U.S.-EU CONSULTATIONS ON OSCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BRUSSELS 002091

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/RPM WAKE, RUSSELL; EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM OSCE EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: U.S.-EU CONSULTATIONS ON OSCE


Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The EU hosted a U.S. delegation headed by
USOSCE Ambassador Stephan M. Minikes for the biannual U.S.-EU
"COSCE" consultations on the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on May 7. Key findings were:

--U.S.-EU Coordination within OSCE: cooperation between the
U.S. and EU in Vienna is excellent. Especially with EU
enlargement, early consultation is important in order to
avoid policy differences between the U.S. and EU that third
countries (such as Russia) could exploit;

--2004 Human Dimension Conferences: the Berlin anti-Semitism
conference and the companion conference on racism and
xenophobia planned for September display OSCE leadership on a
fundamental issue -- how to build cohesive but diverse
societies;

--Moldova/Transnistria: Russia is stonewalling on
Transnistria for fear of losing influence in the region;
engagement at ministerial and head-of-state level is
necessary for a solution;

--Belarus: the U.S. and EU should keep linking closer
relations with Belarus to progress on human rights/democracy,
and send a tougher message on that to the GOB;

--South Caucasus: recommendations on how and whether the EU
Neighborhood Policy covers the region are set for June;

--Central Asia: the Kazakhs must be informed as soon as
possible of the reforms required for U.S. and EU support of
their candidacy for the 2009 OSCE chairmanship;

--Ukraine: U.S. and EU concerns on Ukraine are almost
identical, and EU has confronted Ukraine on democracy/media
freedom issues;

--The Balkans: the EU, OSCE and UN all have a role in Kosovo;
OMIK institution-building efforts should continue;

--2004 OSCE Economic Forum: free markets and the rule of law,
not more seminars, are needed in the OSCE area; the OSCE
Economic Dimension's stress on good governance is appropriate;

--2004 Annual Security Review Conference: high-level
political participation is key to the success of this
conference;

--OSCE Personnel Issues: choosing a new SecGen and other
personnel issues merit close U.S. and EU attention;

--OSCE Budget: almost no one wants their assessment to go up,
some (e.g. Russia) want substantial cuts. No one yet has
clear idea how to square this circle;

--Sofia Ministerial: the EU said focus on priority issues --
Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Chechnya -- would result in
higher-level turnout and increased public recognition of the
OSCE. The U.S. proposed a Ministerial declaration on
tolerance and OSCE endorsement of the Container Security
Initiative.

END SUMMARY.

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Participants
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2. (U)

EU Delegation
--------------

Ireland (current EU Presidency):

Barbara Jones, Director of Russia, Eastern Europe, OSCE and
Council of Europe Section, MFA Dublin
Peter Fitzpatrick, Deputy Director, OSCE and Council of
Europe Section, MFA Dublin

The Netherlands (successor to Ireland in EU Presidency):

Frank van Beuningen, Policy Coordinator, Security Policy
Department/OSCE Desk, MFA The Hague
Willemijn Kallenberg, Senior Policy Officer, Security Policy
Department/OSCE Desk, MFA The Hague

European Commission:

Gilbert Dubois, Head of Unit for OSCE and Council of Europe,
DG External Relations
Keith Sangway, Desk Officer for OSCE, DG External Relations
Eero Vuohula, Adviser, Unit for OSCE and Council of Europe,
DG External Relations

EU Council Secretariat:
Stefano Tomat, OSCE and CoE Desk Officer

U.S. delegation
--------------

Stephan M. Minikes, Ambassador to the OSCE
Daniel Russell, Office Director, EUR/RPM
Bruce Connuck, Political Counselor, USOSCE Vienna
Lee Litzenberger, Political Officer, USEU Brussels
Todd Huizinga, Political Officer, USEU Brussels

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Early U.S.-EU Consultation Important
--------------


3. (C) USOSCE Ambassador Minikes stated that early
consultation with the EU in the OSCE has become even more
important since the May 1 enlargement of the EU to 25 member
states. The U.S. wants to engage with the EU before its
positions become set in stone, he said. Barbara Jones,
Director of the Russia, Eastern Europe, OSCE and Council of
Europe Section of the MFA Dublin, agreed, saying that it
should be an EU policy goal not to let gaps between the U.S.
and EU emerge -- particularly on difficult issues. It is
important, she said, not to let third countries exploit
U.S.-EU differences.


