THE "TROPICAL UNITY" OF THE OPPOSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000533

SIPDIS


NSC FOR CBARTON
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM VE
SUBJECT: THE "TROPICAL UNITY" OF THE OPPOSITION

REF: A. CARACAS 437


B. CARACAS 503

Classified By: Mark Wells, Acting Political Counselor, for
Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) The opposition remains convinced that the referendum
is on track, according to a top aide for Enrique Mendoza.
Organizers of the February 14 march to defend the signatures
calling for a recall vote on President Hugo Chavez are
planning on 100,000 (some hope for one million) to
participate with some sporadic violence possible. The march
is an attempt to keep pressure on CNE after a month of
relative calm among the opposition that saw little progress
on the count. The Democratic Coordinating Committee (DCC)
receives its CNE information from a variety of sources and
then takes consensus decisions that are often not the most
effective. Traditional parties form one bloc of opinion
within the opposition, while three parties -- Primero
Justicia, Proyecto Venezuela, and Causa R -- flip-flop. The
DCC's executive group known as the G-5 rarely meets. The DCC
is close to forming a campaign committee to oversee the
referendum. End summary.

--------------
Opposition Still Hopeful at CNE
--------------


2. (C) Poloff met February 11 with Daniel Thiman (PROTECT),
an aide for Miranda State Governor Enrique Mendoza, to
discuss the Democratic Coordinating Committee's (DCC) views
on the referendum process against President Hugo Chavez.
(Note: Thiman works on operations and logistics for Mendoza
in the DCC. While he sees himself as "not a politician," he
attends most DCC planning meetings. End note.) Thiman said
the DCC remains convinced of the inevitability of the
referendum, though he admitted some increased doubts over the
last week due to the issue of "plana" signature forms (filled
out but not signed in the same handwriting). Still, he said
that the date the DCC is using internally for getting a
response from the National Electoral Commission (CNE) on the
referendum is February 27 (Comment: This is much sooner than
the OAS/Carter Center estimate that the CNE would finish on
March 16 at its current pace. End comment.)


3. (C) Poloff asked Gente de Petroleo chief Juan Fernandez on
February 12 about the opposition's expectations at the CNE.
Fernandez admitted that many opposition members are not
following the signature count as closely as they should. In
the end, he said, the politicians in the opposition believe
the CNE will strike a political solution and avoid the messy
details. (Comment: This may well be the "Venezuelan"
solution to the CNE's many troubles, though we wonder whether
this meeting of the minds will happen. End comment.)


--------------
February 14 March: Caracas-Only Or Greater?
--------------


4. (C) Asked why the opposition is pushing the February 14
march, Fernandez said it is based on resentment between the
DCC and the CNE. Fernandez said that CNE director Jorge
Rodriguez (pro-GOV) asked Mendoza in January to lower
pressure in the media against the CNE so that the work could
be carried out. The DCC believes they were tricked once it
became apparent the CNE was not going to meet the arbitrarily
set deadline of February 13. The DCC decided it was time to
ratchet up the pressure, lest the count drag on interminably.


5. (C) Thiman said DCC organizers of the February 14 march to
the CNE are planning on 100,000 participants (refs a and b).
He described the march as a "metropolitan march," meaning
that demonstrators would not be bussed in large numbers from
around Venezuela, with the exception of some 2,000 Proyecto

Venezuela participants from Carabobo. The tactic of having
six smaller marches rally at Plaza Venezuela and head toward
the CNE downtown is designed to imitate a military maneuver
that will intimidate Chavez, Thiman added. (Note: the GOV
announced a "megamercado" of meat sales on February 14 and 15
on Avenida Bolivar, in the path of the opposition march. In
the past, the opposition has skirted such events.)


6. (C) Thiman expressed concern that the GOV seemed to be
setting up the opposition for an April 11-like event in which
an opposition march to the presidential palace turned bloody.
Thiman said the march did not intend to go all the way to
CNE headquarters, which is currently surrounded by radical
Chavez loyalists led by premiere street activist Lina Ron.
Though organizers do not plan to come close to the Chavistas,
Thiman worried that the march could "get out of control."


