TSJ LAW TAKES EFFECT

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001817 SIPDIS NSC FOR CBARTON USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD USAID DCHA/OTI FOR RPORTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2014 TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE SUBJECT: TSJ LAW TAKES EFFECT Classified By: A/DCM ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR REASONS 1.4 (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (U) The Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice came into effect May 20 after the National Assembly (NA) passed it on May 18. The Internal Policy committee of the NA made several substantial changes in the law between its second reading and the final vote, which the opposition claims violates parliamentary procedures. These changes increase the power of the Constitutional Chamber of the court, granting it supervisory power over other chambers and give legislators greater influence over the judiciary. Constitutional expert Tulio Alvarez_ has challenged the validity of the law before the TSJ. -------------- Substantial Changes in Law -------------- ¶2. (C) The Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice (LOTSJ) came into effect on May 20 after the National Assembly (NA) passed it on May 18. The final version of the law contained substantial changes made by the Internal Policy Commission (IPC) of the NA without discussion in the plenary. Opposition deputies criticized the changes, noting that Assembly commissions do not have the authority to do so. The IPC made the final changes under unusual circumstances. After the IPC's president, Nicolas Sosa (MAS) failed to gather a quorum to discuss the Commission's report required for the bill to go to its final reading, the commission's vice president, pro-Chavez deputy Iris Valera (MVR),called the pro-Chavez majority of deputies to order without opposition presence. The pro-Chavez quorum then made the changes to the law. ¶3. (U) In addition to the irregularity of making changes between second and final readings, opposition deputies have protested that reducing the bill from 179 articles to 23 to overcome an opposition filibuster violates law-making principles. The pro-Chavez majority also changed National Assembly rules six times in the 16-month discussion of the bill when the opposition used existing rules to block the bill. -------------- Super Chamber -------------- ¶4. (U) NA Deputy Gerardo Blyde (Primero Justicia) found more than 34 changes to the law done by the committee. The version of the law passed on second reading attributed to the full court, the right to "resolve the conflicts of whatever nature which may arise among the chambers", and to "review the sentences dictated by any of the chambers". The version of the law presented by the IPC to the plenary for final approval gave these powers to the Constitutional Chamber. It also gave the chamber the right to take over jurisdiction of a case when fundamental constitutional principals are at stake. This was not in the law as passed on second reading at all. ¶5. (C) NA Deputy Leopoldo Martinez (Construyendo Pais) told PolCouns 19 May that the changes turn the Constitutional Chamber into a super chamber, a supreme court above the supreme court. In the version of the law passed on second reading, the full court, consisting of all the judges from all the chambers, had that role. Martinez called this increase in power especially dangerous given the Constitutional Chamber's demonstrated bias in favor of President Chavez. Another change eliminated the requirement that members of the NA and TSJ justices have no family connections. Numerous newspaper reports have pointed out that the Second Vice President of the NA, Noheli Pocaterra is married to TSJ justice Carlos Oberto Velez. -------------- LOTSJ Challenged in TSJ -------------- ¶6. (U) Constitutional expert Tulio Alvarez_ challenged the constitutionality of the new law before the TSJ on 24 May. He specifically challenged articles 13 and 23 of the LOTSJ. Article 13 deals with the Nominations Committees for TSJ justices. Alvarez_ claims, as does Gerardo Blyde, that articles 264 and 270 of the 1999 constitution state that the nominations committee is dependent on the Judicial Power, not the Legislative Power. The new law gives the power to elect the nominations committees to the NA. ¶7. (U) Article 23 of the law gives the Moral Power (Human Rights Ombudsman, Attorney General, Controller General) the authority to suspend justices indefinitely, pending the two-thirds vote in the NA that the 1999 constitution requires to remove a justice. Alvarez_ and Blyde call this article one of the most dangerous parts of the law. Alvarez_ argues that it clearly usurps the power of the NA, and subverts the power of the TSJ. (Note: Under these provisions, the suspension of a judge is tantamount to removal, according to Chavez opponents, because of the present control the executive enjoys over the legislative and moral branches of government.) -------------- Last Stand? -------------- ¶8. (U) Critics of the law, fear it will permanently compromise the judicial system. The liberal daily El Nacional editorialized on 20 May, "The new Supreme Court law ... is nothing less than the end of the rule of law and of checks and balances ... the door has been opened to establish an outdated and militaristic dictatorship with a deep repressive and police-heavy orientation. There is no longer justice in Venezuela." Referring to the changes made by the IPC of the NA, Tal Cual editor Teodoro Petkoff wrote May 20, "What the governing-party majority has done with the (law) during the session in which it was given final approval goes beyond the limits of the abuse of power, arrogance and the most absolute disrespect for public opinion. There is no longer any pretense of hiding behind a fig leaf." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The TSJ law puts the judiciary firmly under Chavez' control. The changes made in the Assembly's commission demonstrate the pro-Chavez majority's willingness to bend parliamentary rules and use its simple majority to push the Chavez agenda through the NA. This Chavista success gives the opposition cause to be concerned about future legislation such as the media, anti-terrorism and national police bills which are designed to advance Chavez' revolution. The Constitutional Chamber coup, slipped in in a technical session, suggests the GOV may be willing to use blunter instruments to give Chavez what he wants. SHAPIRO NNNN 2004CARACA01817 - CONFIDENTIAL