4. (C) Jones said that EU enlargement would have "a powerful
effect" on the EU role in the OSCE. She said the EU OSCE
Working Group would ask EU FonMins in June for a mandate to
do a strategic assessment of EU policy on the OSCE. She said
EU member states are discussing internally various papers on
the topic, and that they might meet at the end of May to
discuss the way forward. The July-December Dutch EU
presidency, she said, would likely be tasked with finishing
the assessment.

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Coordination on Approach to Russia?
--------------


5. (C) The discussion shifted to U.S.-EU coordination on
engaging Russia in the OSCE. Jones, who is in charge of
coordinating Irish EU presidency preparations for the May 21
EU-Russia summit, said she was pessimistic about Russian
intentions toward the OSCE. She said the key question is
whether the new Russian FonMin, Sergei Lavrov, will change
the Ivanov MFA's coolness toward the OSCE. On the positive
side, Jones said that in his two meetings with the EU so far,
Lavrov had "talked the talk of effective multilateralism."
On Chechnya, Jones said all indications are that the Russians
will keep "forum shopping," and might favor Council of Europe
engagement over that of the OSCE. In conclusion, Jones said
that the EU had just presented Russia with a framework for
dialogue based on the St. Petersburg Summit Joint Declaration
of May 2003, emphasizing convergence with EU standards on
democracy, respect for human rights and related issues.


6. (C) Minikes said it is necessary to concentrate on areas
in which engagement with Russia would be productive. On some
issues Russia is simply not willing to engage, as often
reflected in the Russian OSCE Mission in Vienna's lack of
guidance from Moscow. On difficult issues, such as Chechnya,
Moldova, and Georgia, ministerial-level or presidential
engagement would be necessary to make progress.

-------------- -
Anti-Semitism Conference Shows OSCE Leadership
-------------- -


7. (C) Referring to the demographic perspectives for the EU,
Minikes said the April 28-29 Berlin anti-Semitism conference
and the companion Brussels meeting on racism and xenophobia
planned for September are bringing OSCE into a leadership
role on one of the fundamental issues for Europe's as well as
America's future: how to build cohesive societies that
respect and integrate diversity. Both sides agreed that the
success of the Berlin conference entailed a responsibility to
work hard to make the Brussels conference relevant as well.
On the idea of appointing a Special Representative on
Anti-Semitism, Minikes said the U.S. does not want to create
a new OSCE bureaucracy, but is not closed to the idea of a
part-time representative modeled on Ahtisaari's role in
Central Asia. Jones said Irish FM Cowan had reacted
positively when Bulgarian FM Passy broached the idea, but
that most in the EU favor revisiting the issue after the
September racism conference.

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Moldova/Transnistria: Russia Stonewalling
--------------

8. (C) Discussion focused on Russian opposition to the
proposed May 4 experts' meeting (to prepare a principals,
meeting),and its resulting cancellation. Both sides agreed
that Russia is stonewalling on Transnistria for fear of
losing influence in the region, and that engagement at
ministerial and head-of-state level would be necessary for a
solution. Jones said the EU will raise Moldova (as well as
Georgia and Chechnya) at the EU-Russia summit. Frank van
Beuningen, Policy Coordinator for the OSCE Desk in the Dutch
MFA, asked whether the possibility of a Russia-NATO summit on
the margins of the June NATO summit in Istanbul could be used
as leverage to get the Russians to begin fulfilling their
Istanbul commitments. EUR/RPM Director Daniel Russell
responded that Russia had made "zero movement" toward meeting
its Istanbul commitments, both in Moldova and in Georgia. He
said a Russia-NATO summit would almost certainly not lead to
progress on that front.


