HOW REAL IS CHAVEZ'S OIL THREAT?

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000731 SIPDIS NSC FOR TSHANNON AND CBARTON ENERGY FOR DPUMPHREY AND ALOCKWOOD E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2014 TAGS: EPET PGOV VE SUBJECT: HOW REAL IS CHAVEZ'S OIL THREAT? Classified By: AMB. CHARLES SHAPIRO; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) On February 29, President Chavez threatened to cut off Venezuelan oil supplies to the U.S. or to nationalize U.S. company assets if the U.S. were to seek to "blockade" or impose sanctions against Venezuela. The U.S. majors in Venezuela dismiss his words as bluster but do not totally discount some action on his part. Chavez has sought, largely unsuccessfully, to diversify Venezuela's oil sales away from the U.S. in the past. Weighing against a sudden cut-off is the fact that it would be enormously costly and time consuming for Venezuela to seek out new markets to replace its sales to the U.S. where specialty refineries are tooled to handle Venezuelan heavy crudes. However, Chavez's brutal restructuring of PDVSA after the general strike of December 2002-February 2003, and his draconian exchange control system show that on economic matters a purely political logic often prevails for him. On a much smaller scale, he has used oil as a political tool with his action against the Dominican Republic in 2003. While we believe such a high risk action is not imminent, Chavez's character, revolutionary ideology, and ignorance of how international markets function mean it cannot be ruled out completely. Chavez may believe that his threat, against the backdrop of U.S. domestic politics, may cause the USG to back off. And, of course, it serves to fire up his supporters and to burnish his revolutionary credentials. End Summary. -------------- STINGING WORDS -------------- ¶2. (C) On February 29, President Chavez threatened that "not a drop of oil would arrive from Venezuela" if the U.S. were to seize CITGO or otherwise "blockade Venezuela." He went on to add that the U.S. should remember that it has "plenty of installations here" (that could be seized in retaliation). Venezuelan Ambassador to the U.S. Bernardo Alvarez minimized the remarks in a press conference the next day saying that "that message was intended for the Venezuelan people and not the North American Government." Inquiring about our reaction to President Chavez's remarks, Juan Fernandez, President of "Gente de Petroleo" (Petroleum People),an opposition civil society group consisting of former PDVSA staff, commented to PolCouns March 4 that Chavez's comments should not be dismissed off-hand. As a PDVSA executive, he recalled, he had had discussions with PDVSA President Ali Rodriguez about contracts being canceled capriciously. Rodriguez told him, Fernandez said, that he had to understand that the decisions were matters of state, not business. -------------- -------------- U.S. COMPANY REACTIONS TO NATIONALIZATION THREAT -------------- --- ¶3. (C) We canvassed the U.S. majors (ChevronTexaco, ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil) operating in Venezuela for their reactions to Chavez's threat of nationalization. They were united in dismissing his words as bluster. However, ChevronTexaco de Venezuela President Ali Moshiri commented to econoff on March 2 that he believes the GOV is watching the U.S. companies closely. He added that he has a "gut feeling" there could be some action taken if a company were to "step outside the boundaries." Mark Ward of ExxonMobil, which besides operating in Venezuela, has a long-term purchase contract for Venezuelan crude, remarked that PDVSA would be hit by a blizzard of law suits. All three local company presidents pledged to let the Embassy know immediately of any operational changes. -------------- A STABLE SUPPLIER LOOKS TO DIVERSIFY MARKETS -------------- ¶4. (C) In the past, senior Chavez administration officials have repeatedly reminded U.S. policymakers that Venezuela has never suspended oil shipments to the U.S and assured them that Venezuela would continue to be a stable supplier of oil. Nonetheless, announcements of PDVSA's attempts to develop other markets have been a hallmark of the Chavez years. While it is normal for any business to seek to expand its markets, we have long felt that Chavez's ideology was such that he would prefer other customers rather than the U.S. In reality, however, the process of building new markets in the oil business can be a slow, costly one. In 2001, PDVSA was ordered by the Ministry of Energy and Mines to cultivate a market in India and signed a contract with Indian firm Reliance Petroleum. We understand that contract proved unprofitable and was allowed to lapse in 2002. -------------- A CUT-OFF WOULD BE COSTLY... -------------- ¶5. (C) Moving out of the U.S. market would be very painful for Venezuela. Venezuela exports 1.4-1.6 million b/d to the U.S. The majority of these exports are heavy, sour (i.e., high sulfur) crudes bound for so-called deep conversion refineries that have been tooled to handle them. PDVSA's U.S. affiliate CITGO operates several of these refineries and others are operated by ventures that have long-term purchase agreements with PDVSA. Admittedly, there would be an impact, possibly serious, on the U.S. in terms of refinery economics, etc., if Chavez were to stop these exports. But the U.S. would have the whole world to turn to for alternative supplies, either crude or refined, and, as a Washington-based oil analyst told the Ambassador, the option of drawing upon the Strategic Petroleum Reserve would be available to calm markets. We very much doubt whether Chavez is weighing these factors at all in making his threats. Nor does he appear to be considering the fact that in the event of such a cut-off PDVSA and thus Venezuela could be grievously harmed. India and Brazil have been mentioned to econoff as possible markets for these Venezuelan crudes. The local stringer for industry publication "Petroleum Argus," however, has informed us that Brazil has little of the hydrotreating and coking capacity needed to handle the crudes while India's Reliance Petroleum could only handle 150-200,000 b/d of heavy crude based on its current desulfurization capacity. ¶6. (C) He adds that most European and Asian refiners could not run these Venezuelan crudes straight through their facilities, but