MENDOZA TO TAKE FRAUD ARGUMENT BEFORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 002688 SIPDIS NSC FOR C. BARTON USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2013 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM VE SUBJECT: MENDOZA TO TAKE FRAUD ARGUMENT BEFORE INTERNATIONAL OPINION Classified By: DCM Stephen G. McFarland for reason 1.4 (d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Miranda State Gov. Enrique Mendoza told the Ambassador August 20 that the opposition had formed a commission to compile the "evidence" supporting the allegations that the GoV committed fraud in the August 15 referendum. Personally convinced that the GoV committed fraud, he said the Coordinadora would not present the case to the National Electoral Council or Venezuela's Supreme Court, but rather would use it to delegitimize the Chavez government. The Ambassador reminded Mendoza that the opinion of the OAS and Carter Center technical experts will be key, and urged him to take the evidence to them. Mendoza recognized that the technical nature of the allegations hindered understanding by the public. He concurred with the Ambassador that what would be most convincing would be a person revealing complicity. Mendoza also said he had convoked the leaders of the major political parties to discuss the recommendation of "democratic" governors and mayors not to participate in the scheduled regional elections. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Miranda State Gov. Enrique Mendoza is convinced that President Chavez committed electronic fraud to win the August 15 presidential recall referendum. Meeting with the Ambassador and PolCouns August 20, Mendoza recounted the allegations that have been made public since August 16. The Coordinadora Democratica leader said he had formed a commission led by constitutional lawyer Tulio Alvarez, with members such as former Supreme Electoral Council President Carlos Delgado Chapellin, to compile the "evidence" they are gathering. Mendoza said the evidence was not for use in filing complaints with the National Electoral Council (CNE) or bringing cases before the Supreme Court. Both these institutions, Mendoza asserted, lack legitimacy. Instead, the opposition will use the information to delegitimize the Chavez government. ¶3. (C) Mendoza said the opposition had had two windows of opportunity to press the fraud case in the first days after the vote. Former President Jimmy Carter, he said, had closed one of them with his statement August 16, whereas OAS SYG had kept the other open as a result of the conversation Mendoza was able to have with him. Urged by the Ambassador to take the evidence nonetheless to the OAS and Carter Center experts, particularly because of its technical nature, Mendoza said they would, of course, do so. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador then asked Mendoza what impact a declaration by the international observers that there was no fraud, based on the August 19-20 audit of the results in which the opposition had refused to participate. He reminded the Governor that numerous governments had already blessed the results, and following the audit, the USG might well follow suit. Mendoza responded that the opposition would continue putting its case together. It would be a mistake to try to put information together to compete with the timing of the audit, he said. He emphasized that the importance of having the information fully in place even if it took days or weeks. ¶5. (C) Mendoza recognized the difficulty of presenting convincing arguments to the technically challenged and acknowledged that in this type of situation, the best arguments come from persons with hand on knowledge of what supposedly occurred. He said for example, that a local radio station owner in his state had told him that a National Guard captain had lamented to a family member that he had participated in changing paper receipts to keep his job. ¶5. (C) Mendoza noted that acting hastily had most recently caused the death of an innocent woman at Plaza Francia, when irresponsible leaders could think of nothing more to do than to call people out on the street as a reaction to the loss. Another mistake the opposition had made, according to Mendoza was trusting Smartmatic. He said they had been convinced by a member of the Coordinadora who is the father of one of the Smartmatic executives that "the boys" would do a good job. -------------- Future Elections -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador referred to the prospects for the gubernatorial and mayoral elections in light of the real possibility that the fraud allegations would still be alive September 26. He asked Mendoza what would a Venezuela without opposition governors in the major states look like? Mendoza said the opposition was examining that question. He noted that the Association of Governors and Mayors had recommended that they not participate. The decision, of course, was not up to the sitting officials, Mendoza said, but up to the political parties, which could in any case choose other candidates if the incumbents did not want to run. He said he had convoked the leaders of the main parties for a discussion August 22 to determine their course of action. ¶7. (C) Mendoza noted that it would be folly to simply abandon the political space to Chavez. He said there are those in the opposition who advocate mass resignations, for example, presuming that Chavez is working from the same assumptions as they are. Mendoza recalled that during the December 2002-January 2003 strike he had attempted to negotiate end to the stoppage with then Minister of Interior Diosdado Cabello and none of the arguments about jobs and commerce worked. To participate in the elections, however, Mendoza said there would have to be some adjustments to the conditions, such as agreement to reconcile paper receipts with the electronic tabulation, which the government is unlikely to do. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Mendoza is prepared to make the fraud case the banner for continuing opposition to Chavez. He is not alone, from what we have seen among his fellow governors and mayors. There are enough Venezuelans who believe they in fact have been robbed to maintain a core constituency in the double digits of percentages. Putting the matter in the hands of the commission headed by Tulio Alvarez will help bring clarity and order to the various types of fraud mechanisms that are being alleged. The question is whether it will be sufficiently credible. ¶9. (C) The question of participating in the regional contests is crucial because participation would give the opposition venues to maintain and cultivate grassroots support and provide a channel for anti-Chavez sentiment. Boycotting the elections would create a vacuum that Chavez's associates, or opponents willing to take the opportunity for a variety of reasons, would fill quickly. Participation in the regional elections -- especially if the opposition did fairly well -- would legitimate the referendum process. Shapiro NNNN 2004CARACA02688 - CONFIDENTIAL