9. (C) Minikes said he believed Putin had drawn a line in the
sand on Moldova -- he was not going to do anything that would
lessen Russian influence in Moldova by bringing it closer to
the West. The argument to make to Putin, said Minikes, is
that Putin should make a deal now while a known quantity,
Moldovan President Voronin, is still in office. Only a
high-level approach to Putin has a chance at success.
Russell underscored that with his observation that Putin's
having appointed his close associate, Deputy Head of
Administration Dmitriy Kozak, as Russian Moldova negotiator
made clear that the Russian MFA could not move on Moldova
without Putin's involvement.


10. (C) USOSCE PolCouns Bruce Connuck said that one reason
Moscow is foot-dragging on Moldova is concern that an
OSCE-brokered Moldova deal, that draws Moldova closer to
Europe, might also further stimulate forces in Ukraine that
want to distance Ukraine from Russia and align it more
closely with the West. Commission OSCE Unit Chief Gilbert
Dubois underlined the need to keep pushing Ukrainian
President Kuchma to help find a solution to the Transnistria
problem. Jones said the EU will raise the issue at the May
18 EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council meeting in Brussels.


11. (C) On approaching Voronin, Minikes raised the planned
early June visit of OSCE ambassadors to Moldova and proposed
that the visit be used to make clear to Voronin that the U.S.
and EU will keep working for a solution. Jones was open to
this idea, but did not add any specifics.

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Belarus: EU Getting Tougher
--------------


12. (C) Jones said the May 12 meeting of the EU Working Group
on Eastern Europe (COEST) will include three Belarus-related
items. First on the agenda will be the text of an EU public
statement on the Pourgourides report. Jones said EU member
states were extremely upset by this "damning" report, which
accuses GOB officials of criminal murder and which cannot be
dismissed, coming as it does from the COE's parliamentary
assembly. The statement, said Jones, will be tough (but fall
short of imposing sanctions). Jones said the EU will call
for an independent investigation and publication of the
report in Belarus. Some EU members are questioning the value
of any further engagement with Belarus until this issue is
resolved, but Jones said she would argue that engagement
would be necessary to deliver the tough message. Once there
is an agreed text, Jones said, it will be blessed by the EU's
Political and Security Committee Ambassadors on May 13.


13. (C) Second on the May 12 COEST agenda, said Jones, will
be the reply to Belarus FonMin Martynov on the step-by-step
policy. Jones was very pleased to have received the proposed
U.S. reply to Martynov on May 6. She said it had been
circulated within the EU and is key to keeping the EU on the
same track as the U.S. in its internal discussions. Her
initial impression was that the U.S. reply was a bit "soft."
She indicated the EU might want to insert a reference to the
Pourgourides report, or propose tougher language. The EU
COEST group would be working off the reply proposed by EU
Minsk Heads of Mission and the U.S. text. Jones hoped to get
the EU reply cleared at the COEST, but said it might be
difficult. She appreciated U.S. willingness to coordinate
both timing and substance and to have our missions in Minsk
deliver the reply, or replies, on the same day.


14. (C) Finally, Jones said the COEST will discuss plans for
the May 25 visit of Belarusian opposition leaders/NGO reps to
Brussels. Plans now are for meetings with Irish FM Cowen,
Chris Patten and Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen, plus a
public press statement. Jones said the EU does not want this
cast as an anti-Lukashenko event, but as normal EU
consultations with the opposition prior to elections.


15. (C) Jones committed to contact us after the May 12
meeting to coordinate follow-up. She expressed great
appreciation for the close cooperation with the U.S. on
Belarus, adding that it had not been easy to get approval to
do the recent joint U.S.-EU demarche in Minsk, but that the
U.S. had thereby sent a "powerful message" to the EU that if
the EU consulted with us, we would "play it straight." She
also praised coordination in Minsk between U.S. Ambassador
Krol and his French counterpart. Jones said she wanted to
continue the coordination; she said there is "no daylight"
between the EU and the U.S.: EU policy remains:

-- step-by-step;
-- engagement to be able to deliver tough messages;
-- ban on high level contacts;
-- maximum pressure for GOB progress on human
rights/democracy.


