EUR PDAS BRADTKE'S SEPTEMBER 27 DISCUSSIONS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BRUSSELS 004235

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM AND EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUR PDAS BRADTKE'S SEPTEMBER 27 DISCUSSIONS WITH
THE EU


Classified By: USEU Political Military Officer Jeremy Brenner for reaso
ns 1,5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Visiting EUR PDAS Robert Bradtke covered a
wide range of topics in meetings with the EU Political and
Security Committee Troika and Director General Robert Cooper
on September 27. The US and the EU voiced support for UNSCR
1564 regarding Darfur, and the EU sought consultations with
the US on a "division of labor" in Sudan. On
Russia/Moldova/Georgia, neither the US nor the EU found
grounds for optimism regarding December OSCE Ministerials,
but both insisted that Istanbul Commitments must come before
ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty. The EU shares the US
view on MONUC and the Great Lakes, that there is a need for a
stronger mandate and higher force levels. In Afghanistan, the
US is looking for a way to merge ISAF with OEF, while the EU
expands its efforts at Democracy support. On Operation
Althea in Bosnia, the US desire to vest final Dayton
authority in DSACEUR met considerable resistance from the EU
side. EU battlegroups are moving ahead, with EU assurances
that they and the NATO Response Force (NRF) will be mutually
reinforcing. US underscored concern about lifting of EU arms
embargoes on Libya and China. End summary.

Sudan/Darfur
--------------

2. (C) PDAS Bradtke pointed out the high level of interest
within the USG over developments in Darfur. He noted that the
Secretary had characterized the situation as "genocide,"

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giving high profile impetus to our desire to speed the
deployment of African Union monitors. Bradtke took note of
the significant EU contribution, and reiterated the US pledge
of an additional 20 million dollars. Bradtke lamented the
apparent hesitance by the AU to accept assistance with their
military mission on offer, but pointed to hopeful signs of a
greater willingness to work with experts after meetings last
week in New York.


3. (C) The EU Presidency underlined the EU's full support for
UNSCR 1564, and called for intensified pressure on the
parties. The EU continues to look at options, including the
imposition of sanctions. Dutch Presidency representative
Ambassador Alphons Hamer noted the urgent need to get peace
talks back on track in October when discussions resume. The
EU Commission is looking at ways to mobilize funds for the
Peace Facility. Hamer referred to AU requests for planning
assistance, and said that there was a need for realistic
cooperation based on the AU's capacities. He noted a
North/South linkage to the situation in Darfur, and said it
was vital that all sides understand that no one can expect to
gain from the stalemate.


4. (C) Deputy Director General for European Defense and
Security Policy, Peter Feith -- recently returned from a
fact-finding mission to the region -- said the AU needs
assistance in planning, logistics, and funding. In planning,
Feith emphasized the need to get the right mix. He urged that
donors focus on building AU capacity, such as headquarters
operations in Addis and Khartoum. He argued against a focus
on protection forces, but called for monitors to reach out to
remote areas. He said that the UN has shown some flexibility,
and he urged that we build on -- and phase in -- the Caemmert
plan. Feith supports a significant police component as part
of the overall mission in Darfur, believing that a police
presence might alleviate the need for military protectors.


5. (C) With regard to logistics, Feith cited a need for lift
and transport assets as well as covering accommodation costs
for the deployed units in Darfur. He suggested continued
close coordination with a view to arriving at a division of
labor between the EU and the US. Feith asked for US views on
where this coordination could best take place. On funding
issues, the EU Commission observed that the EU cannot simply
become the "paymaster" of the African Union. Funding,
including a tranche of funds for the Peace Facility, must be
undertaken with reasonable and efficient planning in place,
and it must contribute to capacity building within the AU.
There can be no question of releasing additional funds if the
EU is "uncomfortable" with the AU's strategic approach. In an
earlier meeting, Director General for Common Foreign and
Security Policy, Robert Cooper, told Bradtke that the EU
envisions a larger role in Addis, but he did not expect
Europeans to play a major role on the ground in Darfur --
other than the small group of observers already there.


