Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04CARACAS3506
2004-11-16 14:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

CHAVISTAS AT THE HELM IN A SEA OF RED

Tags:  PGOV KDEM PHUM VE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 003506 

SIPDIS


NSC FOR CBARTON
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2014
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM VE
SUBJECT: CHAVISTAS AT THE HELM IN A SEA OF RED

REF: A. CARACAS 3432

B. CARACAS 3382

C. CARACAS 3431

D. CARACAS 3368

Classified By: Abelardo A. Arias, Political Counselor,
for Reasons 1.4(b).

-------
Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 003506 SIPDIS NSC FOR CBARTON USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2014 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM VE SUBJECT: CHAVISTAS AT THE HELM IN A SEA OF RED REF: A. CARACAS 3432 ¶B. CARACAS 3382 ¶C. CARACAS 3431 ¶D. CARACAS 3368 Classified By: Abelardo A. Arias, Political Counselor, for Reasons 1.4(b). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) October and August electoral successes have renewed President Hugo Chavez's mandate, placed his loyalists in most of the governorships and key mayoralties, and positioned the Chavista movement to capture an overwhelming majority in next year's National Assembly elections. Chavez supporters say that, with the opposition atomized and oil prices sky high, they have few excuses for not advancing the Bolivarian Revolution. Chavez has denounced an inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy as the reason benefits are not reaching people. Pro-Chavez governors, many of them ex-military, are calling for radical overhauls of state governments, including the rapid integration of GOV "mission" programs into previously opposition-controlled areas. Political persecution of the remaining opponents -- such as the media and Sumate -- also appears to be in the Chavista tool box. End Summary. -------------- Bolivarian Expansion -------------- ¶2. (C) With President Hugo Chavez's victory in the August 15 recall referendum and the subsequent sweep by his candidates of the October 31 gubernatorial and mayoral elections, Chavez now dominates government in Venezuela (refs a and b). Nine of the 23 governors are retired military officers with ties to Chavez. In addition, the executive continues to exercise controlling influence over Venezuela's other branches of government. With opposition political parties beaten 59-41% in the referendum and 63-37% in the regional elections, the Chavistas' prospects for next year's National Assembly elections are favorable. Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) Deputy Saul Ortega told poloff November 2 that pro-Chavez parties hope to increase their majority, though achieving a two-thirds majority would be difficult. Opposition deputies fear the Chavistas could win between 120 and 135 of the 165 deputy positions, giving Chavez a ready two-thirds majority. -------------- No More Excuses -------------- ¶3. (C) Chavez has called for sobriety in the wake of the regio
nal elections victory. He told the newly elected officials on November 1 it was time to close ranks and fight to the death against corruption, bureaucracy, and inefficiency, "three vices that threaten the Bolivarian Revolution." Chavez emphasized the point by adding "the greatest enemy of the revolution is no longer the U.S., it is bureaucracy." Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel said on November 5 that now there are no excuses not to govern. Opposition voices immediately seized on the GOV message, suggesting Rangel was admitting that Chavez had not governed for the last five years. Chavez and other GOV leaders have stated that they must try to win over the four million persons who voted for the opposition. Christian Democrat (COPEI) Deputy Cesar Perez Vivas told reporters November 5 that governance was now the exclusive responsibility of the MVR, adding that no type of hegemony is healthy for any society. Rangel noted that "to govern without an opposition is the most annoying thing in the world," and called for new leadership from within the opposition "capable of dialogue with the government." -------------- Change is Good -------------- ¶4. (C) The "three vices" -- corruption, bureaucracy, and inefficiency -- have become the mantra for the newly elected pro-Chavez governors and mayors. Upon taking office, most denounced their predecessors for allegQ administrative irregularities. In Miranda State, for example, Governor Diosdado Cabello declared the health and education sectors to be in a state of emergency. Cabello's supporters on Miranda State's legislative council told reporters they are considering granting Cabello power to legislate by decree. Patria Para Todos (PPT),the third largest pro-Chavez party, has staked out its role as the GOV conscience. PPT Secretary General Jose Albornoz told poloff November 4 his party is organizing "brigades" in every state and municipality to monitor government programs