AN UPDATED SNAPSHOT OF PM DZURINDA

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000284

SIPDIS


NSC FOR DAN FRIED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2014
TAGS: PGOV PINR LO
SUBJECT: AN UPDATED SNAPSHOT OF PM DZURINDA

REF: BRATISLAVA 161

Classified By: Amb. Ronald Weiser for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (C) Summary/Introduction. With increased opportunities
to engage Prime Minister Dzurinda and the GOS during the NATO
accession event at the White House on March 29, the FM
informal in Brussels on April 2, and the Instanbul Summit,
post offers an updated snapshot of the Prime Minister and his
relations with coalition partners. During the autumn of
2003, Dzurinda created considerable friction within the
ruling coalition when he fired National Security Office
Director Mojzis and Defense Minister Simko after losing
confidence in them. As a result, Dzurinda now heads a
minority government because Simko left Dzurinda's party,
taking six other deputies with him. Since Simko's departure,
however, Dzurinda has returned to his consultative approach
with ANO, the Christian Democratic Movement, and the
Hungarian Coalition Party. The Prime Minister discussed his
actions with the Ambassador several times last autumn and
provided, from his viewpoint and in the Ambassador's opinion,
reasonable political justification for his actions, although
the methods the PM used were illconceived in implementing his
agenda. Poor tactics aside, Dzurinda remains strongly
committed to reform and continues to move Slovakia away from
the flagrant subversion of democratic norms and institutions
that flourished under former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar.
End Summary/Introduction.

Reacting Out of Anger
--------------


2. (C) Last fall, Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda hit
probably the lowest point of his political career. In
August, the press announced that the PM had named a
"skupinka" or small group of people who were destabilizing
the Slovak state. While Smer MP Robert Kalinak named the
PM's so-called skupinka, Dzurinda never publicly confirmed or
denied Kalinak's list. However, the skupinka acted as a
catalyst for several events, including the removal of
National Security Office chief Jan Mojzis and Defense
Minister Ivan Simko. (See reftel) During the late summer
and early fall, Dzurinda appeared to be lashing out at those
whom he perceived as enemies, including the press, reacting
with anger rather than with his usual conciliatory approach.
Even Dzurinda would likely admit now that he handled the
situation poorly, temporarily damaging public and
international perception of his leadership and Slovakia.
Prior to these events, the PM had earned the reputation of
being a skillful negotiator who had mastered Slovakia's
political minefields, able to build compromises among
unlikely, and frequently clashing, political parties.
According to some coalition politicians, Dzurinda allegedly
felt that since this coalition was ideologically closer than
the one he headed in his first term, he could push government
personnel decisions onto his coalition partners without his
usual behind-the-scenes negotiations. They resented this
treatment, expecting to be consulted as in the past.

Thin-skinned Prime Minister
--------------


3. (C) The skupinka event also highlighted that Dzurinda
does not accept criticism graciously. A disillusioned
founder of SDKU remarked to emboff that the PM particularly
dislikes being told what he has to do, whether it is by a
coalition member, an advisor, or another country. Between
August and October, Dzurinda reacted poorly to criticism from
within his party as well as from his coalition partners,
which eventually led to the creation of Ivan Simko's
breakaway Free Forum.

Loyalty or Betrayal
--------------


4. (C) Dzurinda's expectation of loyalty and his strong
emotional reaction to perceived betrayal influenced his
decisions. Dzurinda was angry with Mojzis because the NBU
Director had been indiscreetly critical of the PM on numerous
occasions, and those remarks made it back to Dzurinda,
resulting in a power struggle that Dzurinda was determined to
win. Dzurinda told the Ambassador that he felt forced to
sack Defense Minister Simko because he would not vote with
Dzurinda in removing Mojzis. Dzurinda said that he had to
remove Simko in order to maintain party discipline and
coalition loyalty because Simko was his appointee to the
SDKU-designated post. Dzurinda, however failed to adequately

convince his coalition partners of the reasons why he lost
confidence in Mojzis and therefore he appeared to be forcing
personnel decisions onto the coalition without consultation.
In doing so, he temporarily tarnished Slovakia's
international image.

A Return to Normalcy
--------------


5. (C) During the last several months, Dzurinda has
solidified the relationship with ANO, and to a lesser extent
mended fences with the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK),the
Christian Democratic Movement (KDH),and his own Slovak
Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU). He has subsequently
tread more carefully in making decisions, consulting with his
partners quietly. We note that the appointment of NBU Chief
Aurel Ugor was handled with no major accusations from
coalition or opposition members. More importantly, Dzurinda
did not "win" with this appointment because of his agreement
not to appoint a new head withough the coalition's approval.

Still Committed to Reform
--------------


6. (C) Despite the hiccup last fall, Dzurinda remains
committed to continuing the reform process, although at times
slowly. His campaign pledge to root out corruption has only
a few big name arrests, primarily from opposition parties.
The almost dysfunctional judicial system is being reformed
slowly, but it still hampers the anti-corruption campaign.
Since 1998, when Dzurinda was first elected, he has
dismantled the structure that his predecessor, Vladimir
Meciar, created to steal from the government. In addition,
the KDH Ministers of Justice and Interior act as a system of
checks and balances, having made significant steps in the
fight against corruption and retooling the judicial system.
Under Dzurinda's watch, the Slovak Information Service
recently has been purged of all former employees of the
communist-era intelligence agency including those purported
to be responsible for last year's wiretapping scandal.

The Necessity of Personal Politics
--------------


7. (C) The personality conflicts from last fall appear to be
behind Dzurinda, but the highly personalized nature of
politics will remain. Emboffs constantly are reminded how
small the leadership elite continues to be as everyone knows
each other, either from university days or through family
connections. Dzurinda's government, and subsequent prime
ministers, will most probably continue to operate within a
style of cronyism that remains a legacy from communism. Most
Slovaks feel, whether it concerns national politics or a
simple business transaction like buying flowers, one relies
on personal connections rather than institutions. On the
positive side, Dzurinda's government has enacted many laws
and regulations to reduce cronyism and to increase
transparency in government.

Prospects for Working with Partners
--------------


8. (C) Dzurinda has returned to his more customary approach
of consultations before announcing government decisions. In
conversations with Slovak interlocutors, many have remarked
that the PM has learned his lesson. The referendum calling
for new elections and his lack of parliamentary majority will
keep Dzurinda focused on coalition health. Poor tactics
aside, Dzurinda remains strongly committed to reform and
continues to move Slovakia away from the flagrant subversion
of democratic norms and institutions that flourished under
former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar.

WEISER


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