EU/TURKEY: ACCESSION TALKS NOT A DONE DEAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004009

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2014
TAGS: PREL TU EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU/TURKEY: ACCESSION TALKS NOT A DONE DEAL

REF: A. LONDON 6824


B. THE HAGUE 2190

Classified By: USEU/POL: Harry O'Hara, reasons 1.4 B/D


1. (C) Summary: The current conventional wisdom in Brussels
is that Turkey will get "yes-but" recommendations to start
accession talks with the EU from the European Commission on
October 6 and the European Council on December 17. We expect
the debate in both bodies to be contentious. It would only
take one dissenting vote in December to derail Turkey's
prospects. End Summary

Time-Line: Key Dates
--------------


2. (C) European debate on Turkey will be driven by two key
dates: October 6 and December 17. On October 6, the
Commission will provide the Council with 1) an analysis of
Turkey's performance when measured against the "Copenhagen
Criteria," and 2) a recommendation on whether to offer a date
for accession talks to Turkey. In addition, the Commission
will also give the Council 3) an "impact statement" that will
assess the impact on European institutions and budgets of
possible Turkish membership. On December 17, the European
Council (heads of government from all 25 Member States)
should take a decision on offering Turkey a date to begin
accession negotiations based on the outcome of Commission
discussions. In between these two dates (on November 1),the
current Prodi Commission will step down and be replaced with
the new Barosso team. Commission sources tell us that the
current Commissioners are determined to finish their
recommendation on Turkey on their watch, however, so it is
unlikely the new Commission would play a major role in this
process.

October 6: Judged against what?
--------------


3. (C) The Commission's recommendation should be based on
whether Turkey has adequately met the EU Copenhagen
"political criteria." This means an assessment of Turkey's
internal/domestic human rights reforms and practices in terms
of laws passed and implementation of laws and reforms. By
design, other political issues that will figure prominently
in European political debate over Turkey (relations with
Cyprus, religion, NATO, the costs of membership on current
members, or the impact on ratification of a European
Constitution) have been excluded. Also not at issue in the
Commission report is the question of Turkey's "suitability"
or eligibility for membership. For the Commission, Turkey is
eligible, and the main question is whether or not Turkey's
enormous political reforms and changes over the last five
years are enough to offer a date to begin talks.

Setting the goalposts
--------------


4. (C) DG-Enlargement staffers who head the working-level
effort on Turkey see the key question as follows: when
compared with the last round of members and other current
candidates, has Turkey done enough? Turkey, they say, should
first be measured against "less than perfect" protections in
other recently-admitted countries -- such as Slovakia's
treatment of the Roma or Latvia's treatment of ethnic
Russians. In addition, Turkey is to be considered in light
of the situations in Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria, all of
whom have been offered negotiations despite flaws in their
records. What the Commission has told us is that it wants to
avoid judging Turkey by a different standard than it did for
the new 10 members or 3 current applicants. The Commission's
bottom line is that it will not ask that Turkey demonstrate
"perfect" or "full" completion of the Copenhagen Criteria
when some current member-states are also not perfect.

October 6: the "yes-buts"
--------------


5. (C) Current Brussels conventional wisdom is that Turkey
will get a "yes-but" decision o/a October 6 (Commission
sources tell us that the date could slip a few days),
although no one expects debate among the Commissioners will
not be controversial. The key internal debate in
DG-enlargement is how to word a conditional yes to get it
through the College of Commissioners. The Commission usually
decides by consensus, although a final decision can, in
theory, be taken by simple majority vote. Under informal
consideration in the Commission are two conditional "yes"
recommendations:

-- yes, but listing certain conditions that still must be met
before accession talks start; or

-- yes, but explicitly listing conditions that will be
expected to be met during (not before) accession talks. This
latter is sometimes called the "Croatia model" (ref A).
Within DG-Enlargement, there is a strong belief -- almost an
article of faith -- that accession negotiations themselves
provide a powerful vehicle for effecting political and
economic reforms.

The Commissioners: How They Line Up
--------------


6. (C) Importantly, DG-Enlargement officials preparing the
reports have virtually ruled out a "flat no" as an option.
For many Commissioners, led by Enlargement Commissioner
Verheugen and President Prodi, EU enlargement is a legacy
issue. Turkey is the last piece in the puzzle that they
began to assemble at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999.
Still, among the 30 Commissioners, there remains a wide range
of views on Turkey, and no consensus on whether to offer a
date. Already, Commissioners Bolkestein (Netherlands) and
Fischler (Austria) have spoken out not only against offering
a date, but also questioning Turkey's suitability for
membership at all. The Bolkestein argument asserts that
Islamic Turkey is not European, and therefore should not even
be considered. His arguments run counter to the entire
dynamic on Turkish membership over the last few years, and
will likely fall flat. Fischler's key points are that taking
on Turkey is too expensive for current members. These
arguments may carry more weight with Commissioners who must
juggle a budget, or political leaders looking for an out if
this issue is moved to the Council in December. Spanish
Commissioner De Palacios also reportedly opposes offering
Turkey a date.

