SLOVAKIA ON CUBAN HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 001109

SIPDIS


STATE FOR WHA/CCA CHRIS SIBILLA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2014
TAGS: PHUM PGOV LO CUBA'>CU
SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA ON CUBAN HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY

REF: STATE 262206


1. (C) Summary. In advance of reftel, poloffs had been
discussing CUBA policy with a range of GOS and NGO
interlocutors. GOS CUBA policy centers on the "critical
dialogue" approach: The GOS must have contact with CUBAn
government officials to be prepared for an inevitable
democratic transition and to maintain economic and commercial
ties. GOS support for this approach has not changed despite
frozen bilateral relations for over one year and a recent
highly offensive letter from the CUBAn Ambassador to the
Slovak President of Parliament did much to fuel public
opinion against the Castro regime. MFA Interlocutors argued
that parliamentary leaders and NGOs have greater flexibility
to support CUBAn dissidents more directly. NGO activities
include fund raising for the families of CUBAn dissidents,
awareness campaigns, and lobbying the GOS and Members of the
European Parliament (MEPs). Leaders in parliament have
spoken out strongly on human rights conditions in CUBA. End
Summary.


2. (C) Slovaks in both government and the NGO sector have
been actively promoting human rights and supporting
dissidents in CUBA for years. The U.S. can take some credit:
the same activists that became "experts" on democracy through
SEED funds are now exporting their experience to other
countries that haven't yet made the dramatic leap to
democracy and free market systems. However, most of the
motivation for Slovak policy towards CUBA comes from memories
of what it was like to live in a repressive regime, and from
what happens afterwards.

The Government
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3. (C) The MFA is feeling pressure from some EU members to
warm relations with the Castro regime. On the one hand, the
GOS wants to support dissidents and democratic transition.
On the other hand, it knows that even when regimes topple
overnight, institutions change slowly and bureaucrats remain
in place. Current party members may be future democratic
leaders; take for example Foreign Minister Kukan who studied
in Moscow and began his diplomatic career as a representative
of communist Czechoslovakia. Slovakia also wants to be
competitive for commercial contracts in CUBA, and believes it
has a better chance if it has good relations with the current
regime.


4. (C) Oldrich Hlavacek, Director General of the Fourth
Territorial Department, and Denisa Juristova, Desk Officer
for Latin America and the Caribbean, told poloffs December 3
that the GOS cooperates with the GOC, while at the same time
encouraging Slovak NGOs to engage CUBAn dissidents. Slovak
diplomats in Havana and Slovak government officials in
Bratislava above desk officer level have had no contact with
the GOC (except through diplomatic notes) since Fall 2003
when the Slovaks invited CUBAn dissidents to an official
reception. Hlavacek credited the Spanish initiative to
weaken the EU's restrictive measures on CUBA with prisoner
releases and warmed CUBAn-Spanish relations. He said the GOS
cannot leave a "black hole" in CUBA by ignoring political
contacts in the country that will remain as part of the
bureaucracy after a democratic transition. A viable dialogue
is critical to a smooth transition of power.


5. (SBU) Juraj Kubla and Juraj Prituten of the MFA's Human
Rights Department described CUBA policy as primarily driven
by the common EU position. Kubla said the GOS supports the
Honduras resolution and cited President of Parliament Pavol
Hrusovsky's support for the September 19 CUBA conference
statement in Prague. (NOTE: Hrusovsky also opened another
conference on CUBAn human rights the following week in
Bratislava.) Kubla said the department preferred to focus on
human rights concerns "closer to home," particularly in
Ukraine and the western Balkans.


6. (C) Hlavacek could not foresee his government lobbying on
CUBA issues in the UN. When asked about the influence the
GOS will wield in 2006/2007 as a non-permanent member of the
Security Council, Hlavacek replied that the GOS has defined
the Balkans, Cyprus, the Middle East, and its neighboring
countries as its priorities for the term.


