EU AND JAPAN TALK TOUGH TO TIGERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001362 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD PLEASE PASS TOPEC E.O. 12958: DECL: 08-18-14 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER CE NO JA EU LTTE SUBJECT: EU AND JAPAN TALK TOUGH TO TIGERS Refs: (A) Colombo 1323, and previous (U) Classified by Charge' d'Affaires James F. Entwistle. Reasons 1.5 (b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The EU troika and the Japanese ambassador both delivered tough messages to LTTE political chief Thamilchelvan on killings, child soldiers and a rapid return to the peace table. Thamilchelvan told all that the LTTE is committed to a federal solution in accordance with the Oslo declaration and that the LTTE-proposed ISGA is a stepping stone in that direction. Both the EU and the Japanese noted that Thamilchelvan has dropped his rhetoric about not being able to return to the peace table until the Karuna issue is under control. Moreover, the Norwegian Charge', to his surprise, found Thamilchelvan willing to discuss dates for peace talk resumption during his weekend trip to Kilinochchi. The Norwegians here see the need for several weeks of "quiet diplomacy" to give them "room to maneuver" while the EU and Japan do not see the need for a co-chair's statement now but defer to their capitals. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Dutch Ambassador Blankhart and EU Charge' Wilton hosted an informal co-chairs meeting August 17 to brief on the previous day's EU meeting in Kilinochchi with Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) political chief Thamilchelvan. Japanese Ambassador Suda also reviewed his August 15 meeting with Thamilchelvan and Norwegian Charge' Laegreid brought the co-chairs up to date on his recent circuit-riding between the LTTE and the GSL. Japanese Perspective -------------- ¶3. (C) Invited to go first, Japanese Ambassador Suda advised that he had focused on three points with Thamilchelvan. First, Tokyo is seriously worried about the current political impasse on peace talks and is especially frustrated with the LTTE since, in Tokyo's view, President Kumaratunga (CBK) has made concessions which the LTTE has not reciprocated. Japan believes it is time for the LTTE to "get serious." Second, Suda said he laid down a strong marker about the recent uptick in killings and told Thamilchelvan that it is clear that for at least the last month the killings have been in one direction: "headquarters LTTE" killing Karuna LTTE and members of other Tamil groups like the EPDP. Finally, the LTTE must reconfirm its commitment to the tenets of the Oslo declaration, especially the commitment to a federal solution. It is not constructive for the LTTE to only talk about its Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) proposal. ¶4. (C) In response, Suda said, Thamilchelvan "smiled and nodded as usual" but did not deny responsibility for killings (but did repeat his familiar language about how it is the GSL's responsibility to uphold security in its areas). Asked what the major LTTE "obstacles" were in getting back to the peace table, Thamilchelvan said "confusion in the South" with too many voices holding forth on the peace process. On federalism, Thamilchelvan said it was not possible under the current constitution and the Tamil people "could not wait" for constitutional reform. Thus, a "more immediate" solution must be found. He stressed to Suda, however, that the LTTE no longer desires a separate state and that the ISGA is a stepping stone to a solution within the context of a united Sri Lanka. ¶5. (C) Thamilchelvan also told Suda that LTTE remains committed to the Oslo Declaration. Norwegian Charge' Laegreid interjected that Thamilchelvan has reaffirmed LTTE commitment to the Oslo Declaration in recent conversations "without us having to solicit such reaffirmation." The Norwegians have also been hearing the "within a united Sri Lanka" formulation lately and find this positive. Tough Talk from the EU -------------- ¶6. (C) Turning to the EU meeting, Blankhart said that the EU troika (Blankhart, Wilton and UK High Commissioner Evans) had hit Thamilchelvan hard on LTTE killings. They noted that the EU had issued a balanced statement in early July calling on all sides to refrain from violence. Now the situation was different, with only Kilinochchi LTTE carrying out killings. As with the Japanese, Thamilchelvan did not deny the killings. Blankhart said the troika also hit Thamilchelvan hard on child soldiers, noting that recruitments were continuing and that the LTTE had lost all credibility on the issue. Thamilchelvan admitted the LTTE was "not in compliance" with the UNICEF program but then lapsed into the "usual" line about how "the children come to us so what can we do?" Blankhart said she cut off Thamilchelvan and told him it was very clear what the LTTE should do: turn any and all child soldiers over to UNICEF rapidly and transparently. ¶7. (C) Blankhart said the troika was also blunt about the need to get back to the table, echoing the Japanese formulation that CBK has made concessions but the LTTE has not. Thamilchelvan demurred, stating that the LTTE no longer insisting on a separate state is a "concession