EU IN UN: IO A/S HOLMES IN BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004107 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2014 TAGS: PREL UNGA EUN USEU BRUSSELS SUBJECT: EU IN UN: IO A/S HOLMES IN BRUSSELS REF: A. A) BRUSSELS 2292 ¶B. B) STATE 167370 Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In meetings with IO Assistant Secretary Kim Holmes on September 15-16, EU officials: --stressed EU commitment to "effective multilateralism with the UN at its core;" --continued their push for enhanced status for the European Commission (EC) in UN bodies (EU additionality); --agreed that engaging the EU in the UN before EU positions had been decided was difficult but necessary; --stressed strengthening the African Union (AU) in Darfur; --were noncommittal on EU next steps in Iraq; --predicted the EU would agree to UNSC referral of Iran's nuclear program if no deal were made by November; --did not predict whether a WEOG rotation in the UN Human Rights Commission (UNCHR) could be worked out. The EU is determined to increase its influence in the UN -- one official's speculation about a future permanent EU UNSC seat, although long-range, reflects how far the ambition goes. We must keep engaging the EU on these issues, including on additionality, to be sure U.S. interests are taken into account. END SUMMARY. -------------- --- The EU, the UN, and "effective multilateralism" -------------- --- ¶2. (C) Robert Cooper, EU Council Director-General for Common Foreign and Security Policy, expounded on the essence of EU policy toward the UN: "effective multilateralism with the United Nations at its core." A world in which states are governed by law is an important EU aspiration, Cooper said, adding that, while law is nothing if not backed by power, power without law is barbaric. Given this EU view of the world, Cooper said, the UN is key to providing legitimacy for international action, even if it is not always the best venue "for getting things done." Here Cooper stressed EU consensus on the importance of the UN, noting that it was not just something that "idealists" (like Sweden) believed in -- even the UK, France, and Germany supported it. Returning to the subject of power, Cooper also noted the occasional necessity of "multilateralism with muscle." He said he expected most future EU military operations would be "UN-mandated." Even exceptions to this rule would likely occur under some sort of UN context. 
¶3. (C) Holmes noted that "effective multilateralism" had originated as a U.S. concept. He added that the U.S. defined "effective" as fulfilling a purpose. He said it was not the process itself that lent legitimacy, but what was being accomplished. Holmes said, and Cooper agreed, that the U.S. had done more productive work in the UN than it was often given credit for, and that the multilateralist-unilateralist debate over Iraq had produced more fog than clarity. Holmes remarked that he had seen an improvement in relations among UNSC members, including on Iraq. Cooper replied that, from an EU perspective, the wounds had not yet healed. Furthermore, he said, encouraging EU member states to get engaged in Iraq when it looked so risky and expensive was difficult work. He added that the current Dutch EU presidency was pushing hard to that end, perhaps "harder than the market will bear," and that strong divisions remained among member states. On a rational level, he said, everyone wanted Iraq to be a success--but politicians, and especially heads of state, were not always rational. ¶4. (C) On the effect of Iraq on transatlantic relations, Cooper did not think Europe would ever take a unified stand against the U.S. Cooper said the U.S. could usually find numerous EU allies ("at least 10") to support its positions. He dismissed the possibility of the EU's becoming a "counterweight" to U.S. influence. -------------- -------------- Additionality: EC Push Continues, US Stance Clear -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Holmes raised EU additionality (the European Commission's push for enhanced status in international organizations and UN conferences) in meetings with Fernando Valenzuela, Deputy Director-General for External Relations in the European Commission (EC),and Christoph Heusgen, Director of the EU Council's Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit. Valenzuela, who is slated to take up his new appointment as EC Ambassador to the UN in New York in early 2005, said traditional observer status for the EC in the UN was no longer adequate. While stressing several times that the EC did not dispute that voting rights belong only to UN member states, he said "full participant" status (on which he did not elaborate) "below the level of voting member" would best fit the EC's international weight in areas in which the EC shares EU decision-making power with EU member states. Valenzuela said he was not pushing for any change in UN rules -- he wanted a "pragmatic solution for better results in the UN." Raising the current dispute regarding the World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR -- see reftels), Valenzuela maintained that EC know-how on dealing with international disasters eclipsed that of the EU member states, thus pragmatically justifying full WCDR participation short of voting. ¶6. (C) Holmes explained that, while the U.S. welcomes EC expertise and does not want to stifle EU participation in UN agencies and conferences, the UN Charter defines the UN as an organization made up of member states, with only member states having the right to be represented in decision-making. Going beyond that for the EC would pose not only a legal problem but also give the EU an unjustified additional voice, thus putting the U.S. and other UN member states at a disadvantage compared to the EU. In addition, it would set a precedent that would open the way for other regional organizations to request similarly advantageous status. Holmes emphasized that the issue was not whether the EC could contribute its input in EU deliberations but whether a non-UN member should have a role in UN decision-making. ¶7. (C) Expressing a different view than that of the EC and Valenzuela, Heusgen said EC status was not a top concern for the EU Council. Heusgen echoed Valenzuela's arguments about the EC's "special competence" in many areas, but said that when the EU gains a "legal personality" under the new EU constitutional treaty, the EU should be represented as one unit. Therefore, he said, this issue