7. (C) In favor, among others, are RELEX' Chris Patten,
Verheugen, and Prodi. Not all Commissioners are equal in the
debate, and the views of the latter three Commissioners will
likely carry more weight than the opinions of other
Commissioners. There are a number of Commissioners who are
likely to go with the consensus -- or if consensus is
impossible then with the majority opinion.

NGOs: All Over the Board
--------------


8. (SBU) As we entire the waning days of the debate, a number
of NGOs have released reports designed to influence and shape
the debate. Some recommend kicking the issue down the road
(again),others question Turkey's democratic and cultural
credentials to join the Union, while still others strongly
endorse membership for strategic reasons. None are likely to
change the outcome in the Commission.

The European Council "Wild Card"
--------------


9. (C) The heads of state and government at the December 17
European Council will have the final say. They meet behind
closed doors. The leaders will be under enormous pressure to
make a decision, and strange deals have been known to emerge
as a result. Decision-making requires consensus: it takes
only one country ready to vote against Turkey to derail the
process.


10. (C) Political leaders will weigh their previous
commitments to Turkey and the enlargement process against
broad skepticism among their voting publics about Turkish
membership and the EU in general. Greece, Germany, the UK,
and Poland have all pronounced in favor of a date for
accession talks December 17. France's position is more
complex, but President Chirac has come out in support of
giving Turkey a date. We expect that some/all the Balts will
swing behind membership for Turkey also, but Turkish FM Gul's
recent trip to the region was aimed at shoring up Baltic
support. Cyprus and Austria are reportedly most skeptical
about membership, with Denmark also said to be wavering, and
the Hague facing strong public opposition. Other
member-states appear to have no strong views, and could go
with a consensus either way.

The Triumph of Inertia Over Politics?
--------------


11. (C) The arguments in favor of Turkish admission are
strong. Recent progress has been laudible, and the strategic
arguments for bringing a moderate Islamic democracy into the
European fold are compelling. European leaders have also
made so many promises to Turkey over the years that pulling
back at this time would be viewed as a colossal breach of
faith. For much of the European voting public, however,
these arguments have not proved convincing. Less than one
third of Europeans polled recently believe that Turkish
membership in the EU is a good thing. For many of Europe's
political leaders, who were pummeled in this summer's
European Parliament elections, the pressures to pander to
voters at home by standing firm on Turkey could prove
appealing. The poorer new members, hoping to reap benefits
of EU programs, will fear that Turkish membership could come
at their expense. Another potential dividing line could come
over religion, especially if the Vatican weighs in more
forcefully. A number of Christian Democrats have already
expressed variations of this theme, including Commissioners
Bolkestein and Fischler. Some leaders, worried about the
possible impact on referenda on the European Constitution to
be held next year, could argue for postponement. In
European politics, these are all powerful arguments against a
yes vote for Turkey in December.

Cyprus??
--------------

12. (C) One critical difference between the Copenhagen
decision in 2002 and the situation today is that Cyprus is
now a member of the EU. The conventional wisdom in Brussels
is that Cyprus would not dare block Turkish membership,
especially since Greece has staked a strong strategic
position in favor. But Brussels orthodoxy has already been
flummoxed by Cypriot President Papadopoulos on two occasions
-- first in opposing the April referendum, and then by
blocking the EU's aid/trade package for Northern Cyprus.
Nicosia has proven it is willing to stand firm, even in
isolation, on matters directly related to its dispute with
Turkey. And if they hold firm in December on Turkish
membership, it won't matter how the other 24 countries line
up.

Will they flinch in December?
--------------


13. (C) EU heads will make the final determination on Turkey
this year -- not Foreign Ministers and not the Commission.
The Dutch Presidency will be key in shaping and guiding the
debate, particularly as the European Council approaches.
Nonetheless, the deciding factor will be the political
calculations that 25 leaders make at the European Council.
As they weigh public opinion, North Cyprus, the role and
place of Islam in Europe, fears about job losses, the costs
of Turkish membership, uncontrolled internal migration, and
lower agricultural and regional subsidies that their
countries might receive after eventual Turkish membership,
the attraction of avoiding any decision will grow. A
rancorous and fear-driven public debate in Europe this fall
could easily push the heads of states and government to
flinch on December 17. This is an issue the key European
leaders will have to struggle with; we should listen to their
concerns and continue to urge them privately to keep their
eyes focused on the historical nature of the decision rather
than immediate political gains.

McKinley