EU CIV/MIL PLANNING AND THE OPS CENTER: SHAPING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004937

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/ERA, AND S/CRS
LONDON FOR DAVID BAME
BERLIN FOR KRISTINE PELTZ
PARIS FOR GUS RECINOS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2014
TAGS: PREL MOPS EUN NATO USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU CIV/MIL PLANNING AND THE OPS CENTER: SHAPING
THE OUTCOME

REF: A. BRUSSELS 4686 B. BERLIN 3648

Classified By: USEU polmil officer Jeremy Brenner for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).


1. (C) Summary. As EU High Representative for Common Foreign
and Security Policy Javier Solana and the PSC review papers
designed to create a civ/mil planning cell and a capacity to
stand up an EU Operations Center, they will consider it in
the context of strategic EU efforts to define its future
global role in security matters. In line with last year's
adopted European Security Strategy (ESS),Solana's focus is
on development of the EU's concept of its comparative
advantages, with a special focus on the instruments of "soft
power" and integrating civilian and military components of
crisis management. By
pushing for stronger NATO liaison relationships with the EU
civ/mil cell, we can help channel its evolution and, in so
doing, strengthen joint NATO-EU efforts to integrate
civil/military activities rather than emphasize core military
activities better
left to NATO. End summary.

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December 2003
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2. (C) A FR-UK-GE paper on civ/mill planning and an EU
Operations Center that went to Javier Solana for his
consideration in early November 2004, put flesh on the bones
of a long-standing EU idea. At the same time that the EU
adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS),the December
2003 European Council (Heads of State and Government) invited
Solana to "propose the necessary measures for establishing a
cell with civil/military components to meet the objectives
and comply with the principles" set out in the EU Presidency
document entitled "European Defense: NATO/EU Consultation,
Planning, and Operations." The Heads
of State stressed that this cell should be functional as
early as possible in 2004.

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June 2004
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3. (C) The European Council Conclusions of June 2004 took the
idea further, agreeing to work on establishing an EU
Operations Center. The Council specified that the Operations
Center would not be a standing headquarters, and that the
primary option for conducting autonomous military operations
would remain National Headquarters. A decision to draw on the
"collective capacity " of the EU Military staff would be
taken, upon the advice of the Military Committee, in a case
where a joint civil/military response is required and no
National HQ is identified. The Operations Center's charter
would be to plan and conduct operations -- within the
spectrum envisaged in the Treaty -- on the scale of Operation
Artemis (Note: Operation Artemis involved a deployment of
2000 personnel controlled by an OHQ of 70. End note.) The
Council specified that the civ/mill cell and facilities for
the Operations Center would be located in the same building
as the main structures of the EU Military staff. (Note:
Currently, EUMS is housed at 150 Avenue de Cortenburgh in
downtown
Brussels. End note.)


4. (C) In that same month, ESDP HR Solana presented concept
papers that spelled out the mission, functions, and terms of
reference of both the civ/mil cell and the Operations Center.

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Civ/Mil Cell
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5. (C) Under Solana's concept, the civ/mil cell would
undertake strategic contingency planning at the initiative of
the High Representative or the EU Political and Security
Committee. Its mission would be to reinforce the national HQ
designated to conduct an autonomous operation, and assist in
integrating civilian and military operations. Solana's
concept charged the civ/mil cell with responsibility for
creating and maintaining the capacity to stand up an
Operations Center capable of planning and running an
autonomous EU
military operation. That responsibility is vested in a
permanent 8-member core staff within the civ/mil cell (also
referred to as the "Key Nucleus).

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Operations Center
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6. (C) On paper, the Operations Center is designed to exist
only as an empty room with 60 workstations, and required
communications equipment -- until it is activated by a
consensus decision of the European Council. The FR-UK-GE
paper added a requirement that the EU Military Committee must
conduct a risk assessment and make a finding that the
operations center is capable of running the operation --
including the risk of escalation. This provision was
conceived as one of several institutional "locks" that will
provide political
limits on the scope and ambition of the Ops Center. This is
in addition to the other stipulations on size and location.
The latest draft paper dated November 10, prepared by
Solana's Council Secretariat staff dropped the requirement
for military advice, calling only for an "assessment" that
the Ops Center is capable of managing the risks associated
with the Operation. If this language remains as currently
drafted, it could represent a weakening of the political
"locks" put in place in previous versions.