for peace." He then started his argument about how the proliferation of "voices" in the south is an obstacle to peace. Blankhart said she told Thamilchelvan that in democracies there are always "many voices" speaking out on all issues and that this is a good thing. She told Thamilchelvan that the only voice in the South he needed to listen to was the President's. Asked about adherence to Oslo and the role of the ISGA, Thamilchelvan told the EU ("he made it very clear") that the ISGA is something to be negotiated with the GSL, not something that the LTTE will insist the GSL accept or reject. Moreover, Thamilchelvan stated, "the ISGA should lead to the federal solution that was discussed in Oslo." Karuna Obsession Over? -------------- ¶8. (C) Both the Japanese and the EU troika noted that Thamilchelvan did not raise his long-familiar talking point that there can be no progress on a return to the peace table until the Karuna issue is resolved. Indeed, they had to raise Karuna and the situation in the East with Thamilchelvan. Both parties said that their clear impression is that the LTTE leadership believes it has gotten control of the Karuna issue and made progress on reasserting control over the East. Norwegian Charge' Laegreid concurred, noting that the LTTE has indeed dropped its "Karuna obstacle" language and now is "back to arguing about wording and linguistics." Norwegians See Some Hope (Maybe) -------------- ¶9. (C) In that vein, Laegreid noted that when he met with Thamilchelvan last weekend, the LTTE political chief had told him that the LTTE would not accept any GSL language on an interim authority as the basis for a return to peace talks. Rather, only the ISGA could be the basis for discussion. Laegreid had earlier on August 17 conveyed this message to GSL Peace Secretariat Jayantha Dhanapala who had instructed Laegreid to tell the LTTE that the GSL would never agree. ("I don't even have to go to the President with this.") Laegreid said he had passed the GSL view back to the LTTE by phone and expected to have a reply from them by the end of the week. Meanwhile, Laegreid said, the GSL continues to work on its own interim authority proposal which it probably will not make public before the next round of talks to "avoid having it picked apart in the press." ¶10. (C) Laegreid also reported that in his weekend meeting with the LTTE, the Tigers had launched into their usual riff about the longsuffering Tamil people who were not getting their share of development assistance, etc. Laegreid said he had cut them off and told them that development assistance would not flow until progress was under way towards a "final solution." If the LTTE really cares about the Tamil people, why are they dragging their feet on peace? This engendered an intense LTTE sidebar conversation in Tamil. After a few minutes of this, Laegreid interrupted to say, "what about returning to talks in mid-September?" Thamilchelvan said they could not, since there will be a large Tamil meeting in Geneva then. But, to Laegreid's surprise, the LTTE leader said "What about early October?" Laegreid said he had raised that time period with Dhanapala earlier on August 17 and the Peace Secretariat chief had said that would be fine with the SIPDIS GSL. Laegreid had conveyed that back to Kilinochchi, along with a message from Dhanapala that the GSL cannot be expected to "sit idly by" while the LTTE kills Sri Lankan citizens. ¶11. (C) Laegreid emphasized that it was not clear if Thamilchelvan had the authority to seriously discuss dates or not. Nonetheless, the Norwegians had found it encouraging and see it as a possible sign that the LTTE realizes they have to move on peace talks. Laegreid said that there is "no timetable" for Solheim or Helgesen to come back in the near future (local press reports notwithstanding) but that could "change rapidly" depending on events on the ground. Next Steps -------------- ¶12. (C) Blankhart and Suda both felt that the LTTE, having been hit hard by the EU and Japan, would need some time to take this on board and consider next steps. Laegreid observed that Thamilchelvan needs time to "ponder" and the Norwegians need "time to maneuver" and continue "quiet diplomacy" in light of the discussion of dates and the apparent LTTE dropping of the "Karuna obstacle." Thus, a co-chair's statement now probably was not needed although this was a matter for capitals to decide. Laegreid said Helgesen would be talking shortly with Deputy Secretary Armitage and with Japanese envoy Akashi (we understand the conversation with the Deputy Secretary occurred overnight). Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) The tough EU and Japanese messages seem to have been heard loud and clear although it is impossible to know whether Thamilchelvan reports back accurately to his masters and to what extent they care what the EU and Japan think. Both Thamilchelvam's mention of dates for peace talks and his apparently newfound lack of concern on the Karuna "obstacle" are noteworthy, although many semantic differences remain to be ironed out before the LTTE and the GSL agree on what would be discussed at the next round. Meanwhile, the Norwegians continue to deliver quite a bit of mail in both directions. END COMMENT. ENTWISTLE