"HEGEMONY IS A CHALLENGE:" CHAVISTA LEADER VIEWS

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 003584 SIPDIS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2034 TAGS: PREL EPET PGOV PHUM ENRG VE SUBJECT: "HEGEMONY IS A CHALLENGE:" CHAVISTA LEADER VIEWS GOV Classified By: DCM - Steve McFarland for reason 1.4 (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Chavez supporter and Patria Para Todos (PPT) secgen Jose Albornoz talked with DCM November 18 about impending cabinet changes, policy challenges for Chavez and the MVR party, and potential to improve bilateral relations. PPT accepts that party stalwart Ali Rodriguez will leave PDVSA to be Foreign Minister, but is resisting a proposal to replace Ambassador to the US Bernanrdo Alvarez_ with William Izarra. New PDVSA president may be Energy Minister Ramirez_. Internally, Chavez' challenge is to not let political hegemony be undone by corruption. Albornoz said the GOV paid attention to international and to US views on human rights cases, pointing to the release of Henrique Capriles; he said the Sumate case essentially would remain in suspended animation, so that the case could be revived in 2006 if needed. Albornoz made a strong pitch for improved bilateral relations, including a presidential summit in 2005; DCM said the summit was improbable, and stressed that improved relations would depend on the resolution of each sides' concerns, including Sumate, the penal code, and press freedom. End Summary. Cabinet Changes in the Works -------------- ¶2. (C) Chavez ally and PPT SecGen Jose Albornoz stated that PDVSA president Ali Rodriguez, a key PPT leader, would move to the Foreign Ministry as early as November 19. Energy and Mines (MEM) Minister Rafael Ramirez_ was the leading candidate to replace Rodriguez; Albornoz warned that Ramirez_ was close to Cuba (comment: Rodriguez was rumored to be very close to Castro as well). Albornoz said that there was another idea floating around: to move Ambassador to the U.S. Bernardo Alvarez_ back to replace Ramirez_, and to send to Washington William Izarra, the theoretician of the revolution, former coup plotter, and father of Communications Minister Andres Izarra. The PPT was trying hard to resist this, Albornoz said, and warned that Izarra was harder-line than Alvarez_, and also that it was Marta Harnecker--who has an office in Chavez' palace--that was pushing Izarra's candidacy. (comment: Izarra is a low-key and approachable ideologue whom Chavez had distanced himself from. Izarra did valuable work in the referendum, and in now back in Chavez' favor.) DCM did not say, "oh what a shame if Alvarez_ were to be replaced." The other cabinet change in the works is to replace Health Minister Capella with the sister of Army commander Gen. Baduel. Albornoz said that Capella had been forced out because his arrogance had caused considerable problems in a ministry which had to satisfy numerous unions and groups of customers. "Hegemony is a Challenge:" -------------- ¶3. (C) Albornoz said that during the November 13 meeting at Fuerte Tiuna with the Chavista governors and mayors, Chavez underscored the need to fight corruption and inefficiency. There were, however, initial signs of discord in Chavez' MVR party. Chavez' recent order to the MVR to respond positively to the desire for cooperation from the Union party of Francisco Arias Cardenas (ex-Chavez coupplotter, and former Chavez rival) had really annoyed MVR deputies like Nicolas Maduro, Iris Varela, and William Lara. These deputies feared that Arias Cardenas could somehow displace them, Albornoz asserted. For the PPT, however, now was a time of opportunity: the party now had 30 regional assembly delegates, and 27 mayors. The PPT was pushing its deputies to get on accountability commissions in their respective assemblies in order to support anti-corruption efforts (comment: in many cases, probably to ensure corruption flows their own way). Meanwhile, the Chavistas are focused on the 2005 national assembly elections. The Chavistas supported the Electoral Council (CNE) decision to suspend the December recall elections (of opposition deputies) because any opposition victory would be a real boost for the opposition, whereas an MVR victory would have little additional impact on the heels of their August 15 and October 31 successes. It was, however, a fiercely fought debate within the Chavista parties, Albornoz said. Better Relations with the U.S.? -------------- ¶4. (C) Albornoz stressed that Ali Rodriguez would, as Foreign Minister, aim for improved bilateral relations -- ideally to the point that there could be a Chavez-Bush summit in 2005. DCM said that while nothing was impossible, this sounded very improbable. The USG view is that presidential meetings reflect a positive bilateral relationship. There would have to be considerable improvement on the issues each country is concerned about. In the case of the U.S., these included Sumate, the penal code, and the media law. Albornoz asked if we had not noticed that the Sumate case had moved in the favor of the defendants; he also claimed to have lobbied Chavez, at our request, to free the then jailed Henrigue Capriles. DCM said we had. Albornoz (who bears a grudge against Sumate from when Sumate trounced his own Comando Ayacucho in 2003-4) said that the judicial action against Sumate would be frozen, but not dropped altogether, so that the GOV could take it up again during the 2006 presidential campaign if needed. On the penal code, Albornoz offered only that Venezuela was not as advanced a society as the US; on the media law, he agreed that it was "crap" ("una cagada") as drafted. He nodded assent when the DCM observed that its purpose was to reduce TV network income by imposing local content rules. Back to Rodriguez, Albornoz said that the new Foreign Minister would be interested in meeting privately early on with the Ambassador; DCM urged him to press Rodriguez to do so. Comment: -------------- ¶5. (C) Albornoz usually offers a tantalizing mix of insights, news, and self-promotion. Our take: --While the decision to replace the ineffective FonMin Perez is logical, the choice of Ali Rodriguez is curious. It would seem to foreshadow an increase in Chavez' oil diplomacy, but it also raises questions about where PDVSA is headed. The change would make some sense from Chavez's perspective: it reduces the PPT's disproportionate power in PDVSA (Ramirez_, although a protege of Rodriguez, lacks the latter's political heft). It would be a graceful exit for Rodriguez, and Rodriguez would offer Chavez far more ability to execute policies than FonMin Perez. --There is some churning about within the MVR and pro-Chavez groups. Thus far we have seen nothing that Chavez can't easily control -- but there are differences out there over direction and resources and personalities, and we believe the Chavista hegemony will magnify those differences over time. --The international message on Sumate has had at least some positive effect. Indeed, had prosecutor Anderson not been assassinated November 18, it is possible that the Sumate case might have evolved more positively in a short period of time -- although Albornoz's desire for what he called a "sword of Damocles" was and remains a plausible option. Brownfield NNNN 2004CARACA03584 - CONFIDENTIAL