MECIAR OR GASPAROVIC: WHAT IT MEANS FOR US

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000340

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2024
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PINR LO
SUBJECT: MECIAR OR GASPAROVIC: WHAT IT MEANS FOR US

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Weiser for reason 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary: The April 17 run-off election for president
does not present much of a choice: neither Meciar nor
Gasparovic would be an ideal Slovak president in the view of
the U.S. or Slovakia's new EU and NATO partners. Although
the president does not directly influence foreign policy,
this election strengthens the position of nationalist and
populist parties that are not particularly friendly to the
U.S. We should adopt a public line that stresses our respect
for democratic choice, participation in the electoral
process, and the attendant responsibility. End Summary.


2. (C) Vladimir Meciar against Ivan Gasparovic in the April
17 second round of the presidential election was not what we
(or anyone else) expected or hoped for. Meciar has a history
of abusing power, sanctioning corruption, and condoning
illegal acts. Gasparovic was for many years Meciar's
lieutenant, and has supporters with both populist and
nationalist tendencies. Neither is especially friendly
toward the U.S. However, given the relative lack of power
vested in the office of the president, we do not expect
immediate effects on U.S. interests.

Chance for Rehabilitation?
--------------


3. (C) Meciar seeks legitimacy and U.S. and EU approval. He
is now on the record as supporting Slovakia's membership in
both NATO and the EU, and it is unlikely he would backtrack
now. His presidency would be a chance to rehabilitate his
international image, and many analysts believe this would be
his strongest motivation. Foreign governments may be
unwilling to invite him for official visits based on his
behavior in the past, but even Slovaks who despise him
believe he would not actively undermine Slovakia's
reputation. On the other hand, Meciar is unpredictable. He
will likely continue to play power games with his own party
and with other politicians, and will control HZDS either
directly or through a puppet (the tradition is for the
president to resign from his party, although it is not a
constitutional requirement).


4. (C) Gasparovic is untested on the international scene,
which means his name is not as tainted as Meciar's. In the
opinion of many, he is the lesser of two evils as a
pragmatic, opportunist politician. They believe that once he
is in office, he will not worry about his small party (less
than four percent support) and will leave the politicking to
Smer. Others, however, believe Gasparovic is more dangerous
than Meciar, for both Slovakia's and U.S. interests.
President Schuster pointed out to the Ambassador after the
election that Gasparovic was Meciar's right-hand man who only
broke with him over personal ambition (Meciar did not include
him on the HZDS Parliament list for the last election),has
never recanted or even acknowledged his actions under the
Meciar regime, and, unlike Meciar, is allied with extremist
nationalist elements. PM Dzurinda's foreign policy advisor
cautioned DCM that "the worst candidate may not be the one
you think." Another Dzurinda advisor told P/E chief that
Meciar would be "easier to work with" in completing the
government's reform agenda. (Comment: This may be a reaction
to Fico's support of Gasparovic.)

Damage on the Domestic Front
--------------


5. (C) Whether the next president is Meciar or Gasparovic, he
will likely seek to undermine the governing coalition and its
reform program. He will veto legislation, influence
appointments (such as ambassadorial and senior military
posts),and use the bully pulpit to advance his interests and
criticize the coalition. To some extent, the governing
coalition is accustomed to dealing with an "opposition"
president, as Rudolf Schuster also vetoed many laws, held up
ambassadorial appointments, and voiced his dissatisfaction
with economic reforms. More worrisome is how Meciar or
Gasparovic might use the authority to grant presidential
pardons and release corrupt cronies from jail, including
former Slovak Information Service director Ivan Lexa and
businessman Jozef Majsky (although under current law they
must be convicted before they can be pardoned, unlike the
pardons Meciar issued in the Kovac affair).

Fallout
--------------


6. (C) Opposition parties have new wind in their sails.
There is already rampant (and overblown) speculation about
what the next governing coalition might look like. There is
no doubt that this was a huge boost to Meciar and his HZDS,
Smer's Robert Fico (who can take credit for boosting
Gasparovic to the second-round),and Gasparovic himself.
Coalition politicians can barely speak from surprise and

disappointment.


7. (C) The silver lining may be the wake-up call this
election sends to the governing coalition, particularly the
SDKU. Before the vote, the attitude within the SDKU was one
of complacency: Kukan was leading in the polls and there was
smug confidence that all was well. When recriminations about
who "lost" the election are over (septel),the coalition will
have no choice but to band together against a stronger common
enemy or face possible extinction. There will be less room
for internal bickering and divisions. At this time we do not
believe new elections are in the cards, although that could
change based on future coalition cooperation.


8. (U) The EU and NATO have not made official comments, but
European Parliament rapporteur for Slovakia Jan Marinus
Wiersma expressed disappointment to press that voters in the
second round will be choosing from two candidates
representing the old HZDS.

Long Term Significance for U.S. Interests
--------------


10. (C) The presidential election will not have much effect
on U.S. interests. Either a Meciar or Gasparovic presidency
will be considerably less forthcoming than Schuster's, but
will have little direct influence on day-to-day engagement
with us. There is a possibility of more rhetoric directed
toward the U.S. from the Presidential Palace, and even more
so directed at the government. However, the Slovakia of 2004
is not the Slovakia of the mid-1990's. Most of the powers
that Meciar enjoyed as "pseudo-President" in 1998-99 have
been removed or otherwise constrained. Public expectations
-- political, economic, and otherwise -- have been shifted in
ways not easily undone, and bureaucratic structures have been
reformed. EU and NATO membership are not only seals of
approval but constraints on behavior.


11. (C) The political effects are more important.
Dzurinda's government and President Schuster have been
courageous in standing behind U.S. actions in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo, both with words and troops. The
rest of Slovakia is not convinced. If the coalition does not
react responsibly to this defeat, their reform program could
be threatened, and our expectation of continued support for
U.S. initiatives could be hurt as well. The party that most
staunchly supports the U.S. is the SDKU. Within the
coalition, the more isolationist Christian Democrats (KDH)
were anti-Iraq War (for religious reasons). The Hungarian
Coalition Party (SMK) is more stable, but would have trouble
carrying the water for us given its ethnic minority status.
ANO may not survive beyond the next election. Among the
opposition, both Meciar's HZDS and Fico's SMER are more
interested in following the popular mood than defined
national interests.

Where Should The U.S. Be?
--------------


12. (C) Given the active and visible U.S. campaign against
Meciar prior to the September 2002 parliamentary elections,
the question has arisen as to the U.S. position on this
election. We believe the answer should be cautious and
reflect the significant changes that have occured in this
country. It would be a useful lesson for the Slovak
electorate to see that its vote is respected but that at the
same time its decisions have consequences. Our public line
should be that we respect a democratic vote, encourage
participation in the electoral process, and are confident
that the Slovak people will consider Slovakia's future when
they vote.
WEISER


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