EU ADOPTS NEW NONPROLIFERATION STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000036

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/ERA, T, AC, NP, NP/PPC (CHRIS MURRAY)
NSC FOR SUSAN KOCH
OSD FOR STEVEN SCHLEIEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2014
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP PINS UNSC EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU ADOPTS NEW NONPROLIFERATION STRATEGY

REF: A. BRUSSELS 14


B. 03 USNATO 124

C. 03 BRUSSELS 5520

D. REIDHEAD-MURRAY ET. AL. E-MAIL 12/05/03

E. 03 BRUSSELS 4518

F. 03 BRUSSELS 4424

G. 03 BRUSSELS 4143

H. 03 BRUSSELS 3263

Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (U) SUMMARY: EU heads of state and government adopted an
"EU Strategy Against Proliferation of WMD" at their December
12-13 Summit in Brussels. The strategy expands and
integrates the various pieces of the EU's existing
nonproliferation policies -- notably the nonproliferation
Principles and Action Plan adopted at the June 2003
Thessaloniki EU Summit (ref H). The strategy calls for the
integration and strengthening of EU instruments, including
export controls, CTR programs, external leverage over third
countries (including aid and trade),interdiction, and
"coercive measures" as a last resort. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) COMMENT: But the EU is not yet able to answer the
tough question of when and under what conditions it would
resort to the use of force. EU member states do not want to
limit their options, nor are they ready to stray too far from
the comforting legitimacy of the UNSC. That said, the EU
nonproliferation strategy represents an energetic commitment
from a major global partner to cooperate on countering the
development and spread of WMD. We should welcome the overall
commitment, work together where we find common ground, and
engage on points of disagreement. END COMMENT.

(Note: EU documents mentioned in this cable are available at
http://ue.eu.int/en/summ.htm)

--------------
Effective Multilateralism:
Keeping the Baby, Tossing the Bathwater
--------------


3. (C) The cornerstone of the EU's nonproliferation strategy
is "effective multilateralism," a concept discussed at length
in the European Security Strategy (refs A, F, G). Developed
partly in response to perceptions of increasing U.S.
unilateralism, the EU's concept of effective multilateralism
envisions shoring up the existing nonproliferation regime and
strengthening the role of the UNSC in nonproliferation.
While Europeans largely share our view of the threat posed by
WMD (Eurobarometer polling in 2002 found that over 70% of EU
citizens fear WMD proliferation.),and agree that the
existing regime is unacceptably flawed, they fear the U.S.
intends to dismantle it altogether, effectively throwing the
baby out with the bathwater. To hedge against that outcome,
the EU has become increasingly keen on reforming
international institutions and security regimes to make them
more effective.


4. (U) To make the multilateral treaty regime work, the
nonproliferation strategy commits the EU to strengthening
compliance, enforcement, and detectability of violations, and
to work toward criminalizing state violations, presumably
under the UNSC. The strategy calls on the EU to strengthen
verification mechanisms, and to create new ones where needed,
and says "the EU is prepared to enhance, as appropriate, its
political, financial and technical support for agencies in
charge of verification."


5. (SBU) Parallel with these efforts, the EU will "pursue the
implementation and universalization of the... NPT, the IAEA
Safeguard agreements and protocols additional to them, the
CWC, the BTWC, the HCOC, and the early entry into force of
the CTBT." Reflecting the importance the EU places on
multilateralism -- and on presenting a united EU front in
international fora -- EU FMs adopted a Common Position on
universalizing and reinforcing multilateral nonproliferation
agreements at the November 17 Council meeting, one month
before adopting the strategy that would formally call for it
(ref D). The Common Position outlines in general terms how
the EU intends, largely through diplomatic action, to go
about strengthening and universalizing the above agreements.
It is designed to "serve as a yardstick in the negotiations
of EU positions in international fora," and as such,
represents the positions we should expect from the EU in all
relevant international organizations and in U.S.-EU
consultations.

--------------
Regional Stability: They Just Need More Help
--------------


6. (C) The EU strategy describes regional insecurity as the
underlying cause of WMD proliferation, and says "the EU will
foster regional security arrangements and regional arms
control and disarmament processes" to address the problem.
(Note: The EU is generally supportive of the concept of
regional Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones (NFZs),especially in the
Middle East and Mediterrannean Basin.) While also
acknowledging "there can never be any justification for
proliferation," the strategy overall paints a picture of
proliferation as an understandable, if regrettable, result of
"real and legitimate security concerns." The strategy makes
reference to the utility of both positive and negative
security assurances, but leaves little doubt that the EU is
more comfortable with the former than the latter.

-------------- --------------
Conditioning EU Relations on Nonproliferation Commitments
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Notwithstanding the EU preference for carrots over
sticks, the EU has recently toughened in a positive way by
endorsing the principle of conditionality in external
relations (ref D). On November 17, EU FMs adopted a policy
requiring inclusion of a "nonproliferation clause" in all EU
agreements with third countries. The clause will be
considered an "essential" element of agreements, meaning that
it conditions the political and economic-commercial benefits
under the agreement as a whole on satisfactory adherence to
international nonproliferation norms. Failure by any party
to uphold its obligations under the clause could result in
punitive action, including as a last resort suspension or
termination of the agreement as a whole. (It is not yet
clear whether or how this conditionality principle will be
applied to countries like Israel, Pakistan or India.) Syria,
whose association agreement with the EU was concluded in
December, is the first country to sign the clause (ref C).


