EU-RUSSIA SUMMIT: TWO-WEEK DELAY UNLIKELY TO BRIDGE DIFFERENCES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004915



SIPDIS



DEPT FOR EUR/RUS AND EUR/ERA



E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2009

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, ETRD, RS, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS

SUBJECT: EU-RUSSIA SUMMIT: TWO-WEEK DELAY UNLIKELY TO

BRIDGE DIFFERENCES



REF: STATE 04629



Classified By: USEU POLOFF LEE LITZENBERGER; REASONS 1.4 (B,D)



1. (C) Summary. The EU-Russia summit will take place

November 25, a two-week delay at Russia's request. Moscow

said it wanted to allow the EU's new Barrosso Commission to

participate, but many here believe that the EU's insistence

on a simultaneous agreement on roadmaps for all four "spaces"

of EU-Russian relations was the true motivation and Moscow

wanted time to undermine the EU consensus for a package deal.

The delay provides opportunity for progress, but there is

little mood for compromise on either side and there will be

no joint declaration, merely a joint press statement. Only

the roadmap on cultural issues is nearly agreed. In the

economic space, Russia refuses to include May 2004

commitments to phase out Siberian overflight fees and

increase domestic energy prices. In the internal security

space, Russia is unwilling to discuss Chechnya or human

rights, but wants references to Russian minority rights in

the Baltic states and a visa-free travel regime for Russian

citizens. In the external security space, Russia rejects the

EU's "common neighborhood" concept, emphasizing that its

unique connection to the CIS is unlike that of the EU.

Instead, Moscow wants to highlight joint efforts against

terrorism and seeks to participate in EU crisis management

decision-making. The EU will also seek Russian support in

organizing an EU mission to the Northern Caucuses and holding

regular consultations on human and minority rights. End

Summary



Delay Buys Time, but for what?

--------------

2. (C) Moscow's surprise request to postpone the planned

November 11 EU-Russia summit, which has now been re-scheduled

for November 25, provides the two sides with a small window

of opportunity to make further headway in the negotiations

over the "Four Common Spaces" -- the EU's headline documents

for EU-Russia relations. (The four spaces are Internal

Security, External Security, Economics and Trade, and Culture

and Research.) At present, texts on two spaces * Economics

and Culture * are close to agreement; the other two are

problematic. The EU is insisting that texts for all four

areas be agreed simultaneously; Russia wants to move ahead

and announce agreement on the first two at the Summit. EU

officials, however, say that the EU has already reached its

redlines, and progress will only be possible with concessions

from Russia. According to Commission Russia Desk Officer

Michael Miller, this will require the engagement of Russia's

Presidential Administration to overrule the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs. Russia has so far rejected the EU's

approach, which Moscow considers an excessive intrusion in

Russia's foreign and economic policies that betrays a lack of

respect for Russia as an independent power. EU-Russia

negotiations are expected to continue right up to the summit.





Why the Delay?

--------------

3. (C) The EU accepted Moscow's request to delay the summit

until after the new Commission is approved (Parliament

approved the Barroso Commission on November 18),but

unofficially some in Brussels doubt that Putin's desire to

meet Barrosso was the true motivation. Some EU officials

suspect that Moscow simply wanted more time to press its case

bilaterally with countries with which it enjoys close

relations, such as Germany, Italy, and France. Moscow's

goal, these officials suspect, is to undermine the EU 25

resolve to insist on a package deal on the four roadmaps.

Moscow, they said, may also hope to dangle the prospect of

significant summit deliverables in front of the Dutch, who

hold the EU presidency, if the Hague agrees to a partial

agreement, dividing the four spaces. Negotiations on the

roadmaps continue, but EU officials say there is little time

or mood to compromise on the part of Brussels, and they do

not anticipate significant breakthroughs.



4. (C) There appears to be little disposition to compromise

on Russia's side either. Moscow insists its recent

ratification of the Kyoto and PCA (Partnership and

Cooperation Agreements) treaties should suffice as

concessions on its part. Moscow expects to resolve the

outstanding issues at the political and not technical level.

To facilitate a political breakthrough, Moscow appointed

high-level coordinators responsible for each roadmap, and

appears disappointed at the lack of reciprocation on the part

of the EU. According to Russian Embassy officials here, two

out of four coordinators are close Putin aides: Sergei

Yastrzhembskiy (responsible for the cultural space) and

Victor Ivanov (internal security space). The other two

coordinators are Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov

(external security space) and Victor Khristenko, Minister of

Industry and Energy and until recently Deputy Prime Minister

(economic space).



5. (C) The tactic of appealing bilaterally to the political

will of its friends within the EU may benefit Moscow.

Council Secretariat's Carl Hartzell admitted that there would

be pressure in EU circles to make more progress. He said

that the EU suffered from a certain "psychological effect"

that inevitably leads some members to call for compromise

when no deal with Russia appears possible. Possibly taking

advantage of this EU weakness, Yastrzhembskiy told Brussels

on November 11 that Prime Minister Fradkov would replace

Putin at the summit if no agreement on the four spaces was

made.