6. (C) USEU Charge called for realistic engagement, noting
that there are three provincial capitals within Darfur, and
that the AU has been unable to develop acceptable accounting
mechanisms. He also said there was a need for planning cells
in Addis Ababa and Khartoum.


7. (C) Observers, and Police training. PDAS Bradtke outlined
the US hope to see a force of 1500 observers deployed by the
end of October as part of an eventual total of 3500. He said
that meetings in New York had been used to accelerate the
deployment process. Bradtke noted that the AU has no policing
capability and asked who the EU would plan to work with if it
undertook a police training mission, given that the Sudanese
security forces are part of the problem.


8. (C) Feith outlined three options for a police mission to
Darfur. The first would be an EU-only operation, which he
said was unlikely to find consensus among EU member states.
The second option would be an ESDP mission with 50 senior
police advisors in an EU chain of Command to mentor, monitor,
advise, and train local police under an AU or UN umbrella.
The third option would be an AU Police Mission with EU
trainers within a Sudanese chain of command. The trainers
would serve to steer the Sudanese command away from embarking
on harmful or undesirable missions.


9. (C) USEU PolMinCouns asked whether the deployment of
unarmed monitors did not risk creating a situation where
international observers might witness atrocities taking
place, but could do nothing to stop them. Feith responded by
saying that this would not be the case if the mandate and key
supporting tasks for the protectors called for protection of
civilian populations. He also said that the presence of
unarmed observers had been shown to have a deterrent effect
against attacks against civilians.


10. (C) NAC-PSC Consultations. Bradtke pointed out that
UNSYG Annan had approached both the EU and NATO seeking
support in Darfur. Under these circumstances, it was a
particular disadvantage that the issue could not be raised in
NAC-PSC sessions because of the ongoing political question
over participation by Cyprus and Malta in NATO-EU
discussions. This made consultations difficult in an area
that could be appropriately covered under the provisions of
the Berlin Plus Agreements. The EU Presidency replied by
acknowledging that this was a strange situation, but that the
issue could only be dealt with by all 25 EU member states. He
urged greater contacts between the NATO International Staff
and the EUMS as one way around the blockage. Bradtke said
that NATO could become involved under the right
circumstances, but it would depend upon a specific requestfor assistance. EU
representatives observed that there is a
"siege mentality" within the AU, and that additional
"non-african faces" as part of the mission would be a
sensitive matter. In the earlier meeting, Robert Cooper,
suggested that coordination could best be carried out via
talks between Peter Feith and NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary
General for Crisis Management and Operations, Robert Serry.
Cooper recommended against holding the discussions at the
senior political level (Solana- De Hoop Scheffer) and the
NAC-PSC is not feasible because of the Cyprus-Malta problem.
Cooper also suggested that it would be difficult for the AU
to accept a NATO role. He pointed out that even with all the
EU's money, they have found it difficult to gain entrance to
the AU HQ in Addis. "Everything is political with the AU,"
Cooper concluded.

Georgia/Moldova: Istanbul Commitments
--------------

11. (C) Ambassador Hamer opened the discussion by observing
that the EU continued to insist upon fulfillment of Russia's
Instanbul commitments.However, Hamer warned against holding
any high expectations for the December OSCE Ministerials. On
Moldova, Hamer noted that only a single ammunition
repatriation train has left Moldova this year. He said that
the EU tries to work with Moscow within the OSCE, but there
is a need for the US to push the Russians in the right
direction. The prospect is not promising for regional
declarations at Sofia, since they are not likely to find
agreement in Moscow.


