VENEZUELA'S REFERENDUM: THE DAY AFTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 002605 SIPDIS NSC FOR CBARTON USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2014 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM VE SUBJECT: VENEZUELA'S REFERENDUM: THE DAY AFTER Classified By: Abelardo A. Arias, Political Counselor, for Reasons 1.4( b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Venezuelans will vote August 15 on whether to recall President Hugo Chavez. If the opposition wins, it plans to hold primaries to pick a candidate and then battle Chavez again in presidential elections. Though removed from office, Chavez will still lead the country's largest political movement and expects to have the full support of the Venezuelan state to wage his campaign. If Chavez wins the recall referendum, it will be a mortal blow to the opposition's current political leadership. Chavez the victor will likely strike a conciliatory tone initially to attract a loyal opposition from the remains of the opposition, but will continue to persecute symbolic opposition. The legitimacy of the victory for either side is crucial, making fraud allegations and the margin of victory key variables in how the results are accepted by the Venezuelan people. Although the Constitution speaks of an election 30 days after the President leaves office, it is unlikely that the National Electoral Council will be able to stage one in such a short period of time. End summary. -------------- If The Opposition Wins ... -------------- ¶2. (C) If the "Si" vote wins in the August 15 presidential recall referendum against President Hugo Chavez, the National Electoral Council (CNE) must, according to the constitution, hold convoke elections within 30 days. Given the logistical requirements for such an election, the date is likely to slip up to 90 days. The opposition plans to hold a presidential primary to select its candidate. Although close to agreement on rules and a date for the primary, both are still under discussion. ¶3. (C) The opposition will seek to maintain its united front against Chavez throughout the campaign, and will not field multiple candidates to face Chavez in the new election. Coordinadora Democratica (CD) leader and Miranda State Governor Enrique Mendoza is the front-runner. If the opposition's candidate wins that election, he or she would complete the presidential term through 2006. The new president would face the challenge of forming a government out of a diverse opposition, reuniting a deeply divided society, re-energizing an economy addicted to high oil revenues and unsustainable social spending, and reforming a Venezuelan state corrupted by five years of Chavez's Bolivarian Revolution. ¶4. (C) If Chavez loses the referendum, he will be politically wounded and stripped of his claim to represent Venezuela's majority. His control over four of the five branches of government (legislative, judicial, moral, and electoral) and leadership of Venezuela's largest political party, the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR),however, will give him room to maneuver and possibly negotiate with the opposition. Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel would become president and is likely to continue to give Chavez complete support of the Venezuelan state. Some note, however, that Rangel's personal ambition may temper his support for a beaten Chavez. Though the Supreme Court (TSJ) has not definitely ruled that a recalled Chavez can run immediately in the new election, most politicians believe Chavez will be permitted to run. TSJ President Ivan Rincon told the Ambassador in late 2003 that since the Constitution does not explicitly say a recalled President cannot run he should be allowed to do so. He also thought it essential for political reasons. ¶5. (C) If the opposition wins by a thin margin, political uncertainty will be heightened. A voting system failure could have similar consequences if results are delayed more than 48 hours. Chavez could react as he did during the November signature drive and claim the opposition had engaged in "megafraud." Chavez supporters have already set the stage for this accusation by suggesting that CANTV, Venezuela's privatized national telephone carrier, is capable of manipulating election data during transmission. If Chavez supporters perceive they are losing the referendum due to fraud, there is likely to be some violence by Chavez supporters, both in the streets and against opposition targets such as media outlets. -------------- If Chavez Wins ... -------------- ¶6. (C) If the "No" option wins, Chavez will probably call for reconciliation in the wake of his victory and try to reach a modus vivendi with some opposition parties. Rumors have some opposition politicians already negotiating with Chavez. Chavez insiders predict that Chavez will make changes in the cabinet and moderate his rhetoric. Such overtures are likely to be short-lived (as experienced post-April 2002),however, and Chavez will likely return to his persecution of key opposition figures (such as the NGO Sumate, former PDVSA managers, and Baruta Mayor Enrique Capriles). Chavez will have political momentum going into the regional elections, and could win key gubernatorial and mayoral offices. With a vanquished domestic opposition, Chavez will have a free hand to develop his foreign policy of challenging the USG, free trade, and globalization. He will characterize his victory as a defeat for the United States and the imperialism he believes it represents, and will become more outspoken. ¶7. (C) The leadership of the political parties, whom anti-Chavistas will blame for the loss, will suffer a mortal blow. The Coordinadora Democratica is likely to cease to exist in its present form. A new wave of opposition leaders will then have less than two years to regroup for a 2006 presidential bid. A few opposition politicians may answer Chavez's call for reconciliation or, at least, lessen their resolve to oppose him. The opposition would also be fractured going into regional elections, perhaps costing them key positions throughout the country. In sum, the opposition would endure its dark night, but could still recover in time to challenge Chavez in 2006 if they can generate fresh leadership. ¶8. (C) If Chavez's victory comes via fraud or, more likely, manipulation by the GOV, the opposition would cry foul. Radicals in the Democratic Bloc would call for resistance to the GOV, and probably some civic groups and Coordinadora member groups would promote demonstrations and street blockades. This type of resistance to a suspicious or clean win by the GOV would fizzle out. A tainted victory would undermine Chavez's democratic credentials before the international community. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) An opposition victory would mean one more round of elections for Venezuela in which Chavez could yet again return to power. The aftermath of an opposition victory would be fraught with challenges, and in many ways would present daunting challenges for governance. There is concern, for example, about how institutions that have become accustomed to the centralized authority of President Chavez would behave. If Chavez wins the referendum, Venezuela's crisis will continue to fester, especially if Chavez maintains his divisive leadership. The referendum is a critical juncture for Venezuela, but it is just the beginning for finding real resolution of Venezuela's deeply-divided society. Shapiro NNNN 2004CARACA02605 - CONFIDENTIAL