GSL DOWNPLAYS JULY 7 SUICIDE BOMBING IMPACT ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001142 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS NSC FOR E.MILLARD E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2014 TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV PREL CE NO LTTE SUBJECT: GSL DOWNPLAYS JULY 7 SUICIDE BOMBING IMPACT ON PEACE PROCESS AS LTTE DENIES RESPONSIBILITY REF: A. (A) COLOMBO-SA/INS 07-08-04 UNCLASS EMAIL ¶B. (B) COLOMBO 1132 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reason 1.5 (b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Government officials downplay the July 7 suicide bombing in Colombo to keep the incident from jeopardizing the peace process. The intended target, Tamil Minister Devananda, is unfazed by the assassination attempt and dismisses the likelihood that his connection with Karuna may have provoked the Tigers. The Norwegians are concerned about the incident, but are working with the SLMM to keep the situation under control and both sides engaged in the peace process. The LTTE denies responsibility in the suicide bombing and blames other "elements," but expresses its commitment to the peace process and ceasefire. For the moment, it appears that the July 7 suicide bombing was an isolated incident, a "warning" to the government. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) GSL OFFICIALS TAKE LOW-KEY TACK: In the wake of the July 7 suicide bombing in Colombo, the Sri Lankan Government has downplayed the event's impact on the peace process with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Although it is widely assumed the LTTE are responsible for the bombing, the GSL has taken care to avoid accusing the Tigers and has instead focused on condemning the "attempted assassination through a targeted suicide attack" and expressing its sympathies and condolences for the victims and their families. Director General of the GSL Peace Secretariat, Jayantha Dhanapala, told the Ambassador on July 8 that the government was trying to keep the situation under control, being vague about suggesting responsibility for the bombing until the investigation was completed. Dhanapala also felt the July 7 suicide bombing was a directed one and not "general." Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, in a separate July 8 conversation with the Ambassador, said the bombing was "not necessarily a breakdown in the ceasefire." ¶3. (C) The GSL seems determined not to let the July 7 bombing affect the peace talks, but Dhanapala highlighted that "a nervous group was not the best peace partner." He felt that the LTTE was upping the ante on the talks: first they would only discuss an interim administration, now they �00A;would not go back to the negotiating table until the situation in the East was resolved. In Kadirgamar's opinion, the Tigers were in no position to start serious fighting, particularly because of the situation in the east and the dissension in their own ranks. ¶4. (C) ARMY COMMANDER SEES LTTE HAND IN BOMBING: Speaking with the Ambassador on July 8, newly appointed Commander of the Army, Lt Gen Shantha Kottegoda, was certain the LTTE was responsible for the suicide bombing. Kottegoda said it was clear ceasefire violation and the government had to make an official complaint to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). He was also convinced that the Tigers were pursuing an "individual target, and had been for a long time." He felt that the situation with Karuna also contributed to the LTTE's actions. While not conceding that the bombing was in reaction to the shooting of LTTE cadre and other activities in the east -- on July 5, three cadres were wounded, including a senior Tiger political leader, and one more killed -- Kottegoda said that when he visited the east last week, he told the LTTE that there would be no Army involvement with Karuna now that he was in charge. (Comment: implying that there was some involvement previously.) As for Karuna, Kottegoda stated, "I don't know where he is." ¶5. (C) INTENDED TARGET UNFAZED: Since the bombing, the intended target, Hindu Affairs Minister Douglas Devananda, has been vocal about his insistence to continue his ministerial work unabated. The target of several assassination attempts by the LTTE, Devananda was quoted July 7 as saying it would "not be easy to silence me." In a July 8 conversation with the Ambassador, Devananda described how July 7 was a "public day" for constituents to come to his office. When the female bomber refused an investigation by ministerial security personnel, she was then taken to the police station, where she detonated. ¶6. (C) Devananda and his political group, the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP),have long been rivals with the LTTE, who view his ministerial appointment as an affront. Many believe, however, that Devananda's recent public connection with breakaway LTTE rebel Karuna provoked yesterday's assassination attempt. Devananda reiterated to the Ambassador that he was in continuous