Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04CARACAS559
2004-02-17 19:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

BRAIN TRUST PREVIEWS PRIMARY PLANS

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM VE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000559 

SIPDIS


NSC FOR CBARTON
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA FOR DCHA/OTI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM VE
SUBJECT: BRAIN TRUST PREVIEWS PRIMARY PLANS


Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES S. SHAPIRO, FOR REASONS 1.4 9(b) AND
(d)

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SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000559 SIPDIS NSC FOR CBARTON USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA FOR DCHA/OTI E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM VE SUBJECT: BRAIN TRUST PREVIEWS PRIMARY PLANS Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES S. SHAPIRO, FOR REASONS 1.4 9(b) AND (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) On 07 February, the Ambassador met with a group of opposition "wise-men" who made a presentation on a plan for a unified candidate to run for president in elections following an eventual recall referendum. The group claimed that the plan had possible widespread support among leaders of the opposition, ranging from civic groups and the Catholic Church, to the main political parties and potential candidates. The centerpiece of the presentation was a plan for a two-stage primary to choose the candidate. The NGO SUMATE would organize the primary. The exact timing of each aspect of the primary process had been extensively debated, and was not finally decided in all its points. The main conclusion was that the primaries would be announced around the time the referendum was officially approved by the CNE, and that the final phase would take place after the referendum. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by EmbOff notetaker, met with Carmelo Lauria (ex-Minister, AD),Gustavo Tarre Briceno (ex-Deputy, COPEI),Carlos Blanco (columnist for El Universal, ex-Minister, AD),Joaquin Marta Sosa (author, ex-head of VTV),Fernando Martinez Mottola (ex-Minister, ex-head of CANTV),and Maria Corina Machado (SUMATE). The group is composed of retired politicians, columnists, and members of the private sector who have met weekly for 10 years to discuss politics. The group has been consulting with SUMATE over proposals for selecting a single opposition candidate. -------------- Why Primaries? -------------- ¶3. (C) Martinez made a presentation on the debate over the best system to choose a unified opposition candidate. He and several of those present were part of a larger group that has been circulating among the opposition, trying to arrive at a consensus on the best way to resolve several issues. They presented an impressive list of the groups they have spoken to, and who they claim have agreed to the plan. ¶4. (C) The group starts from the premise that support for the recall of Chavez is much stronger than that of the opposition's candidates against Chavez. So while the referen
dum will be won if it is allowed, the election could still be lost, especially since Chavez himself is much more popular than any single opposition leader. Martinez stressed the importance of the opposition developing a positive message for the future to attract those anti-Chavistas who do not support any of the opposition candidates (a figure the presentation put at 13%),and the 10% swing vote between the opposition and Chavez. ¶5. (C) According to Martinez, a primary is the only option that enjoys widespread support, and seems likely to give the eventual winner legitimacy beyond hard-core anti-Chavistas. It is also seen as the best way to force the potential candidates to develop a positive forward-looking campaign, to counter Chavez' relatively clear political message. To this end, Martinez proposed a tightly structured debate for the candidates, forcing them to address the issues of the day, and not just attack one another. The main difficulty of a primary is its organization within the tight schedule provided by the Constitution, which stipulates 30 days between the referendum, and the ensuing presidential elections. Machado was confident that SUMATE could organize and execute the primary. -------------- Unresolved Issues -------------- ¶6. (C) Martinez' presentation stressed six main issues that still need to be resolved. Announcement of the primaries: A consensus was emerging that the announcement of the primary could come as soon as the CNE declared a referendum. Before or after the referendum? While their are good arguments on both sides, the thinking now is to launch the two-stage primary after the referendum, though organization and campaigning might begin before-hand. CNE intervention: The constitution dictates that the CNE oversee elections of party officials, which could impede a possible primary. Machado believes there is a legal argument to avoid CNE involvement, as an opposition candidate is not a party official. Candidate eligibility: Candidates would be required to present signatures proposing them for the ballot. The group tended toward a low threshold (10,000 signatures) in order to keep most potential candidates inside the process. One round or two? Two rounds would produce a unified candidate with a majority backing, while a single round among all candidates could produce a winner by a slim margin. Only if one candidate got 40% or more of the vote, and 10% more than the next person, would the second round be suspended. The members of the G5 have reportedly accepted the plan, as have Celia Sosa, Manuel Cova, Americo Martin, and Enrique Tejera Paris. Salas Romer has agreed, but wants a primary with no runoff. Only Teodoro Petkoff has rejected the plan. Who can vote? Should the primary depend on the electoral registry or those who signed the "Reafirmazo"? The group leaned toward a broader and inclusive process. -------------- Can it work? -------------- ¶10. (C) Blanco insisted repeatedly that no one would participate in the process unless they were assured that the winner would not only be the sole candidate, but would have the full organizational support of all the other parties. Martinez felt that Mendoza would probably withdraw to run in 2006 if he saw he could not win the primary. The group noted that Henrique Salas Romer was supporting the plan because it has not emanated from the CD, which Salas views as Mendoza's campaign committee . ¶11. (C) Joaquin Marta Sosa is working on a consensus campaign platform and a more basic plan of governability for the opposition. But irreducible differences would need to be solved by allowing the candidates to run in the primary on those issues where they differ. The main issue is whether the candidates will run again in 2006 if they win (Henrique Salas Romer),serve only until 2006 (Enrique Mendoza),or serve only as an interim leader (Manuel Cova). -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) The opposition has got a number of issues it must deal with simultaneously: getting the CNE to set a date for a referendum, winning the referendum, settling on a single opposition candidate for president, developing a unified campaign organization and platform, and winning the election are the near and medium-term tasks. This proposal helps resolve the candidate and platform issues, while the coordinadora focuses on the CNE. The group was confident their proposal would be accepted by all the interested groups. The key to its ability to achieve this feat seems to have been a preference for negotiation and compromise over demands and impositions. Getting Salas to agree has been the most impressive accomplishment so far. If it is as close to acceptance by all candidates as they claim, this group will have provided a tremendous service to the opposition. SHAPIRO NNNN 2004CARACA00559 - CONFIDENTIAL

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