and spending. Alberto "Chino" Carias, an aide to incoming Metropolitan Caracas Mayor Juan Barreto, told poloff November 5 they planned to use "social intelligence" networks whereby political sympathizers inform on the misconduct of police and, in the case of public hospitals, medical personnel. Carias, a member of the radical Tupamaro armed political group, also said he is participating in a committee to restructure and "improve the image" of the Metropolitan Police. ¶5. (U) Pro-Chavez elected leaders in previously held opposition areas are rushing to integrate the GOV's various "mission" programs into state and local government plans. In Metropolitan Caracas, for example, officials plan to convert existing public health clinics into outpatient care offices of Barrio Adentro, the medical assistance program operated by Cuban personnel in poor neighborhoods. One of the first acts in office of Monagas State Governor Jose Gregorio Briceno was to invite the Cuban doctors of Barrio Adentro into all state hospitals and clinics, asserting that "exclusion and stinginess" had ended in his state. In Miranda, state officials announced that all state schools would be integrated into the "Bolivarian School" program, which reportedly adds a revolutionary slant to subject matter. The officials also announced that school facilities would soon be opened to Missions Robinson and Rivas (primary and secondary education for adults). -------------- If They Don't Join You, Beat Them! -------------- ¶6. (C) The GOV continues to intimidate potential Chavez opponents using state powers. Outgoing Metropolitan Caracas Mayor Alfredo Pena is in hiding (rumored to be in Miami) after charges that he misappropriated funds and was the intellectual author of killings during the events of April 2002 (ref c). Representatives of the NGO Sumate continue to face conspiracy charges, though the case has been delayed by an intervention from the Supreme Court (ref d). Political crimes prosecutor Danilo Anderson is also working his way through the lists of people the GOV associates with the April 2002 coup and the so-called Carmona Decree. Coordinadora Democratica operations chief Enrique Naime was "escorted" by GOV intelligence police (DISIP) to court in the early morning of November 9, where he was fined for defamation of National Electoral Council officials in statements he made during the 2000 mega-elections. Furthermore, the pro-Chavez majority in the National Assembly is also proceeding at full steam on approving the Social Responsibility Law, which threatens to restrict what private television and radio outlets can report. -------------- Chavez Lays It Out -------------- ¶7. (U) In an interview aired on state television on November 11, Chavez spelled out the lines his government after the August and October victories. Quoted in the pro-GOV daily Diario Vea, Chavez said the Bolivarian Revolution would have: -- strengthened popular organizations, such as the "electoral patrols" and "electoral battle units"; -- new GOV institutions with social dimensions, such as the new Popular Economy Ministry; -- a humanistic "social economy" transcending the "perverse" capitalist model; -- increased production through "endogenous hubs"; -- a multipolar foreign policy, accelerated with Chavez's upcoming visits to Spain, Russia, China, and Iran; -- development of a new military structure; -- an electoral strategy in which pro-government political parties should elect their candidates; -- the creation of a new "Anticorruption Moral Power"; and -- a more efficient communications strategy incorporating community broadcasters. -------------- Comment: Happy Red Year! -------------- ¶8. (C) With high oil revenues added to this rosy scenario, expectations among Chavez supporters are high; a state television program host even ends his show "Feliz Ano Rojo!" or "Happy Red Year!". Chavez is consolidating his base and pinning down his enemies. He has protected his flanks in his own political parties by having in governorships nine ex-military colleagues and his father, who are more loyal to Chavez than to the MVR. The newly elected Chavistas are not shying away from the central government, which we expect will further dominate the Venezuelan political scene. While some GOV leaders are counseling reflection and prudence in flexing their new muscle, the Bolivarian Revolution is indeed rolling along. There remains pending, however, a clear definition of what that revolution really means, other than a collection of reformist and populist measures as determined by Chavez himself. There are signs of jockeying among the pro-Chavez parties, but no serious indications so far of infighting among Chavez's core team. Absent an external economic shock or major social unrest, it looks like smooth sailing for President Chavez -- but as the GOV admits, now it has to govern and to fulfill the expectations of the 60 percent who voted for Chavez. Brownfield NNNN 2004CARACA03506 - CONFIDENTIAL

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