7. (C) The DCM recently hosted the MFA's "EU team" for lunch
and engaged them on maintaining the EU's restrictive
measures. The EU countries were being handily manipulated by
the GOC to decrease support for dissidents. Acting Director
for European Affairs Fratisek Ruzicka was sympathetic to U.S.
arguments. He mentioned that "playing nice" to the Castro
regime has not resulted in any commercial benefits for

Slovakia, and that potential trade should not be the
motivation for policy in this case. However, his view may
not prevail in the MFA.

Parliament: "Critical" Dialogue is A Two-Way Street
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8. (C) President of Parliament Pavol Hrusovsky, also Chair of
the Christian Democratic Movement and a long-time opponent of
communism, has been one of the country's most outspoken
public figures on human rights in CUBA (see para 5). He
recently sent a letter in support of political prisoner Luis
Enrique Ferrera Garcia, describing the release of six
dissidents as a "necessary, but not sufficient, condition for
a change in the attitude toward the regime in CUBA." CUBAn
Ambassador to Slovakia Caridad Yamiri Cueto Milian responded
to Hrusovsky's letter in classic fashion. Her harshly-worded
letter made headlines with the statement, "the dignity and
morals of the CUBAn nation stand high above the misery of
people like you." Op-eds argued that this incident alone was
excuse enough to oppose the EU policy toward CUBA.
Nonetheless, Hlavacek said that when FM Eduard Kukan convoked
the Ambassador to indicate that such language was
unacceptable, he only discussed diplomatic protocol and did
not address the substance of the human rights letter that
sparked the reaction.


9. (U) Another leader in parliament on CUBAn human rights is
Laszlo Nagy of the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK). As
president of the committee on human rights in Parliament, he
traveled to CUBA last Spring to meet with dissidents with
other parliamentary leaders from the Czech Republic and
Sweden. He felt CUBA had been overshadowed by the events of
1989, which represented a lost opportunity to influence
regime change, He commented that the CUBAn dissident
movement is much more organized than what existed in 1989 in
the former Czechoslovakia. He informed poloffs that more
investment into this group is urgently needed and further
relaxing the isolation policy would be a clear victory for
the Castro regime.

NGO Activism
--------------


10. (SBU) Eliska Slavikova from the NGO People in Peril and
Milan Nic of Pontis Foundation detailed the activities of
their organizations in support of CUBAn democratization.
People in Peril focuses on raising public awareness and
grassroots support, while Pontis has taken a more political
route. With support from a 2003 Democracy Commission grant,
People in Peril organized several music and film festivals
throughout Slovakia, published newsletters, and hosted
discussion fora on human rights issues, several specifically
on CUBA. The organization collected small donations at these
events to support the families of CUBAn political prisoners.
People in Peril also encourages the Slovak media to cover
CUBAn issues.


11. (C) Nic described Pontis' activities to include "prisoner
adoptions," lobbying the GOS, and supporting CUBAn
dissidents. The "prisoner adoption" scheme asks each
political party to identify one political prisoner of the
same party affiliation and coordinate public statements and
fund raising on that prisoner's behalf. Pontis has asked
both MPs and MEPs to consider this option. They have also
lobbied the GOS to invite dissidents to diplomatic functions
in Havana and opposed the choice of the new Slovak Ambassador
to CUBA. Nic described the new Ambassador as a businessman
"not connected with human rights concerns." He noted that
Slovak trade with CUBA is small. He claimed a
non-transparent 400 million USD energy project between the
politically well-connected Slovak firm SEZ Tlmace and the
CUBAn government is driving the GOS' CUBA policy. He also
said the 15 UN Caribbean votes that CUBA held influence over
were an important part of Slovakia's bid for a 2006/2007
non-permanent Security Council seat. (NOTE: Slovakia has
since won this seat, the top priority of the GOS' UN policy.)


12. (C) Comment: The GOS CUBA policy is trying to balance
many interests: human rights and support for dissidents,
potential to influence a future regime, promotion of
commercial interests, and being a good EU team player. The
gut instinct of Slovakia's top leaders is pro-democracy,
pro-market economy, and pro-reform. Our challenge remains
getting that instinct to come out around the tables in
Brussels.
WEISER


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