"RE-DISCOVERING" THE OPPOSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 003639 SIPDIS NSC FOR CBARTON USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2014 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM VE SUBJECT: "RE-DISCOVERING" THE OPPOSITION Classified By: Abelardo A. Arias, Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, for Reasons 1.4(b). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Movement to Socialism President Felipe Mujica believes a first step for the Venezuelan opposition is to wage a "campaign of rights," perhaps beginning with a referendum to overturn the soon-to-pass media content law. Additionally, the opposition must regain institutionality in the National Electoral Council, which would permit two or three opposition political fronts to form and compete in elections. Barring this, Mujica asserted, the GOV may choose to ramp up the political fight against opposition groups, which will lead to more radical conflict. Mujica concedes the GOV continues to hold tremendous sway over Venezuela's poor, loyalty that goes beyond financial benefits. While he is idealistic, Mujica at least is giving serious thought to tangible actions for Venezuela's beleaguered opposition. End summary. -------------- Opposition: Leaderless and Confused -------------- ¶2. (C) Felipe Mujica, president of the opposition Movement to Socialism (MAS) party, told poloff November 23 that groups in opposition to President Hugo Chavez are confused and in disarray. The opposition's half-hearted call for abstention of the October 31 regional elections greatly weakened opposition political parties, he said. He asserted that had turnout rivaled that of the August 15 presidential recall referendum, several key races would have gone for the opposition. Mujica said the only viable opposition leader remaining is Zulia State Governor Manuel Rosales. Mujica suggested that Rosales might be able to mount an effective campaign against Chavez in the 2006 elections, but first the opposition must "re-discover" itself. -------------- A Campaign For Rights -------------- ¶3. (C) Mujica suggested the opposition may find its voice by opposing the draft media law currently before the National Assembly. MAS publicly proposed a referendum to abrogate the media law in the likely event it passes (which will probably happen in December). Mujica noted the constitutional requirements for such a referendum are 10 percent of registered voters signing a petition and 40 percent of registered voters calling for the law to be repealed. (Comment: The constitution prohibits referenda to repeal laws that protect or develop human rights, which the GOV would surely argue in defense of the media law. Additionally, the 40-percent threshold amounts to a whopping 5.6 million votes.) Mujica suggested that, regardless of the outcome of their efforts to hold referendum, it could help cement the opposition behind a human rights message and, thus, regain some credibility. -------------- Building Confidence in the CNE -------------- ¶4. (C) Calling it a best case scenario, Mujica suggested one of the opposition's first priorities is to negotiate with the GOV for some level of institutionality in the National Electoral Council (CNE),a sufficient change in personnel to assure fair elections. Mujica said this would allow two to three opposition political fronts to compete for some elected offices. He suggested a center-left bloc formed by MAS, Accion Democratica (AD),Union, and others and a center-right bloc formed by Primero Justicia (PJ),COPEI (Christian Democrats),and possibly Causa R (which recently formed a parliamentary alliance with Primero Justicia). Mujica said that GOV-allied parties are positioned to capture at least two-thirds of the National Assembly in next year's elections (probably in December). He said current CNE rules undermine the constitutional mandate of proportional representation, giving pro-Chavez parties an immense advantage. He suggested a change in the law would be necessary before opposition parties can be guaranteed of winning a sufficient number of seats. -------------- Or Things Could Just Get Worse -------------- ¶5. (C) Mujica admitted that carving out political space for the opposition would require the GOV to recognize and value a democratic opposition movement, which he thought unlikely. He said it is possible for the GOV to continue to defeat the opposition in elections, first in the March make-up elections for governor of Amazonas State and about four mayoralties, and later in the June parochial (neighborhood level) elections and then the December National Assembly races. Mujica predicted an increase in political persecution of opposition figures as well. He thought it possible in this case that radical Chavez opponents could find they have "nothing left to do" but resort to violent acts, alluding to the killing of political prosecutor Danilo Anderson. -------------- "Chavez Nos Toma En Cuenta" -------------- ¶6. (C) Mujica said the opposition's challenge to win the support of Venezuela's poor is daunting. He noted that his own party's traditional lower class base had been mostly co-opted by Chavez, leaving MAS without a niche. Mujica said Chavez's most popular program by far is "impunity." The spread of the informal economy, informal housing, and land and building invasions, a plight for previous governments, have purposely gone unchecked by Chavez. Chavez does not spend anything on these people, Mujica asserted, and yet they are grateful to Chavez for letting them violate property rights or tax laws. Mujica said Chavez gives them hope that things will get better (though they arguably do not). He summed this up with a phrase he says is repeated in Venezuelan shanty towns: "At least Chavez keeps us in mind." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) There are many pitfalls to Mujica's optimistic scenario, but he is an intelligent opposition leader who is at least thinking about the future. It might behoove a more sophisticated Chavista movement to open up political space for a democratic opposition; we do not, however, see Chavez likely to do so, either because he wants to mold his own "democratic opposition" or because he would not risk upsetting his more radical followers. Mujica's view of Rosales as the future presidential candidate is still an embryonic concept, not widely shared by the opposition still two years away from elections. It may also be that Chavez will encourage the opposition in this direction so as to hand the Zulia Governor a decisive and ostensibly legitimate defeat come election time. McFarland NNNN 2004CARACA03639 - CONFIDENTIAL