should be put off until after the treaty enters into force. (NOTE: if approved by voters in the EU member states that are holding referenda and ratified by member-state parliaments, the constitutional treaty would probably enter into force in early 2007. END NOTE.) Looking ahead, Heusgen predicted an eventual permanent EU UNSC seat, but declined to specify whether this would supplement or replace the British and French P-5 seats. -------------- Coordinating with EU Before Positions are Set -------------- ¶8. (C) Holmes stressed to Heusgen the U.S. desire to engage the EU in international bodies before the EU has decided on positions it is unwilling or unable to change. Heusgen agreed that it was difficult for the EU to take outside input into account, remarking that it had been hard to coordinate among the EU-15 and would be even harder with 25 member states. However, he said, EU positions on most issues were now evolving earlier due to the increasing development of EU-wide perspectives among member states and better member-state coordination. The establishment of a unified EU external relations service under the constitutional treaty would enhance this process, he predicted, and make the EU much easier to deal with than under the current six-month rotating presidencies. -------------- Sudan: EU Wants to Bolster AU -------------- ¶9. (C) On Darfur, Holmes expressed hope for an agreement at the UN on an expanded monitoring force. Cooper said the EU wanted to get the AU to function and to make use of the EU military planners waiting in Addis Ababa. Holmes said continued pressure was needed on Khartoum to allow access for the international community -- maintaining the threat of sanctions was important to keeping the pressure on. Outside the UNSC, the international donor community and NGOs must follow through on their commitments to provide needed logistical and financial support. Underscoring the depth of U.S. concerns, Holmes summarized a recent State Department report in which some 1,700 interviewees painted a "devastating" picture. Heusgen said that the EU Council had gotten a mandate from EU FonMins to consider sanctions; a working group was examining the matter. In his view, the most important next step would be to increase the number of observers -- adding to the 150 observers could do more than inserting a poorly trained protection force. Heusgen added that the EU would be happy to help with training, but that nothing had been decided. -------------- EU Noncommittal on Iraq -------------- ¶10. (C) USEU PolMinCouns asked for Cooper's views on the timeline for elections in Iraq and whether the EU would provide any support for the UN protection force. Cooper replied that the EU was "scrambling around" for funding, but he thought it would work out in the end. There had been a discussion in the Council about EU funds to support the UN, but the Community budget could not legally be used for military operations. External Relations Commissioner Patten was casting around for alternatives, but Cooper did not think it would be possible to get around this legal prohibition. The amount of money--25 million euros, or only one million per member state--was so small that Cooper expected the EU to find a way to provide the support. He felt that police training would be "on the margins" of what may be possible for the EU, however. The Council Secretariat was interested in police or judicial training, but this would require member-state backing. There was also the additional question of physical security, Cooper noted. But his organization was continuing to pursue these possibilities. -------------- November Turning Point on Iran? -------------- ¶11. (C) On Iran, Cooper said that the EU-3 (France, Germany, UK) had each briefed him after most meetings with Iranian representatives. Cooper's impression, based on all three countries' read-outs, was that they really did want to bring the rest of the EU along with their efforts. Ensuring the backing of all 25--which Cooper would continue to work toward--would be important in the run-up to what he foresaw as "crunch time" later this fall. If a deal could not be worked out with Iran by November, he expected the nuclear issue to be referred to the UNSC. In response to Cooper's question about the likely content of a UNSCR, Holmes said that an IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) report recommending IAEA referral to the UNSC would assume advance support or at least non-opposition at the UN from reluctant members (China and Russia)-- who would have had to have agreed to the IAEA referral. Meaningful Council action would require more than a technical referral; the details of the IAEA referral would form the basis for the UNSCR and would outline the areas in which Iran needed to take action. Holmes sketched likely next steps, and said that the threat of sanctions would probably be the most severe option a UNSCR would contain. Judging from his reading of the EU mood, Cooper said that he had the impression that November's BOG meeting would be different than previous ones, re-emphasizing that "we are coming to a crunch." "But the Iranians are clever at evading at the last minute," he noted. -------------- EU Noncommittal on WEOG Rotation -------------- ¶12. (C) Holmes also raised U.S. interest in changing the WEOG rotation at the Human Rights Commission. Explaining that the U.S. now accepted remaining off for two years out of 21, it was up to other WEOG members to agree to the same limitations. Heusgen did not predict how the EU would respond, but did say that there had been lengthy debates when reform had come up several years ago. At that time, countries did--after tough discussions--agree to sit out terms. ¶13. (C) COMMENT: The 25-member-state EU's commitment to "effective multilateralism" and to increasing its influence in a strengthened UN have considerable implications for U.S. ability to pursue its interests multilaterally. Heusgen's speculation about an eventual permanent EU UNSC seat, although long-range, reflects how far the EU's ambition may go. We must keep engaging the EU, including on EU additionality, to be sure U.S. interests are taken into account. Our persistence is paying off -- Valenzuela's approach to Holmes on additionality was more conciliatory than EC officials have been in previous meetings, indicating the Commission is realizing that U.S. red lines will have to be taken into account. END COMMENT. ¶14. (U) A/S Holmes has cleared this message. MCKINLEY