12. (C) PDAS Bradtke expressed US appreciation for the close
cooperation of the EU on this issue. Although we did not
succeed in Maastricht on obtaining a ministerial declaration
on regional issues, the Russians did not divide us. The joint
US-EU visa ban on members of the Transnistrian regime was an
example of our positive cooperation. While the US shares the
EU's pessimism concerning the OSCE Ministerial, we must stick
to our bedrock principle that the Istanbul commitments must
come before ratification of the amended CFE. Bradtke
wondered if there were other possibilities to make progress
on OSCE issues at the December Ministerial, noting that
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov had recently taken a less
threatening posture toward the OSCE. He warned, however, that
the Russians hold an extremely negative view of Georgian
President Saakashvili. In his earlier meeting with Robert
Cooper, Bradtke said that Russian FM Lavrov had expressed
critical views of the Georgian PM in meetings with the
Secretary. The PSC Troika participants agreed that the US

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and the EU must stay in close touch in the run-up to the OSCE
Ministerials in Sofia.


13. (C) Ambassador Hamer suggested that Moscow has shown more
openness to an EU role in the Caucasus. He said that EU
envoy Talvitie believed it would be possible to bring about
the withdrawal of 3000 Russian military personnel by
negotiation. Both the EU and the US expressed concern over
recent moves by Russian President Putin that bring into
question the direction of democratic development in Russia.
PDAS Bradtke cited a need to stay engaged with Moscow on
Counter-Terrorism, but said the US is keeping a close eye on
internal developments.


14. (C) Robert Cooper told Bradtke that the EU had noted a
change in atmosphere recently, with some "real Soviet stuff"
coming from FM Lavrov. He cited continuing Russian
assertiveness vis-a-vis the Baltics, which has now become
more pronounced also with regard to Lithuania (regarding
Kaliningrad transit). Cooper also reported that the Russians
have told the EU that they are not ready to discuss Moldova
since it is "a former part of the USSR." According to Cooper,
the Russians are relatively pleased with the functioning of
the NATO-Russia Council and point to it as the "gold
standard" they would like to emulate in their contacts with
the EU. Cooper said that this kind of 25 plus 1 mechanism
would not work with the EU, and they were not prepared to
pursue it.

MONUC/Great Lakes
--------------

15. (C) The Presidency said the EU is supportive of a more
robust and focused MONUC. They call for strong international
monitoring, with a strengthened mandate and access to
information -- including satellite imagery. There is also a
need for better coordination in Kinshasa. The EU has taken
concrete steps toward a December launch of a civilian ESDP
mission to conduct fact-finding and to help reinforce
internal security within the DRC. This would be the first
civilian ESDP mission outside Europe. Per Bradtke, the US
shares the EU's support for stronger MONUC mandate and force
levels. USEU Charge pointed out the need to consider the
Rules of Engagement for an expanded MONUC.

Afghanistan
--------------

16. (C) PDAS Bradtke noted the very high US priority attached
to elections in Afghanistan. On the positive side, there have
been 10 million people registered to vote, of whom 40 percent
are women. Three million refugees returned to the country.
Bradtke credited Eurocorps with a smooth takeover of command
of ISAF and commended the stage one expansion of ISAF. He
said that challenges remain, including finding the
appropriate relationship between ISAF and Operation Enduring
Freedom. Problems with warlords and narcotics traffic must be
resolved. Bradtke said that the end-state should be a merger
of ISAF and OEF. It remains to identify the right timeline.


17. (C) For the EU, narcotics remain a significant threat,
and there is still great concern over the security situation.
Democracy, development, and reconstruction remain at the
heart of EU policy in Afghanistan. The EU Election Monitoring
Mission in Afghanistan will mobilize teams to visit Islamabad
and Teheran to examine registration programs for
out-of-country refugees. Bradtke commended the OSCE
monitoring mission under Ambassador Barry.

Operation Althea
--------------

18. (C) Ambassador Hamer referred to what he characterized
as an "unhelpful" interpretation of a NAC decision sheet that
prevented discussions of non-Berlin Plus issues such as Sudan
and Afghanistan in broader NATO-EU fora. On the transfer of
SFOR to Operation Althea, Hamer cited the need for intel
sharing, since EUFOR would be intelligence driven, based on a
robust situational awareness. He said there would be three
EUFOR sectors as currently exist under SFOR: Tuzla, Mostar
and Banja Luka. He recognized that the US wants a December 2
Transfer of Authority in Tuzla, but said that NATO must so
advise the EU. While the issue of reserves was dealt with at
the earlier NAC-PSC (see septel),Hamer confirmed that all
nations currently in SFOR would be invited to participate in
the force generation process for EUFOR.


