. ¶8. (C) The key element, Bratskaar concluded, is Prabhakaran's repeated references to the spoiler role being played by the JVP which prevents, in the LTTE view, any serious "Southern" effort to get back to the peace table. "The LTTE never likes to have the ball in its court and JVP behavior and rhetoric gives them the perfect excuse to lob the ball back to the government." Bratskaar noted that Norwegian peace envoy Eric Solheim will see LTTE luminary Anton Balasingham in London December 1 and will seek clarification on both Prabhakaran's speech and Balasingham's speech in London. Bratskaar said Solheim will then return to Sri Lanka December 11. His agenda and program have yet to be determined and will depend on events between now and then. An "additional visit before Christmas" had been in the cards all along, Bratskaar said. Bratskaar will not be present for Solheim's visit; he will be attending an SLMM organizational meeting in Copenhagen. -------------- Indian Reaction -------------- ¶9. (C) Indian DCM Mohan Kumar told DCM November 29 that he had not found Prabhakaran's speech particularly worrisome. He described it as "hard line in substance" with no concessions to the GSL. But Prabhakaran's tone, Kumar observed, had been almost "apologetic and defensive" in an attempt to "convince the international community that the LTTE is not the intransigent party." Kumar said he did not regard Prabhakaran's comments about "advancing the freedom struggle" in the absence of a return to the peace table as a threat to return to war. Rather, he viewed them as "largely for domestic Tamil consumption" and less belligerent than previous speeches, concluding, "This was not war rhetoric." Kumar also said he had found significant that there had been "no mention of Karuna or Oslo," nor had Prabhakaran trotted out his familiar language about how a solution in Sri Lanka could not be "dictated" by the international community. -------------- Softer for the International Community? -------------- ¶10. (C) Kethesh Loganathan, a Director at the Centre for Policy Alternatives, told poloff that the speech was likely more subdued for the benefit of the international community. He noted that Prabhakaran did not suggest a deadline or ultimatum and indicated that comments on the LTTE's ISGA proposal would be welcome. Nonetheless, he commented that the speech still had a very serious tone. Loganathan speculated that Karuna's absence from Prabhakaran's speech signaled that the LTTE was indeed having problems with the breakaway leader, and that the LTTE did not want to show weakness by mentioning Karuna. Loganathan surmised that while the LTTE had initially demanded the GSL hand over Karuna as a condition of returning to talks, the Tigers have now changed tack and want to return to talks as soon as possible so that they can neutralize any GSL support for Karuna in the negotiating process. -------------- GSL Reaction? -------------- ¶11. (C) While some press reports indicated that the GSL would reply to the LTTE speech on November 29, it has not released a statement-- possibly because it was busy cajoling the JVP not to make its own independent statement. Eric Fernando, Director General of the Policy Research and Information Unit of the Presidential Secretariat, told poloff that the President was trying to rein in the JVP to avoid complicating the situation further. Sources at the JVP told political FSN that the JVP had decided not to issue a statement, because it would be "acknowledging the insults to the Sinhala people." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) Prabhakaran's annual policy speech was not the sabre-rattling rant suggested by the killings and hartals which racked the north and east in the week preceding the speech (see Reftels B and C). At the same time, while the Tiger leader's annual policy address was more subdued than expected, it was not completely conciliatory. The litany of complaints against the GSL and southern political parties was familiar, but the failure to mention Karuna, ostensibly the biggest provocation the LTTE has faced, was surprising. The softer tone of the speech may be the result of recent visits to the Wanni by Balasingham and Norwegian Foreign Minister Petersen, as well as the Tiger delegation's October visit to Europe, in which a more international perspective was on offer. While Prabhakaran was hard on the JVP, he was less vitriolic toward the President than usual, perhaps to offer her some space to forge a way back to the peace table. LUNSTEAD