BRAZIL: RESPONSE TO ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 002151

SIPDIS

NOFORN

GENEVA FOR CD DEL, UNVIE FOR IAEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2014
TAGS: KNNP MNUC ETTC PREL PARM BR NPT IAEA
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: RESPONSE TO ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AS
CONDITION OF SUPPLY

REF: A. STATE 180283


B. BRASILIA 1045

C. BRASILIA 1221

D. BRASILIA 1069

E. BRASILIA 909

F. BRASILIA 1005

Classified By: Political Counselor Dennis Hearne, reason 1.4 (d)


1. (SBU) Poloff delivered ref A talking points to Ministry
of Foreign Relations Sensitive Technologies and Disarmament
Division (MRE/DDS) Deputy Director Manuel Montenegro, who is
well versed on Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) matters.
Montenegro had participated in the recent NSG plenary meeting
in Sweden and his comments likely reflect the thinking of his
superiors within Itamaraty. Poloff also exchanged brief
pleasantries with Ambassador Sergio Duarte, President of the
2005 NPT Review Conference, and his assistant Jandyr Ferreira
dos Santos.


2. (C) Responding to the Brazil specific points in ref A,
Montenegro sought to clarify the GOB position on conclusion
of the Additional Protocol (AP). Montenegro stressed that
the GOB does not have any "conceptual" problem with the AP
and "would get there eventually," implying a Brazilian
disposition to sign the protocol at some point in the future.
However, Montenegro said he was certain that Brazil could
not complete its internal policy consideration of the issue
in time to adhere to the AP prior to the 2005 NPT Revcon. In
that regard, he noted that Brazil's congress had issued a
"caveat" to the MRE that the congress wants to see "concerted
effort towards nuclear disarmament" among weapons states if
it is to consider approval of the Additional Protocol. (Note:
Under Brazilian law, the Additional Protocol would almost
certainly have to be approved by Brazil's congress, as it is
a substantive addendum to an international treaty. End note.)



3. (C) Responding further to ref A points, Montenegro said
Brazil continues to oppose implementation of the AP as a
Condition of Supply (COS) for trigger list transfers in the
NSG. Montenegro was surprised that the USG was continuing to
press for the UK/Austrian proposal to establish AP
implementation as a COS since, following the NSG Plenary and
after GOB delegation discussions with the UK and Austrian
delegations, it was Montenegro's understanding that the
UK/Austrian text was "dead." Montenegro further said that the
GOB is against the use of the NSG as a kind of "cheerleader
for the AP."


4. (C) Comment: Montenegro is a candid MRE specialist in
non-proliferation issues, and we suspect he is offering a
realistic assessment of the deliberate pace the GOB will take
toward the AP, even as senior Brazilian officials continue to
indicate a disposition to eventually sign on. His assessment
reinforces views expressed earlier this year by FM Amorim and
Defense Minister Viegas to visiting Energy Secretary Abraham
and former NP A/S Wolf (refs E and F). The public statements
in April by Science and Technology Minister Campos that
Brazil would sign the AP in time for the 2005 NPT Review
Conference now seem isolated and too optimistic. We believe
the GOB's reservations probably continue to include: (1)
reluctance to appear to bow to external pressures, from the
USG, IAEA or in the context of the NSG; (2) concern with
perceptions that the AP pressure on Brazil in some fashion
lumps Brazil in the suspect company of North Korea and Iran,
when the GOB feels Brazil ought to be seen as a model citizen
in non-proliferation; (3) concern that the GOB needs an
"air-tight" case on the merits of the AP before taking the
matter to Brazil's congress, which only reluctantly ratified
the NPT and may renew its criticisms of a perceived lack of
disarmament progress among the weapons states. We will
continue to try to gain more clarity on the thinking within
the GOB on these issues.

Danilovich