would instead have to blend them with a light, sweet crude to meet refinery specifications. While this is possible, Venezuela would have to offer a significant price cut ("next to nothing a barrel," according to our expert) in order to induce refineries to accept the crudes. Venezuela would also have to undercut other sellers into these markets such as Russian oil sales to Europe. In sum, given the realities of refinery operations, it would be more likely that Venezuela would have to make small scale deals with small countries to start with and suffer through a long process of market development. ¶7. (C) A bigger risk to the U.S. might lie in a decision by Venezuela to divert to other markets the approximately 400,000 b/d of light crude controlled by PDVSA. But here again Venezuela would take a price hit and the shipping market would also be another barrier. Venezuela would be forced to hire tankers that normally operate in other areas, for instance the West Africa to Asia routes. Many of these long range tankers could not enter Venezuelan ports -- only Jose can accommodate a tanker holding more 500,000 barrels. These transport costs would place further pressure on the price of Venezuelan crudes. ¶8. (C) In the area of products, we understand there are now a few long distance product runs between Venezuela and Europe, primarily in jet fuel. Venezuela might be able to expand this market. Venezuela could export more fuel oil and gas oil to Asia which could affect power and heating oil prices in the U.S. But here again, Venezuela would probably have to offer deep discounts to attract non-traditional buyers and the shipping costs might be prohibitive. The U.S. gasoline market has already been affected by problems in Venezuela's refineries resulting from the 2002-2003 oil strike. It appears that the market is already likely to be more severely affected in 2004. Several sources reported to econoff on March 4 that Venezuela itself is now importing over 100,000 b/d of unleaded gasoline to the Amuay refinery to compensate for problems at the neighboring Cardon refinery. ¶9. (C) Finally, the experience of the 2002-2003 strike demonstrated that Venezuela has limited storage capacity. The strike demonstrated that if the export stream of a million or more barrels a day is stopped, production will have to be shut in in as little as 48 hours in some fields. We see no evidence that PDVSA had taken any steps to increase storage. Also, the capabilities of PDVSA's current marketing personnel would probably not be up to the task of placing over a million barrels of oil a day onto the spot market. -------------- -------------- ...BUT PRAGMATISM NOT NECESSARILY THE REVOLUTIONARY WAY -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) While PDVSA management know the damage that a cut-off of oil to the U.S. could do to the company, the new PDVSA is staffed by fervent supporters of the "revolution" or by opportunists who would be unwilling to lose their access to the spoils of corruption. The recent decision to stop the development of the market for orimulsion, the oil-water blend designed to replace coal in electricity plants, could be illustrative. Canada's New Brunswick Power has recently sued Bitor, PDVSA's orimulsion affiliate, alleging breach of an agreement to supply orimulsion. New Brunswick went ahead to install additional generation capacity based on signature of a Letter of Intent with PDVSA only to have PDVSA announce its decision to supply existing contracts only. Chavez himself is reported to have blocked signature of the agreement with the Canadians. It appears the decision was made to forego the development of a relatively small but growing market for a product developed from Venezuela's ample supplies of extra heavy crude to produce a higher yield blend. Thus, market development was sacrificed to short-term financial gains, at a time when the GOV needs lots of ready cash for spending to maintain its political standing with its low-income voter base. -------------- OIL AND POLITICS -------------- ¶11. (C) Chavez also showed his willingness to use oil as a political weapon in September 2003 when he suspended oil shipments to the Dominican Republic in protest against supposed coup-mongering by former Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez. Although Chavez has since publicly announced that shipments under the San Jose Accord would be resumed, a shipping industry contact tells us that what Venezuelan oil is going to the DR is moving through traders and not directly. Chavez's restructuring of PDVSA, laying off 20,000 employees following their participation in the general strike aimed at his ouster, is another indication of his willingness to put political considerations above economic ones in dealing with oil-related issues. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) Chavez's priority is regime survival. Stopping oil sales to the U.S., and taking what could be an enormous revenue loss does not on its face appear to be a recipe for ensuring the economic stability he presumably needs. However, Chavez may believe that, in a crisis, the short-term pain inflicted on the U.S. would be enough to cause the USG to back off from some action against him or that by raising it now he makes such action less likely. Chavez's combination of an oil embargo threat with insulting remarks about President Bush also send a message to supporters that, not to worry, he can deal with USG pressure on the referendum. With at best limited understanding of how international oil markets function, Chavez may also be over-estimating Venezuela's power in such a confrontation. He probably does understand that a sudden cut-off of sales to the U.S. would be a momentous decision. Such a decision is by no means imminent; for now it is useful to fire up his supporters and to divert attention from the referendum process. But for the first time, he has laid on the table the use of Venezuela's "oil weapon," such as it is, which must be considered a new and somewhat ominous development. Ironically, such a threat completely cuts against Venezuela's effort to attract new international hydrocarbons investment, such as the Deltana Platform natural gas project for which ChevronTexaco has been awarded a concession or a giant petrochemical plant which Exxonmobil is considering, but clearly Chavez's main concerns lie elsewhere. SHAPIRO