16. (C) Van Beuningen stressed the importance of the October
parliamentary elections. Minikes said the U.S. had told
Bulgarian OSCE CiO FonMin Solomon Passy that, if he did visit
Belarus in late May as he had indicated, he must press the
GOB to agree to an election conference, to issue a timely
invitation to ODIHR to observe the elections, and to appoint
opposition members to electoral commissions.

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South Caucasus and EU Neighborhood Policy
--------------


17. (C) Jones said the central question for the EU on the
South Caucasus is whether and how the region would be
included in the EU's aborning Neighborhood Policy for
increasing assistance and coordination with Eastern European
countries post-EU enlargement. She said the Commission would
issue a paper on the Neighborhood Policy on May 12 and EU
CFSP HighRep Javier Solana is set to make recommendations on
the Neighborhood initiative in June, including perspectives
for the South Caucasus.


18. (C) Minikes observed that the EU's ability to deal with
frozen conflicts and other crises in the region appeared to
him to be hampered by lack of guidance to EU OSCE missions in
Vienna. When a crisis occurred, Vienna missions tended to
waste at least a week in indecisiveness and inaction. Jones
responded that she shared a sense of "bewilderment" as to
what the OSCE role in conflict prevention could be.


19. (C) Both sides agreed on the value of prospective OSCE
field offices in Georgia, but noted Russian opposition and
conflicting Georgian responses to the idea.

-------------- --
Kazakh Bid for 2009 Chairmanship: OSCE Leverage
-------------- --


20. (C) Minikes warned that as a practical matter, the OSCE
decision on Kazakhstan's bid for the 2009 OSCE chairmanship
has to be made by 2005 in order to have time to seek an
alternative chair if necessary. He said that the U.S. would
not support the chairmanship bid of any country that holds
political prisoners. Connuck added that the Kazakhs should
be told as soon as possible what reforms would be necessary
to gain U.S. and EU support for its candidacy; the GOK would
need time to implement those reforms. He also urged that EU
country embassies in Almaty consult on the ground with the
U.S. Embassy, and that our missions on the ground make
coordinated recommendations to Brussels and Washington on how
to proceed concerning the Kazakh candidacy. Minikes noted
that a group of OSCE ambassadors (Canada, Portugal, Slovakia,
Norway and Belgium) would visit Kazakhstan the third week of
May, and that he would visit a week later -- it would be
helpful to know the EU position on the Kazakh candidacy
beforehand. Jones agreed to draft a paper on the "basic
levels of achievement" that Kazakhstan would have to
accomplish in order to receive EU support for its candidacy.

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Ukraine: U.S., EU Share Concerns
--------------


21. (C) Jones reported that the EU-Ukraine Ministerial
meeting in Dublin on April 29 had been "really difficult."
She said the EU participants had "really blasted" Ukrainian
FM Hryshchenko on media harassment and the need for an action
plan for democratic reform, telling him that "your European
ambitions are in your hands." She said the EU left no room
for doubt as to its demands that Ukraine start living up to
European standards if it wants to have closer association
with the EU. She said the EU shares U.S. concern that the
October presidential election be free and fair, and on the
value of the OSCE Project Coordinator's Office in Kiev. She
said Irish FM Cowan and External Relations Commissioner
Patten would raise the issue of the OSCE office with the
Ukrainians.

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Kosovo: EU, OSCE Both Have Role
--------------


22. (C) Both sides agreed that there is no reason to transfer
OSCE capacity-building functions in Kosovo to the EU, a
possibility UNMIK SRSG Harri Holkeri had raised. Van
Beuningen said the EU believes that OSCE, the EU and UN
should continue their cooperation in Kosovo. Jones said the
EU does not have a position on the Holkeri proposal; there is
no EU "takeover agenda." Dubois noted that Holkeri would be
a guest at the May 12-13 Council of Europe Ministerial -- it
would be interesting to see what Holkeri would say there.