19. (C) Bradtke pointed out that a number of allies find the
costs being allocated by the EU to be exorbitant and
disproportionate. He reaffirmed the US commitment to Bosnia
stability, pointing out that the US will fill 44 of 150
billets in the NATO HQ and provide a number of support
personnel to General Schook.


20. (C) Bradtke concluded that the smooth transition process
has shown that Berlin Plus can work, proving the naysayers
wrong. Cooper agreed, telling Bradtke that Berlin Plus
mechanisms were functioning, but it would be up to the new
DASCEUR to make it work smoothly. Cooper noted that Turkey
was not helping the process with its restricted
interpretation of strategic cooperation. (The Greek Cypriots,
Cooper acknowledged, have also behaved "unspeakably.")


21. (C) Dayton Final Authority. Bradtke identified one
remaining point that should be resolved before debate begins
on a new UNSCR in October. Bradtke said that the US had
concluded there was a need to further clarify the issue of
the successor to COMIFOR/SFOR as the final authority on
military matters under the Dayton GFAP. Once SFOR ceased to
exist, there is a need to vest that final authority in
someone. The US position is that this authority should be
vested in DSACEUR as the operational commander in both the
NATO and EUFOR chains of command. DSACEUR could then delegate
that authority to the EUFOR commander and the NATO HQ
commander as necessary in conjunction with delineated tasks.
The US would not accept that the final authority be vested in
COMEUFOR.


22. (C) Peter Feith expressed concern about designating
DSACEUR as the final authority. He wondered whether the US
was trying to move the goalposts at this late date, or if the
issue were even necessary. Feith said it was important --
both politically and psychologically -- that COMEUFOR not be
seen as having any less authority than was held by COMSFOR.
All parties have agreed that COMEUFOR will have full
authority in addressing and assessing issues of
non-compliance under Dayton, and that authority cannot be
qualified or delegated as suggested by the US position.
Bradtke assured Feith that there is no ambiguity concerningCOMEUFOR's "full
Dayton authority" in his areas of
responsibility, but that we did not accept that COMEUFOR
would be vested with the "final" authority. Ambassador Hamer
argued that this issue must be raised within NATO, where "we
will deal with it. Bradtke reiterated that this was not a
question of moving the goalposts, but a legal issue raised by
lawyers. The US would prefer to resolve the issue before it
becomes an issue for negotiation within the UNSC, where we
want to avoid non-participating UNSC members causing
mischief. He argued that DSACEUR could delegate final
authority to the commanders, leaving COMEUFOR's credibility
unchallenged. It was agreed that further discussions of this
issue are needed.


23. (C) Exchange of letters on Reserves. PDAS Bradtke
responded to a question from Feith about an exchange of
letters on reserves by saying that the US has not proposed
such an exchange but supports the idea within NATO that such
an exchange could specify how the parallel decisionmaking
processes in NATO and the EU would work. Robert Cooper noted
the importance of arriving at an agreement that avoided
language on "joint decisions" but allows for parallel
decision-making" in both NATO and the EU.


24. (C) Kosovo. In earlier discussions, Robert Cooper voiced
the EU's support for the ideas contained in the Eide Report
and noted that doing nothing was clearly not an option.
Bradtke said the US generally agrees with the EU's assessment
of the report, and that we are committed to staying in KFOR.


EU Battlegroups
--------------
25, (C) Ambassador Hamer told the US delegation that the EU
plans for Initial Operational Capability of high-readiness
battlegroups by 2005, with Full Operational Capability by

2007. The EU ambition is to be able to launch a mission
within 5 days in response to a request from the UNSYG. The
most probable mission would be to act as a bridging operation
by intervening quickly in a crisis situation, thereby giving
time to the UN to organize its own intervention force. Hammer
assured Bradtke that the EU battlegroups and the NATO
Response Force (NRF) would be mutually reinforcing, both in
terms of capabilities and timelines for deployment.


