EU/DPRK: SE DETRANI DISCUSSES 6PT, KEDO,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004881 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2014 TAGS: PREL KNNP PHUM EAID PINR IR KN EUN USEU BRUSSELS SUBJECT: EU/DPRK: SE DETRANI DISCUSSES 6PT, KEDO, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AND MISSILES REF: A. USEU TODAY 11/10/04 ¶B. USEU BRUSSELS 4756 ¶C. USEU BRUSSELS 1119 ¶D. USEU BRUSSELS 1081 Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During consultations November 9 with Special Envoy Joseph DeTrani and EAP/K Director Jim Foster, EU officials underscored the EU's firm support for the Six-Party Process and willingness to play a constructive role when the time comes. They urged the US to consult early if the EU is ever expected to provide assistance as part of any resolution of the nuclear issue. DeTrani and Foster urged the EU not to agree to anything with Iran that the DPRK could cite as precedent for demanding something short of full disarmament itself. Commission interlocutors said the EU is grappling with what to do about KEDO, and hopes for a signal from the US about its 2005 funding plans. On humanitarian assistance, the EU is disappointed with North Korea's lack of cooperation and decision to quit participating in the UN Common Appeals Process, but will look for other ways to coordinate international assistance. DeTrani and Foster, accompanied by INR Analyst Anthony Ruggiero, also delivered a briefing on the DPRK's ballistic missiles program. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) Special Envoy for North Korea Joseph DeTrani and EAP/K Director Jim Foster met on November 9 with EU Council, Commission and Member State officials to discuss the Six-Party Process and other DPRK issues in advance of a visit to North Korea by the EU's Regional Director-level Troika (ref. B). DeTrani and Foster also met with the EU Political and Security Committee and, accompanied by INR Anthony Ruggiero, briefed cleared EU officers on North Korea's ballistic missiles program. SIX-PARTY TALKS -------------- ¶3. (C) DeTrani briefed his interlocutors on US thinking about the Six-Party Talks and thanked them for the EU's consistent support. He expressed US hope that China will be able to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table in late November or early December, and asked the EU to urge China to increase its pressure on North Korea. Council DG Robert Cooper said he thought we were entering a critical phase because, with President Bush now re-elected, Pyongyang had to decide whether to return to the table or wait out another four years in the unrealistic hope that something might change. DeTrani agreed, and said he was guardedly optimistic that North Korea would make a strategic decision to re-engage. ¶4. (C) Several interlocutors, including Cooper, wanted to know if the US had a "Plan B" for if the Six-Party Talks failed to resolve the nuclear issue. DeTrani and Foster explained that the US saw the Six-Party Process -- a multilateral mechanism involving all major regional parties -- as the only viable way to ensure North Korea's complete, verifiable and irreversible disarmament. The ultimate prize for North Korea was full normalization with the international community. The DPRK needs to make a fundamental decision about what kind of state it wants to be. Until then, there was little the international community could do except keep the pressure on and the Six-Party avenue open. While not ruling out options as a matter of principle, the US was not contemplating any kind of unilateral or military solutions to the problem. EU WILLING TO HELP, WILL NEED EARLY CONSULTATION -------------- --- ¶5. (C) DeTrani's interlocutors were grateful for the timely US briefing on the Six-Party Process. They reiterated the EU's willingness to play a supportive role when the time is right (refs. C, D). Council Secretariat North America and Human Rights Director Jim Cloos said the EU was ready to help in any way it could, while "recognizing our secondary role." Commission External Relations Director Richard Wright pointed out that even though the EU is not part of the Six-Party Talks, the EU would expect to contribute if the talks result in a long-term plan, and therefore should be kept in the loop along the way. ¶6. (C) In separate meetings, Council DG Cooper and HiRep Solana Policy Advisor Chris Holtby urged the US to consult early if it wanted the EU to provide incentives and assistance to the DPRK as part of an eventual resolution of the nuclear issue. The EU will need time and will want input from the US if it is ever expected to play a role, Holtby said. Cooper said the EU would need to know early if the US wanted it to play a bigger role. "It will be easier for us to help you," he said, "if we feel consulted early, rather than just handed a bill." DeTrani and Foster thanked the EU for its willingness to help and said they would bear in mind the EU request for early consultation when the time comes. EU LOOKING FOR SIGN ABOUT FUTURE OF KEDO -------------- ¶7. (C) During a meeting with Commission Director Richard Wright and members of his staff, Wright asked about US intentions toward the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO). The KEDO issue is becoming time-sensitive for the EU, since they must decide whether to fund KEDO next year. Wright said the EU is inclined to continue support for KEDO's administrative costs (Euros 1 million per year),but to discontinue the Euros 4 million they provided for suspension costs last year. The fact that the US is not contributing this year "is not helping," Wright said. He asked for some sort of signal from Washington to indicate whether the US will fund KEDO next year, so the EU can make an informed decision on whether to continue funding. He also pointed out that the legal basis for EU contributions to KEDO runs out at the end of 2005. If KEDO is terminated, Wright said, there will be "contingent liabilities," and "we do not consider ourselves at risk for these." ¶8. (C) DeTrani told Wright that the U.S. continues to see KEDO as a viable entity, but that the KEDO light-water reactor project is not viable. Wright responded that as part of an international settlement, "I don't think we'd object" to termination of the light-water reactor project. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT -------------- --- ¶9. (SBU) Commission Director Richard Wright said that a major goal of the EU's November 13-16 Troika visit to North Korea (ref. B) was to assess recent changes in the climate for humanitarian aid and development projects. Wright said the EU was disappointed by North Korea's recent decision to terminate the UN's Common Appeals Process (CAP),but said the EU would find other ways to coordinate aid to the DPRK. He underscored, however, that monitoring was "non-negotiable" for the EU. ¶10. (SBU) During its November 13-16 trip, the EU Troika also plans to conduct monitoring visits to ongoing development projects, Wright said. The EU was trying to develop a better sense of the economic situation, and hoped to see a deepening of the economic improvements observed in recent Troika trips to North Korea, including an influx of Chinese electronics and revitalization surrounding the Kaesong industrial zone. ¶11. (C) Over dinner with other EU and third-country officials, Wright also mentioned that the EU had two pilot development projects on the books that "could be launched in just a few weeks if North Korea did the right things." But, as we have seen with regard to humanitarian assistance, the DPRK seems to be "going backward rather than forward," he said. Japanese Mission DCM Yoshihisa Kuroda cautioned the EU not to invest too much of itself in planning for possible development projects. He underlined that the first priority of Japan, the US, and others in the region was security, not the development of North Korea. The EU does not have to live in North Korea's neighborhood, he said, and should be very careful not to say or do things that undermine the security interests of those who do. EU interlocutors reassured Yoshihisa that the EU fully supported the Six-Party Process and saw North Korea as a grave global threat. The EU would take its cue from Six-Party partners about the timing and design of any future increase in economic engagement. BRIEFING THE PSC: DPRK-IRAN PARALLELS? -------------- ¶12. (SBU) In a meeting with the twenty-five Member State Ambassadors to the EU Political Security Committee (PSC), DeTrani provided an overview of the Six-Party Talks, then opened to the floor to a range of questions from the audience. Ambassadors asked about the future of KEDO, the possible impact of a nuclear agreement with Iran on the Six-Party Talks, a possible "Plan B" if the Six-Party Talks remain at an impasse, and the climate for humanitarian aid to North Korea. ¶13. (C) DeTrani noted that the EU should be very careful about any potential agreement with Tehran over its nuclear activities, because North Korea could use any relatively weak deal with Iran to try to leverage concessions in the Six-Party Talks. As with North Korea, the international community should accept nothing less from Tehran than the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear-related programs. DeTrani and Foster also made this point in their other meetings throughout the day. EU interlocutors were in listening mode, but several observed in very general terms that the multilateral track the US was pursuing with the DPRK was similar in many ways to the EU's approach to Iran. Only Council DG Cooper underscored the differences, arguing that geography and regional political dynamics made Iran the more dangerous -- if also more potentially democratic -- of the two. At the same time, both had a history of "lying and cheating" which made them equally hard to trust, he said (ref. A). BRIEFING THE EU ON DPRK MISSILES PROGRAMS -------------- ¶14. (S) INR Analyst Anthony Ruggiero, who accompanied DeTrani and Foster, delivered a briefing to cleared EU officials on recent developments in North Korea's ballistic missiles program and indications that the DPRK might be preparing for a new test launch. The EU officials thanked the US for the briefing -- which went smoothly despite incompatible US and EU security guidelines that prevented the use of visual aids -- and expressed hope that North Korea's missiles proliferation activities could be addressed once the nuclear issue was resolved. Several officials asked about DPRK links to outside technology suppliers (especially Russia) and missile customers (Pakistan, Iran, private groups and terrorists). DeTrani and Ruggiero said that the DPRK's willingness to sell complete systems to any country able to pay was alarming, but noted that Pyongyang did not seem interested in selling to non-state entities, probably because of the risks involved. The real danger was that corruption and established DPRK links to organized crime could result in unauthorized technology transfers. Commission representatives said that the EU has raised missiles concerns in its (low-level) political dialogue with North Korea, and said the EU would discuss the problem with China during the December 8 EU-China Summit. (U) This cable has been cleared by SE DeTrani and EAP/K Foster. Schnabel