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OSCE Economic Forum: No Canned Speeches!
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23. (C) Minikes proposed that this year's Economic Forum
dispense with the usual canned national statements that take
time and limit real exchange. The EU interlocutors appeared
to agree with the idea, but lacked the will to buck the
expected resistance of many OSCE members. Minikes stressed
that Economic Forum events should be relevant to real-life
needs; what is needed are not more seminars, he said, but
freedom, rule of law and access to capital for the many
potential entrepreneurs who are squelched not by lack of
business savvy, but by lack of freedom and opportunity.
Commission OSCE Unit Adviser Eero Vuohula responded that, for
those very reasons, he greeted the OSCE Economic Dimension's
current emphasis on good governance. Jones said the key is
to get OSCE field workers, in following up Economic Dimension
conferences, to think beyond their fields of specialization
and build on colleagues' efforts in other fields -- thus
putting into practice the OSCE doctrine of the
interrelatedness of security, economy, and human rights.

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Annual Security Review Conference
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24. (C) Minikes reported that Secretary Ridge could not
attend the 2004 Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC),but
that the DHS Deputy Secretary James Loy will attend. Minikes
stressed the importance of high-level political attendance,
and Jones said Ireland is aiming for ministerial-level
participation. Minikes said the U.S. wants to use the ASRC
to make practical progress on counter-terrorism efforts, for
example, by ascertaining next steps for the OSCE border
management concept and getting OSCE buy-in on the U.S.-EU
Container Security Initiative.

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Personnel Issues Deserve More Attention
--------------


25. (C) Minikes strongly stressed the importance of getting
the right people in OSCE jobs. He warned that OSCE SecGen
Kubis may find another job and leave before his mandate
expires in June 2005. Minikes proposed that the U.S. and EU
consult early about candidates to succeed Kubis. Minikes
hoped the EU would avoid deciding on a "EU candidate" too
early, because that often resulted in the appointment of the
EU default candidate, rather than finding the best person for
the job. The U.S. does not want to be put in the position of
having no choices other than acquiescing to a pre-determined
EU choice, or to casting a veto. Both sides agreed that the
mandate of OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Rolf
Ekeus, which comes to an end on July 31, should be renewed.
Minikes raised the importance of selecting quality OSCE Heads
of Mission, both in the field and in Vienna, and Jones chimed
in that candidate selection issues might be included in the
EU policy paper on OSCE (see para 4). Minikes also said
that, if people in important OSCE positions are not
performing satisfactorily, OSCE members should let them know.
An example of this is the performance of Bulgarian FM Passy
as OSCE CiO -- he is not effectively dealing with human
rights problems in Central Asia and generally avoids
confrontation even if that means not dealing with important
problems. When that happens, OSCE members should send Passy
the message that the CiO job was not being done right.
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OSCE Budget: Keep Current System
--------------


26. (C) Van Beuningen said the EU shares the U.S. positions
(1) against the Russian proposal to scrap the contextual
framework for reviewing scales of assessment and move to a
merged, unitary scale; and (2) in favor of keeping the
present scales of assessment system. Both sides recognized
the dilemma of how to deal with most states, insistence on
not increasing their assessments, and others (e.g. Russia,s)
insistence on substantial reductions, while maintaining
proper financing for the organization.

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Sofia Ministerial: Need Focus, Preparation
--------------


27. (C) Minikes expressed concern about the Bulgarian CiO's
not yet having started consulting other OSCE members on
preparation for the Sofia Ministerial. He said he had
suggested that the CiO pull together some OSCE members to
discuss Ministerial deliverables, and outlined U.S. ideas:
(1) translating the Berlin Declaration on anti-Semitism and
the prospective Brussels concluding document on racism and
xenophobia into a Ministerial document on tolerance; (2)
bringing the 55 OSCE members behind the Container Security
Initiative; and (3) not pinning hopes for the Ministerial on
settlement of regional conflicts.


28. (C) Jones said we should apply the lessons of the 2003
Maastricht Ministerial: when there is focus, more Ministers
show up and the public takes notice. She suggested the Sofia
focus should be Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, and Chechnya.

FOSTER