7. (C) Juan Fernandez said he received word that supporters
were coming in from all over Venezuela, causing him to
estimate that up to one million people might attend the
march. Fernandez said he was very worried about violence,
pointing out that each side has radicals who want to force a
conflict. (Comment: Fernandez is informed by his network of
ex-PDVSA workers around Venezuela, but is not a march
organizer.) Fernandez said he was sure the main march would
not come close to the Chavistas.

--------------
Opposition: An Idiot Savant?
--------------


8. (C) Speaking candidly, Thiman said the opposition suffers
from several asymmetries when it comes to political battle:
they have lots of guts but few brains. He said the DCC has
tremendous operational capability (organizing marches and
signature drives) but lacks strategic sense. He suggested
this was the reason the opposition opted for a march on
February 14 in order to keep pressure on the CNE.

--------------
The Opposition's CNE Connection
--------------


9. (C) Thiman described how the opposition collects and
processes information from the CNE. The opposition's chief
operative at the CNE is Enrique Naime (COPEI),seconded by
Nelson Rampersaad (MAS). Naime also has had an official
sleeping at the CNE for the last 30 days. In addition, each
major political party has, as tradition has dictated,
officials placed in key leadership positions throughout the
CNE. These officials report their observations to Naime and
to their respective party chiefs. Thiman noted also that
opposition witnesses observing the verification process also
report to Naime.


10. (C) Naime and Rampersaad visit DCC headquarters daily and
brief political party chiefs (secgens and presidents),who
also receive information directly from their party members in
the CNE. Thiman said these meetings had been twice weekly,
but are now being held daily. The information is discussed
and a consensus opinion emerges over next steps to take.
Thiman also mentioned that Naime meets periodically with the
OAS and Carter Center. Thiman conceded that the need for
consensus often prevents the opposition from choosing the
first best solution, but it is a political reality.

--------------
The Opposition's Party Blocs
--------------


11. (C) Thiman said that political parties are the principal
actors in the DCC; civil society groups do not have
significant influence on major decisions. Traditional
parties (AD, COPEI, and MAS) usually side together on DCC
decisions with a collection of minor parties (Bandera Roja,
Solidaridad, Union, etc.). The pendulum votes are Primero
Justicia, Proyecto Venezuela, and Causa R. These parties
banded together in January to chastise the other parties for
putting priority on the regional elections instead of the

referendum. Thiman said these parties have about 15
candidates between them, which made them averse to regional
elections. However, he noted that since then none of the
parties have been in the press fighting over regional
candidates, an example of what he called the "tropical unity"
of the opposition.

--------------
A Campaign Committee Coming
--------------


12. (C) The DCC's executive committee, the so-called Group of
5 (or G-5, consisting of Enrique Mendoza, Henrique Salas
Romer, Julio Borges, Henry Ramos Allup, and Juan Fernandez)
has not met in months, Thiman said. The DCC's political
committee, consisting of 60 representatives of parties and
NGOs, will be augmented by a new "G-17" of full-time
officials that will function as a campaign committee
("Comando de Campana"). Opposition leaders believe the
campaign committee will make the opposition more agile in
responding to Chavez on a day-to-day basis. Thiman said
there is almost full agreement on the formation of an
executive campaign committee, with up to nine members, that
will steer the DCC. Enrique Mendoza will continue to head
the DCC, he added.

--------------
Comment
--------------


13. (C) Thiman's report that the DCC is still optimistic for
a February 27 announcement by the CNE is worrisome given the
OAS and Carter Center believe the process will trudge on for
another month. We suspect this is a combination of the
inaccurate and incomplete information as well as an
intentional desire to maintain morale among opposition
workers. Still, these insights help explain why the
opposition seems prone to error and miscalculation. Against
the autocratic style of its opponent, the opposition needs
all the help it can get.


14. (C) Both Thiman and Fernandez are concerned over possible
violence on February 14, expecting a trap laid by the GOV to
slice off another layer of potentially disloyal followers in
the GOV and military. Both agreed that fringe groups on
either side could start something, which would most certainly
be counterproductive for the opposition's efforts.

SHAPIRO


NNNN

2004CARACA00533 - CONFIDENTIAL