U.S.-EU NONPROLIFERATION TROIKA: EU LOOKS FOR U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 004550

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2014
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP UN EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: U.S.-EU NONPROLIFERATION TROIKA: EU LOOKS FOR U.S.
COOPERATION AND FLEXIBILITY

Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 28, the U.S. and the EU held
their semi-annual exchange on nonproliferation issues. This
discussion followed the release of the second U.S.-EU Summit
declaration on nonproliferation. The two sides touched on a
wide range of nonproliferation issues and explored possible
steps that could be taken to implement the two Summit
declarations. On the May Review Conference of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),the EU emphasized the
importance of Article VI and previous Review Conference
results. The EU remains seized with the prospect of
resolving the Iran situation with a &grand bargain8 rather
than a referral from the IAEA Board of Governors to the
United Nations Security Council. The EU is also close to
finalizing the association agreement with Syria including a
clause on nonproliferation. Privately, the EU Council
Secretariat representative told the U.S. delegation

SIPDIS
(Rangaswamy) that the EU Council, in particular Annalisa
Giannella,s office, is seeking to expand and enhance its
profile and expertise in nonproliferation, and would be
interested in attending G-8 meetings either in place of or in
addition to the European Commission representative. END
SUMMARY.

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2004 US-EU Statement on Nonproliferation
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2. (C) Wilke observed that the 2004 statement demonstrates
the EU,s growing political interest in non-proliferation.
Rangaswamy noted the U.S. interest in developing the three
priorities outlined in the statement: implementation of the
UNSCR 1540, coordination leading the NPT Review Conference,
and radioactive source security. She stressed the importance
of making tangible progress on these issues. On radioactive
source security, she mentioned the September 27 meeting
between U.S. and EU radioactive source experts and the IAEA
General Conference endorsement of export and import control
guidance for sources. The EU agreed to provide feedback on
the U.S. suggested steps for implementing the 2004 U.S.-EU
Summit statement on nonproliferation.


3. (C) Wilke was skeptical that an initiative to restrict
transfers of enrichment and reprocessing to additional states
could succeed this year and observed that the atmosphere is
too negatively charged to move forward without alienating the
states that need to be persuaded to accept changes in the NSG
guidelines. The EU was sympathetic to making progress on the
Additional Protocol as a condition of supply given the
reference to this issue in the EU nonproliferation strategy.
Rangaswamy asked whether a change in the French position was
forthcoming, noting that the main opposition to the
Additional Protocol as a condition of supply comes from
France, Russia Brazil, and Argentina. Wilke had "no news on
evolution on the French position." Kayser said that the
Additional Protocol would be incentivized if it included
condition of supply.


4. (C) The EU reported on its September 27 troika
consultations with Brazil. Wilke explained that Brazil sees
itself as championing a leadership role in the Non-Aligned
Movement. In the EU view, Brazil,s posturing is related to
U.S. positions on disarmament and enrichment and
reprocessing. The EU does not anticipate a change in the
Brazilian position prior to the NPT Review Conference. The
EU emphasized that it would continue to underscore the
importance of Brazil,s signature to the Additional Protocol.
The EU also observed that U.S. influence is limited, and can
even be counterproductive at times.


5. (C) On PSI, Wilke stressed that the EU has contributions
to make, in addition to the contributions made by individual
EU member states. Rangaswamy acknowledged receipt of the
EU,s paper on competencies related to PSI and said that the
U.S. is reviewing the document. On universalizing the
Additional Protocol, the EU noted that its effort to expand
adherence has met with mixed results. Some governments
consider the Additional Protocol irrelevant because they do
not possess nuclear materials. Other governments associate
the Additional Protocol to clandestine activity or
noncompliance and have said that their government,s
signature is unnecessary because it is not under suspicion.
Wilke conceded that there is challenge in convincing states
about the benefits and relevance of the Additional Protocol.
Rangaswamy reported on the G-8 effort to expand adherence to
the Additional Protocol, which are being pursued during the
U.S. G-8 presidency. Kayser observed that in some cases, it
could be counterproductive for the U.S. to press for
adherence. Kayser argued that this message is better
received from non-nuclear weapons states. The U.S. and EU
agreed to continue to exchange information on these efforts.

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UNSCR 1540
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6. (C) On the UNSCR 1540, Rangaswamy requested that the U.S.
and the EU consult on next steps after reports are submitted
to the 1540 Committee. Wilke said that the EU was aiming to
meet the deadline. He emphasized that implementation of the
resolution is among the EU,s competencies. The EU sees its
role as filling the gaps where national reporting is
incomplete or insufficient. There is confusion in the EU
about the resolution,s references to national control lists.
The EU is concerned that this language could result in the
creation of national control lists and undermine the
application of the regime control lists. Further, the EU
expressed concern about vague language in the resolution
which, in the EU,s view, could result in different
interpretations and differing standards in reporting national
implementation measures.


