KALINAK ON GASPAROVIC: DOTH SMER PROTEST TOO MUCH?

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000392

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV LO
SUBJECT: KALINAK ON GASPAROVIC: DOTH SMER PROTEST TOO MUCH?


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Weiser for reason 1.4b.


1. (C) Summary: SMER leader Robert Kalinak says SMER's
decision to endorse Gasparovic as a "way to support Kukan
without supporting Kukan" was a nonsensical strategy which
then backfired. Smer remains committed nevertheless to
Gasparovic in the second round. Having a grateful Gasparovic
in the presidential palace would help Robert Fico's prime
ministerial ambitions after the next parliamentary elections
-- a more credible explanation for Smer's endorsement.
Ironically, this makes Meciar the (unofficial and
unacknowledged) government candidate. End Summary.

Presidential Elections: Smer,s Miscalculation
-------------- -


2. (SBU) Smer MP Robert Kalinak told polecoffs that he was
deeply concerned about Vladimir Meciar,s victory in the
first round and his likely success in the run-off. He said
that Smer made a mistake and miscalculated before the first
round in deciding to back Ivan Gasparovic, assuming that the
second round would nevertheless be between Meciar and Kukan.
Smer party officials had no doubts about Kukan,s victory in
the second round. In evaluating the chances of the
candidates, Smer estimated that about 25 percent of Smer
voters would support Schuster, but that those who disliked
him numbered around 60 percent. About 20 percent of Smer
voters would support Meciar, but his "negatives" were about
40 percent. Smer finally chose Gasparovic because he had
about 25 percent support with low "negatives." (SMER vice
chairman Paska told DCM separately that Smer executive
committee was overwhelmingly in favor of Gasparovic.)

Why Meciar is Dangerous and Gasparovic is Benign
-------------- ---


3. (SBU) Kalinak described the differences between Meciar and
Gasparovic and the problems that would arise if Meciar
becomes president. Meciar will have 26 MPs to support his
policies, unlike Gasparovic, who has no party backing in
Parliament and therefore is not dangerous. Kalinak further
speculated that Meciar may block appointments of some
ministers in the future and after the elections he could
exert control not only in parliament (through his MPs),but
also in the ministries by appointing his own people. After
the next parliamentary elections, Kalinak said that he could
envision a scenario in which Meciar would be president and
the prime minister and speaker of parliament would also come
from HZDS. In Kalinak,s opinion, Meciar is a stronger
advocate of EU policies than of transatlantic ties and thus
he will try to be acceptable to the French and Germans and
ally Slovakia with them.

Let,s Make a Deal
--------------


4. (SBU) Kalinak claims that PM Mikulas Dzurinda made a tacit
agreement with Meciar, such that if SDKU and ANO voters do
not vote in the run-off, Meciar and HZDS will not oppose GOS
initiatives. (Comment: Low voter turnout is expected to
assist Meciar's chances.) He contrasted SDKU,s behavior
before the parliamentary elections in 2002 "when SDKU was
vocally opposed to Meciar" and now when they appear to be
silent about his candidacy. In Kalinak,s opinion, Meciar
would sell his party to the highest bidder as long as he is
president. Kalinak also said that Meciar approached Smer for
its support prior to the first round.

Future Coalition Possibilities
--------------


5. (SBU) Kalinak stressed that Smer and he personally tried
to keep distance from HZDS and Meciar, but in the future this
may appear more difficult, should Smer and HZDS together gain
the majority in the next parliamentary election. If Smer
refuses to cooperate with HZDS, Smer,s voters would not
understand why they do not want to make a coalition with
HZDS. In his view, Meciar could enter a coalition with any
available party, including SNS or communists, whose
preferences may grow due to the hardship caused by economic
reforms.

Why Gasparovic is the Lesser Evil
--------------


6. (SBU) In Kalinak's view, Gasparovic was always just number
two in HZDS, and was just following Meciar,s orders.
Gasparovic is more pro-Western and supports transatlantic
policies. Gasparovic has assured Smer leadership that he
will no longer seek support from the nationalists, but used
the opportunity last fall/winter to establish name
recognition. Kalinak does not think that Gasparovic will try
to manipulate the Parliament as Meciar might. Kalinak said
that he will participate in several TV discussions and will
try to appeal to voters to go and vote, warning them that

ignoring the second round will only work to Meciar,s
benefit.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) Others in Smer have told us in the last week that the
decision to support Gasparovic was contentious within the
party, and pushed the "acceptable limits." Nonetheless, Smer
made the strategic decision to endorse this candidate, and is
sticking by him. Ironically, Meciar is now seen as the
government candidate. He is considered the "lesser of two
evils" by coalition politicians who fear a Gasparovic victory
would do nothing but give more impetus to Smer. Jewish
community leaders worried in an April 14 meeting with
Ambassador and Congressman Wexler about anti-Semitic
tendencies of the nationalists that supported Gasparovic, and
seemed to prefer a Meciar victory.


8. (C) Kalinak's comments about Smer seeking to indirectly
support Kukan ring hollow. Several Smer leaders including
Kalinak told us for months that they would not endorse any
presidential candidate in the first round. There was no need
for them to do so, and they can have had no doubt that their
endorsement would swing at least a few percentage pioints to
Gasparovic. A likelier interpretation is that Fico made a
calculated decision that a grateful Gasparovic in the
presidential palace would facilitate his chances to be the
next prime minister, which would not have been the case with
a second-round endorsement of Kukan. Kalinak's attempt at
rationalization is another reminder that Smer remains mindful
of Washington's interest. It is not the first time Smer
leaders have attempted to "spin" their actions after the
fact, usually only when they realize we've been paying
attention.
WEISER


NNNN