Four Spaces: Status of the Roadmaps

--------------

6. (C) The EU and Russia have essentially agreed to the

roadmap text on the cultural space and, according to Miller,

cooperation in this area will continue regardless of the

outcome of negotiations on the remaining three spaces --

economic, external and internal security. Even in the

cultural space, however, Russia appears to be backtracking

from its earlier proposal to establish a European studies

institute at a Russian university.



7. (C) According to Miller, the economic space, which until

recently appeared largely agreed, now poses problems. For

example, Russia refuses to include its May 2004 commitments

to phase out by 2013 Siberian overflight fees and increase

domestic energy prices. The EU aims to reinforce these

commitments by including them in the economic roadmap, but,

according to Miller, the corrupt Russian Ministry of

Transport is reluctant to forego the slush fund that

overflight fees generates. The EU has made progress with

Russia on other economic issues, however. For example,

Russia no longer blocks EU-wide meat exports, imposing only

regional restrictions that are dealt with at the technical

rather than political level.



8. (C) The near agreement of the cultural and economic spaces

contrasts with the "extremely problematic" external and

internal security spaces, according to Commission Deputy

Director General Michael Leigh. In the internal security

roadmap, Russia continues to object to discussion of Chechnya

or human rights, lobbies for mention of Russian minority

rights in Latvia and Estonia, and harbors unrealistic hopes

that the EU will grant visa free travel to Russian citizens.

Viewing visa free travel as a long-term goal, the EU is

willing instead to discuss visa facilitation when linked to a

readmission agreement that Russia rejects. Russia has only

one readmission agreement (with Tajikistan),and refuses to

be responsible for other third country citizens who transit

Russia and seek asylum in Europe.



9. (C) In the external security roadmap, Russia is "not

ready" to discuss issues related to the "near abroad."

Moscow objects to the EU's "common neighborhood" concept, and

refuses any mention of it in the roadmap. According to

Miller, the EU wants a "big leap forward" in cooperation with

Russia to advance what the EU sees as "shared interests" in

Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and Southern Caucuses. The EU

wants a stable, prosperous neighborhood, but it encounters

difficulty overcoming Russia's belief in exclusive spheres of

influence that views the EU's interest as a zero-sum threat.

Russia is adamant about its unique relationship with the

neighborhood countries, which is a much older, deeper and

more privileged one than the EU enjoys with these countries.

Our Russian embassy contacts told us that the EU must

understand Russia's exceptional connection to the CIS. These

diplomats argued that the countries of the "near abroad" are

"relatives" who are "very near to our heart," while to the EU

they are merely neighbors, and new ones at that.



10. (C) In the external security roadmap, Russia wants to

stress the need to fight terrorism, but rejects EU attempts

to link these efforts to the need to respect human and civil

rights. Mirroring debates in NATO, Moscow also seeks to

participate in EU crisis management decision-making, while

the EU offers to facilitate Russian participation in future

ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) missions only on

the basis of an invitation. In effect, Russia is seeking a

de facto veto over potential EU peacekeeping operations in

the CIS.



Possible Summit Deliverables

--------------

11. (C) The EU has nixed Russian proposals for a joint

political statement at the summit, and there is agreement at

present only for a joint press statement. The statement may

emphasize the progress in "practical implementation" in the

roadmaps on the economic and cultural spheres, and will

likely include a pledge to continue working on the remaining

two spaces, external and internal security.



12. (C) Additionally, the EU seeks Russian support in

organizing an EU post-conflict assistance exploratory mission

to the Northern Caucuses, and would like to hold regular

consultations on human and minority rights. According to

Miller, the EU is hopeful that Moscow will reciprocate with a

dialogue on human rights in Chechnya in return for the EU's

recent flexibility in agreeing to discuss Russian minority

rights in Latvia and Estonia.



COMMENT

--------------

13. (C) The EU complains it is getting mixed messages from

Moscow. On the one hand, Moscow says it wants a successful

summit and seeks political deliverables that would show that

Moscow is not isolated internationally. Russia wants a

demonstration of EU solidarity in the fight against

terrorism, but also seeks to limit EU criticism of political

developments in Russia. Some here think that Russia decided

to postpone the summit because it failed to get the

concessions it expected on the roadmaps, underlying Russia's

apparent frustration with the EU's insistence that all four

roadmaps go forward together.



14. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Beyond the planning for the

current summit, EU officials say that policy toward Russia

shifted substantially after the 2003 EU-Russia summit, when

Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi's statements in support of

Putin were out of step with the general EU policy toward

Russia. For Brussels, this highlighted the need for the EU

to have a more coherent and disciplined policy that could

withstand Russian attempts to undermine consensus by

exploiting its bilateral relationships with individual EU

countries. Additionally, the 1 May EU enlargement brought in

former Soviet states and satellites that have a strong

interest in pursuing a tough policy with Russia. Some in

Brussels suggest that a more assertive EU policy that views

Russia as just another Eastern European state*a view that

contrasts sharply with Moscow's image of itself as uniquely

important*may have motivated Moscow to demonstrate its

weight by postponing the summit. The tension between

hard-nosed new members and the EU's larger veteran states,

who often prefer a more moderate approach to Russia, is not

fully resolved. As the new member states find their voice

within the EU, they will continue to influence the EU's

approach to Russia. How Russia chooses to engage the EU as

this process is underway will also affect the outcome. At

present, Moscow is not winning many friends.



MCKINLEY