EUROPEAN UNION DEFENSE POLICY: WHERE IS THE EU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 005308

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2014
TAGS: PREL MOPS EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUROPEAN UNION DEFENSE POLICY: WHERE IS THE EU
HEADED?

REF: A. BRUSSELS 3892 B. BRUSSELS 4686 C. BRUSSELS

4730 D. BRUSSELS 4843 E. BRUSSELS 4937 F.
BRUSSELS 4960

Classified By: USEU Political Military Officer Jeremy Brenner for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. The November 22 announcement by the Foreign
and Defense Ministers of the EU member states of pledges to
establish 13 Battlegroups is the latest step toward the
creation of an EU military capacity. EU heads of state are
committed to giving the EU an effective capacity in global
security and crisis management. There is nominal agreement
on the need for improved military capabilities, and
mechanisms are being created that would allow that to happen.
There is less unanimity on the role these forces will play
and how they will interact with NATO. The readiness of
European governments to spend the money needed to create an
effective capacity remains the weakest link. End summary.

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November 22 Declaration on Military Capabilities
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2. (C/NF) The EU General Affairs and External Relations
Council (GAERC) ministerial meeting brought together the
Foreign and Defense Ministers of the 25 member states. The
Defense Ministers convened in their capacity as the Steering
Board for the European Defense Agency (EDA) (refs a and c).
One of the major products of the ministerial was a
Declaration on European Military Capabilities. The November
22 document establishes an Initial Operational Capability
(IOC) for rapidly-deployable EU Battlegroups as of January

2005. Full Operational Capability to field up to two
concurrent Battlegroup-sized rapid reaction operations,
including the ability to launch both operations nearly
simultaneously, is set for 2007. See septel for a full
discussion of Battlegroups.

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Could a Battlegroup Beat NRF to the Punch?
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3. (C) Two aspects of the GAERC conclusions were
unanticipated. The first was an earlier Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) of January 2005, rather than 2006 as
originally proposed for the first Battlegroup. The British
and French appear to be ready to provide capable existing
national forces until multinational Battlegroups are
established. The January 2005 date coincides with that of
the NATO NRF. There are some EU member states who would be
eager for an opportunity to demonstrate that an EU
Battlegroup is able to deploy to a crisis area before the
NRF. The other unexpected announcement was that Cyprus will
contribute a "niche" capability to a multinational
Battlegroup. Participation by Cyprus in the Battlegroup
project will further complicate efforts to have fruitful
NATO-EU discussions. The EU is likely to refuse to discuss
Battlegroups with NATO without all the participating players
present, given the continuing Turkey-Cyprus procedural
blockage to NATO/EU dialogue (refs d and f).

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Assessing the Capabilities Commitments:
Whose Standards Will Apply?
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4. (C) The EU Ministers also declared that interoperability,
deployability, and sustainability will be at the core of the
Member States efforts to improve military capabilities. The
European Defense Agency (EDA) (ref a) has been tasked to
assess and evaluate capabilities commitments against criteria
to be agreed by Member States. Given the preponderance of
NATO members within the EU and the investments already made,
it is expected that NATO standards will be adopted where they
have been established. Where NATO standards have not yet been
established, however, the EU may seek to define its own.

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Setting the Foundation: The European Security Strategy
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5. (U) The December 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS)
averred that the EU is "inevitably" a global player -- by
virtue of its population (over 450 million people) and
economic strength (producing one-quarter of the world's GNP).
Given the instruments at its disposal, the EU declared it
"should be ready to share in the responsibility for global
security and in building a better world." The ESS identifies
five key threats the EU must be prepared to address:
terrorism; proliferation of WMD; regional conflicts; state
failure; and organized crime. The ESS commits the EU to be
"more active, more coherent, and more capable" in order to
make a contribution to global security in keeping with its
potential. According to the Strategy, the EU should be able
to sustain several operations simultaneously, involving both
civilian and military capabilities

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Laying the Bricks: Headline Goal 2010
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6. (U) The Headline Goal 2010, endorsed by the EU Heads of
State and Government on June 18 2004, is an attempt to set
goalposts for achieving these lofty aims. Member States
committed themselves to be able, by 2010, to respond to the
full spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the
Treaty on the European Union. These include humanitarian and
rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces
in crisis management -- including peacemaking. Under the
rubric of the ESS, the heads of state included joint
disarmament operations and support for third countries in
combating terrorism as tasks the EU must be able to perform
within six years.

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Power Projection: Global Approach on Deployability
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7. (U) The Global Approach on Deployability (GAD) was
introduced in 2003 as part of the European Capability Action
Plan (ECAP). It is a central element of the Headline Goal of
being able to deploy high readiness forces by 2007. In the
November 22 declaration, the EU has committed itself to the
"complete development" by 2007 of rapidly deployable
battlegroups, (refs b and e ) and by 2008, to have available
an aircraft carrier with its associated airwing and escorts.
Project Groups within the European Capabilities Action Plan
(ECAP) have addressed the recognized shortfalls and are
providing solutions for airlift and sealift. GAD is
predicated on the coordination of all strategic lift assets,
mechanisms, and initiatives in support of EU-led operations,
in particular for the EU Battlegroups.

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What Does it All Mean?
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8. (C) The European Union is ponderous, inefficient, and
slow, but its evolution towards some sort of military role is
inexorable. The Heads of State of the Member States are
determined to see the EU take on a more active global
security role, in keeping with its economic and political
influence. They have set themselves the strategic goal, and
are creating the mechanisms and institutions to bring it
about. While still embryonic and largely virtual, new EU
military capabilities should begin to emerge over the next
several years. The EDA will be watching and evaluating to
ensure that the pledges made by Member States are real, and
that they represent actual useable capability. However
long-delayed and over-budget, airlift programs will probably
come on line, as will transport helicopters, satellite
communications and the Galileo program. Civilian/military
planning will be established as of January 1 2005, with
access to an operations center in 2006. Operation Althea in
Bosnia will be a testing ground for new integration
mechanisms to bring together the civilian and military
instruments of the EU.
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Comment
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9. (C) Agreeing on the need to address European military
deficiencies, and to create the mechanisms to do the job,
will prove to be the easy part of the EU's evolving security
posture. Finding the resources to build usable capabilities
will be far harder. Even if the tools are in place and there
is real military capability in hand, the Union will have to
struggle with the difficult question of how and when to use
it, and to what end. There is a significant political bloc
within the EU that is determined to make the EU a more
effective partner to NATO and other international
organizations. There are others, however, that look forward
to building an autonomous capacity that can be employed in
furtherance of EU interests and independent of the US or
NATO. In no case would we expect the EU to deploy an
operation that would directly harm US interests or
objectives. What is certain, however, is that institutions
and mechanisms are being created and resources are being
devoted according to an overall strategic plan that could
soon begin to produce results -- even if meager. We can
neither ignore nor dismiss this process, but must be ready to
engage if we hope to influence its direction and ensure that
US interests also benefit from any emerging EU ability to
project force.

McKinley