7. (C) Rangaswamy responded that the EU had made this
observation previously, during G-8 meetings. The U.S. does
not believe that the resolution encourages the proliferation
of control lists, the resolution was intended to reinforce
the existing regime control lists. Given the EU,s concerns,
Rangaswamy suggested this issue be discussed further by
experts along with consideration of possible next steps.

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Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon)
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8. (C) The EU welcomed the U.S. suggestion to consult prior
to and during the NPT Review Conference. Wilke observed that
weak WEOG coordination during the April Preparatory Committee
lead to disappointing consequences. Wilke and Kayser
repeatedly sought a firm U.S. commitment to Article VI and
pressed hard for confirmation of the U.S. commitment to
previous RevCon outcomes, referring in particular to the 2000
RevCon,s 13 steps. Kayser complained that the U.S. position
on Article VI sends a bad message, especially considering the
willingness of non-nuclear weapons states to undertake
additional obligations by signing on to the Additional
Protocol. This willingness had to be matched with a
willingness on the part of nuclear weapons states to fulfill
their end of the bargain. Kayser was skeptical that the
RevCon could succeed without flexibility on the part of the
U.S. Rangaswamy replied that the U.S. could not support a
2005 RevCon agenda that recognized only the 2000 outcome and
not subsequent developments. The U.S. has emphasized
compliance because we are concerned that noncompliance
threatens the Treaty and all of its benefits. Wilke
criticized the U.S. emphasis on compliance, observing that
the NPT is a balance, and that actions such as the
development of 'new nukes' undermine the basic pillars of the
Treaty. He cautioned about negative atmospherics at the
RevCon. He added that a U.S.-EU "alignment of views
presupposes flexibility", and that U.S. flexibility is
necessary on issues such as disarmament. Wilke expressed the
hope that the disappointing results coming from the most
recent PrepCom would not be repeated.


9. (C) Kayser began by reaffirming the that the EU is "not
engaged in the context of negative assurances". He said that
only once there is universal compliance with NPT and the AP
can there be a discussion about the assurances.

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DG Succession
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10. (C) In response to the EU,s inquiry about the U.S.
position on Dr. ElBaradei seeking a third term as Director
General of the IAEA, Rangaswamy referred to the effort to
establish term limits in the UN system. She explained that
the U.S. believes that a two term limit is a sound policy.
The EU warned that if the U.S. eventually opposes ElBaradei,
it could have a detrimental effect on relations with the
Agency. It will set a negative tone and could be damaging on
efforts related to Iran and other issues. Wilke said that
while the DG is fair, he believes that a battle over
succession could lead to hard feelings which would be
difficult to overcome.

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Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
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11. (C) Wilke informed the group that China had submitted its
application for membership to the MTCR. He added that the EU
position is still under consideration and hoped that a fully
coordinated position would emerge by the time of the Seoul
plenary. EU priorities for Seoul include admission of new
countries; discussion of the relevance of UNSCR 1540; and
consideration tabled proposals. Rangaswamy said that the
U.S. hopes that MTCR Partners will give regional
nonproliferation priority attention at the plenary and
referred to the U.S. proposal on Syria. Wilke replied that
the EU is still reviewing the U.S. proposal.


12. (C) Given the operation of the EU,s common market, Wilke
believes that not having all EU member states in the MTCR
could undermine the Regime. The EU informed Rangaswamy of
its impending demarche on this issue and provided an advance
copy of the letter that would be presented to the U.S. in
Washington. A similar demarche will also be undertaken in
Moscow. Rangaswamy recalled that the U.S. supported the
membership of the new EU member states and confirmed that the
U.S. position has not changed. She inquired whether the EU
had previously contacted Russia or Turkey about their
positions. Wilke affirmed that the EU had weighed in with
Ankara, and asked the U.S. to use any opportunity to do the
same.


13. (C) Wilke regretted that membership of the new EU member
states was being linked to other issues, including the
admission of other states. On this point, the EU mentioned
the possibility that Russia would offer a trade, Russian
support for admission of the new EU member states in exchange
for Kazakhstan,s membership. Rangaswamy responded that, on
Kazakhstan, the U.S. position is unchanged. We would not
endorse membership for Kazakhstan since it is not a
significant potential supplier of missile-related technology.


14. (C) Wilke said that Russia was already providing
pre-launch notifications, and asked whether the U.S. would do
the same. Rangaswamy replied that the issue is still under
U.S. inter-agency review. She suggested that he discuss the
issue on the margins of Seoul plenary with the U.S. head of
delegation, Vann Van Diepen.


15. (C) The EU intends to move forward with a UN resolution
endorsing the Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile
proliferation. The EU reported on their outreach efforts and
are optimistic that a majority of UN members will cosponsor
the resolution.

