VENEZUELA: VIEWS FROM ANDEAN REGIONAL CAPITAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 002480 SIPDIS BOGOTA AND LIMA ALSO FOR A/S NORIEGA NSC FOR CBARTON USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2014 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM VE SUBJECT: VENEZUELA: VIEWS FROM ANDEAN REGIONAL CAPITAL C O R R E C T E D C O P Y CORRECTING PARA NUMBERING Classified By: Abelardo A. Arias, Political Counselor, for Reason 1.5 (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) While the Coordinadora Democratica in Merida is divided about local politics and how to run the campaign for the August 15 Referendum, the leaders of several parties agree that President Chavez will be recalled. A barely visible &Si8 campaign for the recall contrasts starkly with overwhelming &No8 advertisements on the streets of the regional Andean capital. The varied opposition representatives concur that on a national level the people will first unite to oust President Chavez and then require that the opposition unite behind one presidential candidate. Chavez supporters and opponents worried about possible violence after August 15 regardless of the outcome of the vote. End Summary. -------------- The August 15 Campaign -------------- ¶2. (U) In the Andean regional capital of Merida, President Hugo Chavez's &No8 campaign has an overwhelming visual presence compared to the Coordinadora,s weak media campaign. "No" posters, banners, flyers and graffiti appear everywhere. Comando Maisanta also organized door-to-door visits throughout many neighborhoods. Chavez supporters are seen patrolling neighboorhoods and talking to people. In contrast, the "Si" campaign has a few posters that appear throughout the city. The "Si" campaign is much more mobile with some meetings, marches or caravans taking place interspercedly around the city. ¶3. (C) Fernando Soto and Ruben Avila of Merida state,s Comando Maisanta told Poloffs July 22 that in the state of Merida there are 364 electoral battle units, each with 10-12 people per unit. The roughly 4,000 members go door-to-door to both Chavista and opposition households to convince registered citizens to vote for Chavez on August 15. Using door-to-door visits, posters, banners, flyers and graffiti urging the populace to vote &No8, they said, the Comando Maisanta hopes to have between 160-170,000 &No8 votes, about 40-42% of eligible voters. ¶4. (C) Representatives of Primero Justicia, People from the University of the Andes, Movimiento de Trabajo, Accion Democratica, Movimiento Federal and academic leaders in Merida agree that despite their not being as organized as Comando Maisanta, the vote will show the people are against Chavez. Like the Maisanta campaign, the opposition uses door-to-door outreaches (scheduled to begin the week of July 26),and posters and some graffitti. They also use forums, small community meetings and car caravans to garner "Si" support. Primero Justicia (PJ) mayoral candidate Carlos Masini said the mood among the opposition is the most optimistic it has been since January 2004. Some, like Marcos Pino, the campaign manager for the Coordinadora Democratica in Merida, claimed that the people are not out marching and plastering posters because they already know they are going to vote &Si8 August 15. ¶5. (C) The various opposition representatives estimated the &Si8 votes expected in Merida also to reach between 160-180,000 voters, 40-45% of total voters registered. Most of the Merida opposition representatives agreed that Merida would mirror the national vote. Some others foresaw a smaller victory, but a victory nonetheless. All agreed that an important campaign strategy for the Coordinadora Democratica to increase the number of people voting &Si8 is to dispel rumors and inform people the vote is secret. ¶6. (C) According to Pino of the Coordinador Democratica voters who support neither Chavez nor the opposition reportedly are actually a small minority of people in Merida and nationwide. He said some of them do not support the opposition or its candidates perse but will vote for whatever candidate is presented as an alternative to Chavez. In contrast, Luis Loaiza of the University of Los Andes claimed that the possibility of a win was still good, but said the opposition campaign strategy needed to change and to focus on C O R R E C T E D C O P Y CORRECTING PARA NUMBERING the undecided voters. -------------- Primary Possibilities -------------- ¶7. (C) Assuming a &Si8 win, many opposition representatives in Merida are looking forward to a presidential primary to determine who the opposition candidate will be. On a national level, opposition representatives agreed that there will be no dissensions and only one candidate will appear as a result of the primary. Gilberto Belandrini of Movimiento al Trabajo asserted that the people will support whoever wins the primary and punish any other candidates who enter the race by not voting for them. ¶8. (C) Masini said the primary is the only feasible option if the &Si8 wins, because the opposition candidate will not be one of the well-known names being thrown around now. The candidate, Masini predicted, will be &second string8 since it is the policies that are important, not the personality of the candidate. Masini claimed that Miranda state governor Enrique Mendoza, will not &politically castrate8 himself by running for this limited presidency. He claimed that if Chavez were to lose the referendum, he would lose his momentum and the people would turn against him. ¶9. (C) Comando Maisanta leaders believe that in the unlikely event that Chavez were to lose the referendum, his candidate would still win the presidential elections afterwards. Soto and Avila saw the opposition as fractured and claimed that opposition supporters would not be able to agree on one candidate. They claimed that Chavez supporters were united and would support the candidate chosen to run. By running multiple candidates against one Chavista candidate, Avila and Soto claimed, the opposition would be guaranteed to lose. -------------- After the Vote*Possibility of Violence -------------- ¶10. (C) Comando Maisanta's regional leaders Soto and Avila said if Chavez wins and the opposition is not willing to accept the decision, which Chavez supporters see as likely, then those who support Chavez will &use any means necessary to ensure the future of Venezuela for their children and grandchildren.8 Chavez opponents thought fraud, or claims of it, would lead to violence regardless of the decision. Many opposition representatives said that even if Chavez were to accept a &Si8 vote, there are politically extreme factions and &imported guerillas8 who will not accept a peaceful transition. They alleged that Chavista politicians and civil leaders who have gained under Chavez's government think they have too much to lose and will stir the people into violent revolt. Both sides fear that if Chavez supporters are persecuted when the opposition wins, this will play into the hands of political extremists and increase the risk of violence. -------------- Inclusion Solution -------------- ¶11. (C) Unanimously, opposition leaders said that if the opposition were to win the presidency for the next two years, they would have to insure tolerance, inclusion, decentralization and cooperation with factions of Chavez,s supporters to avoid violence and insure govern ability. They said that there were some politicians, even those who support inclusion, who say that those who committed crimes under Chavez,s rule would have to be prosecuted. They did not see the need for prosecution and acceptance as mutually exclusive. Some of the representatives of the opposition believed that leaving Chavez supporters in control of some institutions and political seats like the CNE, Supreme Court, and some gubernatorial and mayoral seats would demonstrate tolerance and acceptance of opposing ideals and give the new government legitimacy. Others believed that having Chavistas with power would be one more problem to be solved. -------------- Comment -------------- C O R R E C T E D C O P Y CORRECTING PARA NUMBERING ¶12. (C) Merida opposition representatives agreed that the current less organized and less visible &Si8 campaign would still be enough to vote Chavez out of power, although some disagreed about the margin by which the opposition would win. Leaders foresaw possible problems to be govern ability and violence. While they recommended inclusion as a means of resolving the potential for violence, most disagreed on exactly what inclusion might mean. Chavez opponents claimed that if Chavez were to win, it would be a no-holds-barred attack on the opposition and democracy. Shapiro NNNN 2004CARACA02480 - CONFIDENTIAL