26. (C) Bradtke welcomed EU initiatives to improve
capabilities, and cited the positive discussions within the
EU-NATO capabilities working group to ensure common
standards. He reiterated the need to harmonize the
battlegroups and the NRF, asking about the creation of the
NATO liaison cell within the EU. He urged further discussions
within the Capabilities Working Group on standards and
certification processes.


27. (C) Hamer said that the EU envisioned a "large number" --
from 8 to 9 -- battlegroups to be eventually available to
meet the EU ambition. He argued that the battlegroup concept
had to be dealt with by all 25 member states under the
principle of inclusiveness. He said that excluding Cyprus
and Malta from discussions or participation was neither
acceptable nor desirable. Battlegroups are seen as a
"welcome lever" on capabilities development.

Iraq
--------------

28. (C) Per Bradtke, the US priorities in Iraq revolve
around supporting the electoral process, including support
for a UN protection force. The assessed requirement is for
three 600-man battalions at an estimated cost of USD 24
million for six months. Potential troop contributors include
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Romania and Georgia, though there are
unresolved problems. Such a force is critical to the UN
presence. EU funds are needed to support these deployments.
Bradtke asked that any planned EU police mission be closely
coordinated with existing programs underway in Jordan.


29. (C) Peter Feith explained that he will lead an EU
civilian crisis management fact-finding mission to Iraq in
mid-October to assess the possibilities for an EU police
training mission. He foresaw a positive EU role in the areas
of Rule of Law, Police Training, and Civil administration.
The fact-finding mission was tasked by the Council and will
travel to Basra and Baghdad, where he asked US assistance in
making broad contacts. One part of the mission will visit
Amman. Ambassador Hamer said that the EU will be as generous
as possible on election support via the UN Iraq Stabilization
Fund. He wondered about the cost of the protection force --
projected by the UN at usd 26 million -- asking what the
funds would be for and how they would be dispersed.


30. (C) Bradtke offered that the bulk of the cost would be
for salaries, and said he would check to see if there would
be costs for insurance associated with the force. The US
will provide lift and sustainment resources, but cannot pay
salaries. He asked if there were legal restrictions on the
Commission's ability to provide funds for such a protection
force. Michel Caillouet, Deputy Political Director, replied
that he "could not say it was impossible" for the Commission
to provide funding for the inner protective circle. Both the
US and the EU were in agreement that the 13 percent overhead
charges proposed by the UN to act as
administrator/disbursement agent was too high. Bradtke
wondered whether one of the contributing nations might be
able to perform the function by distributing money from a
fund into which other contributors could pay.

China/Libya Arms Embargoes
--------------

31. (C) In an addition to the agreed agenda, PDAS Bradtke
raised the issue of existing arms embargoes on China and
Libya. He urged that the EU not lift these embargoes. On
Libya, although Qaddaffi has come a long way, he still had
not received a "clean bill of health." There are questions
related to an attempt on Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah's life,
and lingering human rights concerns. The treatment of the
Bulgarian medics held in Libya is especially troubling.
Ambassador Hamer agreed that the treatment of the medics is
disgraceful. He took note of the US views, stating only that
the issue of the Libyan embargo will come before the Council
at the October 12-13 General Affairs and External Relations
Council (GAERC).


32. (C) Bradtke also expressed strong concern that weapons
sold to China might be used against US forces, especially in
the Taiwan Straits. He also said that lifting the embargo
would send the wrong message on human rights. Hamer said the
US views were well known, and being taken into consideration
by the EU as it weighs its decision. He replied that even if
the embargo were lifted, no one anticipates a flood of
weapons sales to China. He posited that, while there may
remain some human rights concerns, China does not belong in
the same category as Zimbabwe or Sudan.


33. (U) PDAS Bradtke has cleared this message.

McKinley