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Libya
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16. (C) Rangaswamy provided the EU with information on the
U.S.-UK effort to redirect Libyan WMD scientists. The EU
expressed an interest in participating in this initiative.
Pointing out that the U.S. had not lifted all sanctions,
Kayser said that the U.S. should give greater recognition to
what Libya has done. Van Reidhead, poloff at USEU, delivered
a demarche on COREPER's decision to lift the arms embargo on
Libya. Wilke responded to U.S. concerns that "Libya will not
get the same treatment as some other countries do", but he
did not respond to Reidhead's question on which member states
agree with the COREPER decision.

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Syria
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17. (C) Rangaswamy inquired about the status of the WMD
clause in the EU,s association agreement with Syria. Wilke
confirmed that agreement at the COREPER level is close. The
clause has been agreed ad ref by the two sides but some EU
members states have not seen the new language. According to
Wilke, the new language is similar to an earlier draft. He
seemed confident that this language would be acceptable to
the member states and said it "will go through the
institutions without much problems." He emphasized that the
association agreement is a key part of the EU,s approach to
foreign policy -- engagement. Wilke said that the agreement
itself will drive "a wedge in the system that upholds power
in Syria" by opening the economy. The EU views engagement
(with Syria, and Iran) as an instigator for progress along
the lines of Western efforts to push economic and political
liberalization in the USSR, and Eastern Europe.

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Iran
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18. (C) The EU presented conflicting views. On the one hand,
Wilke and Kaysar complained that Iran had not cooperated
fully, that Iran had cleverly manipulated the system to
include language in the IAEA reports that supported their
case. Wilke complimented the U.S.-drafted list of questions
related to the latest report. On the other hand, Wilke
suggested that efforts to push Iran to the UNSC would force
Iran to take a decision to withdraw from the NPT. They view
the Iranian announcement on uranium conversion as a "we're
not bluffing" move. Reflecting on this, he said that we
need to figure out a way to ensure that that Iran does not
withdraw. Wilke recommended further consideration of a
"grand bargain" as a way out. Kaysar expressed frustration
with Iran,s delays and commented that if Iran withdraws, it
would undermine its own position, if you don't have anything
to hide, then why withdraw?


19. (C) The EU asked for clarification on the next steps
after a possible UNSC referral. What would the UNSC be able
to do and how would that help? EU members remain reluctant
for a UNSC referral without having a plan for succeeding.
The EU is concerned that the language from the various
reports is not robust enough to enable the UNSC to act. He
said that using making a case for non-compliance based on
national intelligence services would be risky and risk a
repeat of UNSC debates on Iraq. He added that it would be
preferable to have an international case advanced at the
UNSC, not a national one. He stated his preference for
improving IAEA reports and making them more relevant to UNSC
discussions.

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EU Funding for Nonproliferation
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20. (C) The EU reported on their efforts to establish a line
item for nonproliferation. The EC would like to separate
their nonproliferation and nuclear safety assistance. It is
not clear whether this line item would result in additional
funds for nonproliferation, and the Global Partnership. The
issue still needs to be approved by member states and the
European Parliament. Both Wilke and Defrennes suggested that
the slow budgetary cycle means that we will have to wait
until 2007 "to get serious money", and current efforts to
secure funding are "like a hunting expedition". Defrennes
said that he was hopeful that non-proliferation will be
included in the proposal for a new "Instrument for
Stability", which would also allow the EU to fulfill its
commitments. Defrennes said that the EU, working with a
local think tank, had launched an extensive review of EU and
member state programs on non-proliferation, border security,
and export

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COMMENT
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21. (C) This routine exchange produced a surprising outcome:
a clear sense of disappointment from the EU side that
well-known U.S. positions remained unchanged. The EU
repeatedly urged the U.S. delegation to consider flexibility,
and underscored their interest in working closely with the
U.S. The message was unambiguous )- rigid U.S. positions
prevented closer collaboration with the EU and these
divisions, in the EU view, are not constructive in advancing
nonproliferation.

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Participants
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22. (U) EU Delegation:

Netherlands (current EU Presidency):

Paul Wilke, Head of Nuclear Affairs and Non-Proliferation
Division, MFA Hague
Elke Merks-Schaapveld, Policy Officer, Nuclear Affairs and
Non-Proliferation Division, MFA Hague

Luxembourg (successor to Netherlands in EU Presidency):

Paul Kayser, Ambassador on special mission
Tim Kesseler, Charge de mission, Security Department

European Commission
Marc Deffrennes, Head of Non-proliferation Team
Andrew Denison, Desk Officer for USA and Canada, DG-RELEX

EU Council Secretariat
Stephan Klement, Administrator

U.S. Delegation:

Michael McKinley, Charg, U.S. Mission to the EU
Roopa Rangaswamy, Senior Adviser for G-8 and U.S.-EU
nonproliferation issues, Bureau of Nonproliferation,
Department of State
Van Reidhead, Political Officer, U.S. Mission to the EU
Sean Kimball, Assistant, U.S. Mission to the EU


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