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Looking at the Numbers
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7. (C) The proposed numbers of personnel designated for the
civ/mil planning cell and the Operations Center (detailed ref
a) are in keeping with previous estimates, and do not
represent a departure from long-standing figures. The
Operations Center is designed to be able to support a command
element in line with the "scale" of Operation Artemis, in
which there were seventy Headquarters staff. The Council
Secretariat's November 10 paper calls for a total of 29

SIPDIS
people within the civ/mil planning cell. Of those, 17 would
constitute the Strategic Planning Branch, 4 represent the
Command Group -- including the Commander and his personal
staff, and 8 (including 4 housekeepers) would form the
permanent core staff of the Operations Center in the event it
is activated. The Strategic Planning Branch is to be
operational as of January 1, 2005, while the Key Nucleus
staff would become operational in January 2006.


8. (C) It is important to note, however, that the personnel
to staff an operation of this size is not actually assigned
to the Operations Center; to staff an HQ of the size of
Artemis would require transferring military and staff members
who currently have other responsibilities in Brussels, as
well as augmentation by experts from member states. The
FR-UK-GE paper proposed staffing limits: quantitative
limitations are not specified in any of the relevant European
Council mandates to Solana. Despite some efforts to limit its
scope, political desire within the EU to move ahead with this
project seems to be unequivocal.

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Defining the Mission
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9. (C) US and Allied forces currently conduct planning for
crisis management and military intervention at a combined
force level, and joint force level (inter-service According
to our contacts, the EU civ/mil planning cell and Ops Center
would be expected to plan and operate on the equivalent of
the US inter-agency level, bringing together the full range
of EU "instruments" including Commission experts on law
enforcement, development and
reconstruction, and civil administration, in conjunction with
the required military component to ensure a secure
environment in which the other instruments can be
successfully deployed.

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Channeling the Effort
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10. (C) EU planners and political leaders of some member
states argue the civ/mil planning cell will provide a
capability that has not previously existed by better
integrating military tasks with the law enforcement and civil
administration challenges that are part and parcel of most
regional crises. They frequently speak to us as if this is a
new capacity that is lacking elsewhere in the world. They
also argue that it goes beyond the capabilities embodied in
NATO's crisis management planning, or our own ability to
integrate
military, assistance, and political elements in a
comprehensive approach to a crisis situation. Those who
belong to this school of thought believe in the need for the
Operations Center, where all the EU "instruments" brought to
bear in a crisis management operation can be coordinated. In
many ways, the EU focus is in keeping with the vision
expressed by NATO's Strategic Commanders in an August 2004
paper on the military challenges facing the Alliance over the
next fifteen years, and offers areas for cooperation rather
than duplication.


11. (C) Comment: Solana's strategic goal, supported by EU
heads of government, is to carve out a more robust role for
the EU on the world stage. To do so, he believes this must
include the ability to play a larger role in regional
conflicts -- a role that includes not only political
declarations and assistance programs, but also an integrated
military component in support of the UN Security Council. An
EU better capable of handling the full range of challenges
arising from failed and failing states is in our interest
also, and
should be encouraged. In moving ahead, however, Solana is
walking a tightrope between countries (led by France) that
seek capabilities for the EU that would parallel those of
NATO, and those countries (led by the UK, but cheered on by
many of our other allies) which still see NATO as the primary
structure for "hard security." Sustained US engagement with
the EU on the evolution of the civ/mil planning cell and
Operations Center can be important in helping ensure that the
NATO-EU relationship remains viable for all future
operations. To the extent that we can encourage progress in
EU "inter-agency" planning, we can help
ensure that the civ/mil cell is populated with Justice and
Home Affairs (JHA) experts, development and reconstruction
planners, and civil administrators rather than military
headquarters staff. Such an approach would emphasize the EUs
capabilities in "soft power" projection, provide a multiplier
for US efforts in the same direction, reinforce the role of
NATO (SHAPE) planning for military missions, and forestall
development of an EU Operational Headquarters.

McKinley