EUROPEAN UNION DEFENSE POLICY: WHERE IS THE EU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 005308 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/RPM E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2014 TAGS: PREL MOPS EUN USEU BRUSSELS SUBJECT: EUROPEAN UNION DEFENSE POLICY: WHERE IS THE EU HEADED? REF: A. BRUSSELS 3892 B. BRUSSELS 4686 C. BRUSSELS 4730 D. BRUSSELS 4843 E. BRUSSELS 4937 F. BRUSSELS 4960 Classified By: USEU Political Military Officer Jeremy Brenner for reaso ns 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. The November 22 announcement by the Foreign and Defense Ministers of the EU member states of pledges to establish 13 Battlegroups is the latest step toward the creation of an EU military capacity. EU heads of state are committed to giving the EU an effective capacity in global security and crisis management. There is nominal agreement on the need for improved military capabilities, and mechanisms are being created that would allow that to happen. There is less unanimity on the role these forces will play and how they will interact with NATO. The readiness of European governments to spend the money needed to create an effective capacity remains the weakest link. End summary. -------------- --- November 22 Declaration on Military Capabilities -------------- --- ¶2. (C/NF) The EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) ministerial meeting brought together the Foreign and Defense Ministers of the 25 member states. The Defense Ministers convened in their capacity as the Steering Board for the European Defense Agency (EDA) (refs a and c). One of the major products of the ministerial was a Declaration on European Military Capabilities. The November 22 document establishes an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for rapidly-deployable EU Battlegroups as of January ¶2005. Full Operational Capability to field up to two concurrent Battlegroup-sized rapid reaction operations, including the ability to launch both operations nearly simultaneously, is set for 2007. See septel for a full discussion of Battlegroups. -------------- Could a Battlegroup Beat NRF to the Punch? -------------- ¶3. (C) Two aspects of the GAERC conclusions were unanticipated. The first was an earlier Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of January 2005, rather than 2006 as originally proposed for the first Battlegroup. The British and French appear to be ready to provide capable existing national forces until multinational Battlegroups are established. The January 2005 date coincides with that of the NATO NRF. There are some EU member states who would be eager for an opportunity to demonstrate that an EU Battlegroup is able to deploy to a crisis area before the NRF. The other unexpected announcement was that Cyprus will contribute a "niche" capability to a multinational Battlegroup. Participation by Cyprus in the Battlegroup project will further complicate efforts to have fruitful NATO-EU discussions. The EU is likely to refuse to discuss Battlegroups with NATO without all the participating players present, given the continuing Turkey-Cyprus procedural blockage to NATO/EU dialogue (refs d and f). -------------- Assessing the Capabilities Commitments: Whose Standards Will Apply? -------------- ¶4. (C) The EU Ministers also declared that interoperability, deployability, and sustainability will be at the core of the Member States efforts to improve military capabilities. The European Defense Agency (EDA) (ref a) has been tasked to assess and evaluate capabilities commitments against criteria to be agreed by Member States. Given the preponderance of NATO members within the EU and the investments already made, it is expected that NATO standards will be adopted where they have been established. Where NATO standards have not yet been established, however, the EU may seek to define its own. -------------- -------------- Setting the Foundation: The European Security Strategy -------------- -------------- ¶5. (U) The December 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) averred that the EU is "inevitably" a global player -- by virtue of its population (over 450 million people) and economic strength (producing one-quarter of the world's GNP). Given the instruments at its disposal, the EU declared it "should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world." The ESS identifies five key threats the EU must be prepared to address: terrorism; proliferation of WMD; regional conflicts; state failure; and organized crime. The ESS commits the EU to be "more active, more coherent, and more capable" in order to make a contribution to global security in keeping with its potential. According to the Strategy, the EU should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously, involving both civilian and military capabilities -------------- Laying the Bricks: Headline Goal 2010 -------------- ¶6. (U) The Headline Goal 2010, endorsed by the EU Heads of State and Government on June 18 2004, is an attempt to set goalposts for achieving these lofty aims. Member States committed themselves to be able, by 2010, to respond to the full spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union. These include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management -- including peacemaking. Under the rubric of the ESS, the heads of state included joint disarmament operations and support for third countries in combating terrorism as tasks the EU must be able to perform within six years. -------------- -------------- Power Projection: Global Approach on Deployability -------------- -------------- ¶7. (U) The Global Approach on Deployability (GAD) was introduced in 2003 as part of the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP). It is a central element of the Headline Goal of being able to deploy high readiness forces by 2007. In the November 22 declaration, the EU has committed itself to the "complete development" by 2007 of rapidly deployable battlegroups, (refs b and e ) and by 2008, to have available an aircraft carrier with its associated airwing and escorts. Project Groups within the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) have addressed the recognized shortfalls and are providing solutions for airlift and sealift. GAD is predicated on the coordination of all strategic lift assets, mechanisms, and initiatives in support of EU-led operations, in particular for the EU Battlegroups. -------------- What Does it All Mean? -------------- ¶8. (C) The European Union is ponderous, inefficient, and slow, but its evolution towards some sort of military role is inexorable. The Heads of State of the Member States are determined to see the EU take on a more active global security role, in keeping with its economic and political influence. They have set themselves the strategic goal, and are creating the mechanisms and institutions to bring it about. While still embryonic and largely virtual, new EU military capabilities should begin to emerge over the next several years. The EDA will be watching and evaluating to ensure that the pledges made by Member States are real, and that they represent actual useable capability. However long-delayed and over-budget, airlift programs will probably come on line, as will transport helicopters, satellite communications and the Galileo program. Civilian/military planning will be established as of January 1 2005, with access to an operations center in 2006. Operation Althea in Bosnia will be a testing ground for new integration mechanisms to bring together the civilian and military instruments of the EU. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Agreeing on the need to address European military deficiencies, and to create the mechanisms to do the job, will prove to be the easy part of the EU's evolving security posture. Finding the resources to build usable capabilities will be far harder. Even if the tools are in place and there is real military capability in hand, the Union will have to struggle with the difficult question of how and when to use it, and to what end. There is a significant political bloc within the EU that is determined to make the EU a more effective partner to NATO and other international organizations. There are others, however, that look forward to building an autonomous capacity that can be employed in furtherance of EU interests and independent of the US or NATO. In no case would we expect the EU to deploy an operation that would directly harm US interests or objectives. What is certain, however, is that institutions and mechanisms are being created and resources are being devoted according to an overall strategic plan that could soon begin to produce results -- even if meager. We can neither ignore nor dismiss this process, but must be ready to engage if we hope to influence its direction and ensure that US interests also benefit from any emerging EU ability to project force. McKinley