touch with Karuna, but dismissed the idea that his connection with the rebel Tiger was the reason behind the bombing. Karuna was proceeding with plans to form a political party, the "LTTE - Karuna wing," Devananda said. ¶7. (C) MORE WORK FOR THE NORWEGIANS: Speaking with the Ambassador on July 8, Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar said that the Tigers told him they have no connection to the July 7 bombing. Commenting on the SLMM, Brattskar said the monitors were drafting a letter to both sides "deploring the July 7 violence and the general attitude and events in the east" in recent days. While the Tigers were likely responsible for the suicide bombing, Brattskar felt that both sides had much to answer for, given recent actions. In conjunction with the SLMM, Brattskar said that he and SLMM head Trond Furuhovde were considering meeting separately with both the GSL and LTTE to discuss the ceasefire agreement (CFA). Brattskar said that the GSL hoped the Tigers would issue a statement in support of the peace process and ceasefire, but expressed his doubt that the Tigers would do so. ¶8. (C) DENIAL AND CONDEMNATION BY TIGERS: Not unexpectedly, the LTTE denied involvement in the bombing. LTTE political leader S.P. Thamilchelvan is quoted on the pro-LTTE website "TamilNet" as saying the group had "absolutely no connection in the suicide bombing." Separately, the LTTE also released a statement (Ref A) on its official website, blaming "some elements who are working to disrupt the peace efforts between the Sri Lanka Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam." The statement goes on to criticize the government and military for helping these elements and calls on them to "halt all assistance given to these armed groups." The LTTE concludes the statement reiterating its commitment to the peace process and to the ceasefire. ¶9. (C) OPPOSITION REACTION: The Opposition United National Party (UNP) spokesman Ravindra Randeniya called on the government to pursue those responsible for the suicide bombing and for the government to be accountable for its recent action and cease blaming other parties for the problems in the east. Milinda Moragoda, an MP with the UNP told the Ambassador on July 8 that the LTTE and EPDP have had many clashes in the past three years. Moragoda claimed that LTTE senior theoretician Anton Balasingham always maintained that EPDP was not part of the peace process. Moragoda, too, felt that the July 7 bombing was likely connected to the violence in the East and said the real risk was having the whole situation "slide into chaos." Moragoda said he heard that there were 15 suicide bombers for different targets around Colombo, but, "Why activate one now unless it was connected to the Karuna issue." ¶10. (C) It is interesting to note, however, that police found a suicide vest and landmine in a Colombo suburb on June 17, and explosives under a key Colombo-area bridge some weeks prior. Given the events of July 7, it is possible the "discovered" suicide vest was an intentional warning by the LTTE to the government to cease its alleged activities and support of pro-Karuna elements in the east. When the activities continued, the Tigers may have moved to the next step. ¶11. (C) CIVIL SOCIETY SEES GSL ALSO AS TARGET: In a July 8 conversation with poloff, Jehan Perera, Director of the National Peace Council noted he thought the July 7 suicide bombing in Colombo, which he attributed to the LTTE, was meant as a message to the GSL not to "two-time" the Tigers. He described the attack as retaliation for "government connivance" in July 5 attacks against LTTE cadre in the east. He thought the LTTE felt that unless they hurt the GSL, the government would not bother itself with Tiger concerns. Although Devananda is a long-term target of the Tigers, Perera posited that the LTTE could attempt to assassinate him at any time, and that the timing of this attack indicated that it was against the government, and not Devananda specifically. In his view, the Tigers' choice of target was not one that would lead to war, as an attack on a Sri Lankan Army installation might have. Perera saw the bombing as an isolated incident which would not necessarily escalate into a pattern of attacks in the capital, although he though it was a dangerous sign that the LTTE might use suicide bombing attacks as a tool to "get their way" in the future. ¶12. (C) COMMENT: The general feeling in Colombo is to treat the July 7 suicide bombing as an isolated incident, not as a prelude to all-out war. The government has certainly been treating it that way, downplaying the incident and not accusing the LTTE. While Devananda may have been the specific target, this was almost certainly a warning to the government as well that the Tigers can strike back if they are struck in the East. Interestingly enough, most people in Colombo seem not to have reacted strongly to the bombing, despite it being the first in over two years and the only one since the CFA went into effect. END COMMENT. LUNSTEAD