8. (SBU) The conditionality policy is intended to apply both
to future and existing "mixed agreements" (i.e. involving a
combination of member state and Community competencies) with
third countries. In the case of existing agreements,
amendments will be sought to include a nonproliferation
clause. Most meaningful EU agreements with third countries,
including all framework agreements such as Trade and
Cooperation Agreements (TCA) and Partnership and Cooperation
Agreements (PCA),fall into the mixed category.
Commission-only agreements are omitted from the new policy
because EU treaties bar the Commission from including
political clauses in Community-only agreements with third
countries (i.e. for development assistance). EU FMs
therefore asked the Commission to look for ways -- read,
legal loopholes -- to also link Community assistance programs
to nonproliferation.


9. (SBU) The EU's nonproliferation clause for inclusion in
third country agreements reads:

"Countering Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Parties consider that the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and their means of delivery, both to state
and non-state actors, represents one of the most serious
threats to international stability and security. The Parties
therefore agree to co-operate and to contribute to countering
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
means of delivery through full compliance with and national
implementation of their existing obligations under
international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and
agreements and other relevant international obligations. The
Parties agree that this provision constitutes an essential
element of this agreement.

The parties furthermore agree to cooperate and to contribute
to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their means of delivery by:

-- taking steps to ratify, or accede to, as appropriate, and
fully implement all other relevant international instruments;
-- the establishment of an effective system of national
export controls, controlling the export as well as transit of
WMD related goods, including a WMD end-use control on dual
use technologies and containing effective sanctions for
breaches of export controls.

The Parties agree to establish a regular political dialogue
that will accompany and consolidate these elements."

--------------
Working with Partners
--------------


10. (C) The new strategy highlights the EU's nonproliferation
partnerships with the U.S., Russia, Japan, Canada and NATO.
With regard to the latter, the document says, "The EU will
ensure, in particular, exchange of information and analysis
with NATO, within the agreed framework arrangements." Recent
interest in enhanced EU-NATO cooperation on proliferation and
terrorism -- sparked on the EU side by Council DG Robert
Cooper, and on the NATO side by former SYG Robertson --
reflect the growing European desire to better coordinate
continental and allied approaches to dealing with post-Cold
War threats. USEU and USNATO view this as a positive step
which, despite initial French reluctance (ref. B),promises
to improve strategic cooperation between the two
organizations. We will begin work soon on a joint NATO-EU
security statement, hopefully for agreement at the June 2004
NATO and EU Summits.


11. (SBU) On cooperation with other, less capable partners in
the fight against proliferation, the strategy says the EU
should offer "a program aimed at assisting these countries in
improving their procedures, including the enactment and
enforcement of implementing penal legislation." It adds that
such assistance should be conducted in a confidence-building,
"collaborative spirit." The strategy leaves unsaid how or
whether this sort of (Community-only) assistance would be
related to the EU's new conditionality policy.

--------------
U.S.-EU Cooperation
--------------


12. (C) The strategy notes that EU cooperation with the U.S.,
above all other partnerships, is necessary for the successful
outcome of the fight against proliferation. The U.S.
warrants its own point among the list of actionable items in
the strategy's third chapter, where, under the heading
"Cooperating closely with the United States and other key
partners," it says the EU will work at "Ensuring adequate
follow up to the EU-US declaration on non-proliferation
issued at the June 2003 summit." This is welcome text, and
reflects the determination of HiRep Solana's new WMD Rep,
Annalisa Giannella, to breathe renewed energy into the EU's
collaboration with the U.S. on nonproliferation initiatives.
We will continue to work with Giannella and others to ensure
that implementation of the joint summit statement remains a
matter of priority for the EU (progress will be reported
septel).

-------------- --------------
Actionable Measures Include New Support for Interdiction
-------------- --------------


13. (U) The strategy's third chapter reorganizes and updates
the EU's 22-point nonproliferation Action Plan, adopted along
with the nonproliferation Principles at the June 2003
Thessaloniki Summit. As such, it supercedes the Action Plan
and is now the document of record for the EU's actionable
nonproliferation objectives.


14. (U) Billed as a "living action plan," the third chapter
will be updated every six months, and implementation will be
monitored by a proliferation monitoring center, to be housed
in the Council Secretariat. Once operational, the monitoring
center will also be responsible for collecting information
and intelligence, in collaboration with the EU Situation
Center.

15. (U) The third chapter is divided into four priority
areas, linked to the EU's strategic objectives: Rendering
multilateralism more effective by acting resolutely against
proliferators; Promoting a stable international and regional
environment; Cooperating closely with the United States and
other key partners; and Developing the necessary structures
within the Union. It contains several items not previously
included in the Action Plan, such as the point on U.S.-EU
collaboration mentioned in para 12 above.


16. (C) The other notable new entries fall under a
sub-category titled, "Strengthening identification, control
and interception of illegal trafficking." New language says
the EU will consider "measures aimed at the identification,
control and interception of illegal shipments," and will
"support international initiatives" aimed at the same. These
new points seem aimed mostly at the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI),to which eight EU member and acceding
states belong as founding partners. The EU supports the PSI,
has sought an institutional role for itself in the
initiative, and sent Council and Commission staffers to PSI
meetings in Paris and London as members of the Italian
(then-EU Presidency) delegation (ref E). While the EU bid
for some form of PSI inclusion appears to have abated for the
time being, the EU's new nonproliferation strategy makes
clear that overall EU support for interdiction of illegal
shipments is growing. We expect the Council Secretariat and
Commission to spend considerable energy in 2004 examining
ways the EU can contribute to this expanding area of
international counter-proliferation activity.

Foster