VIOLENCE IN CALI ON THE RISE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 009676 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2014 TAGS: EAID MOPS PINR SNAR CO PHUM PREL SUBJECT: VIOLENCE IN CALI ON THE RISE Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Milton K. Drucker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In mid September, Emboffs discussed security issues with local officials in Cali, capital of Valle del Cauca Department. Despite an overall improvement in most security indicators, the murder rate in the department has increased substantially this year. A combination of several factors has contributed to the highest per capita murder rate in the country: a violent rivalry between two powerful drug traffickers, an absence of real legal punishments for minors, lack of access to adequate employment, and increased gang related activity. At the same time, Cali's outlook is improving as security programs and investment work to provide options and protection for the community. End Summary. -------------- Homicide Rate Increasing -------------- ¶2. (C) Homicides in Cali, capital of Valle del Cauca Department, have increased over the past few years. Cali's murder rate is now the highest in the country. According to Colonel Oscar Lopez, acting Commander of the Army's 3rd Brigade, there had been 1,742 murders in Cali as of September 13, compared with a total of 1,634 in 2003. Cali Police Commander General Mario Gutierrez said Cali averages 8.3 deaths per day, including criminals killed in shoot-outs with police and military forces. ¶3. (C) Municipal authorities attribute the escalating homicide rate primarily to the rivalry between drug traffickers Wilber Varela (alias "Jabon") and Diego Montoya Sanchez. Varela and Montoya finance numerous loosely organized militias that act as private gangs to conduct cocaine trafficking, weapons transfers, money laundering, and selective assassinations. Varela and Sanchez, who inherited the remnants of the Cali Cartel in the late 1990s, used to work together but are now competitors. Varela is known to work with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Montoya has confirmed ties with paramilitary groups. Cali's widespread poverty and unemployment have provided Varela and Montoya with a ready supply of able-bodied youths prepared to engage in criminal activities, including selective assassinations. ¶4. (C) Increasing violence is also ascribed to conflicts between neighborhood gangs unrelated to the Varela/Montoya rivalry, fighting between guerrilla and paramilitary urban militias, and poverty-driven crime. According to Valle del Cauca Governor Angelino Garzon, 60 percent of homicides in the department are a result of clashes between armed criminals, while 40 percent are attacks on unarmed victims. On September 14, Governor Garzon's personal driver was murdered. The motive for the murder is unclear. -------------- Overburdened Government Resources -------------- ¶5. (C) Local authorities explained the difficulties of overcoming rising levels of violence in Cali. Gangs are abundant and loosely affiliated, making it difficult to identify them and bring their members to justice. Downtrodden youth drawn into illegal activities far outnumber Cali's security forces. 2,000 police and 220 military troops work in Cali, and are limited by poor logistics and a lack of transportation, communications, and communications intercept equipment. The Prosecutor General's Office ("Fiscalia"), with only 265 prosecutors for the entire department, has a backlog of approximately 2,500 cases. The Departmental Fiscalia Director noted that Cali's prosecutors cannot even come close to investigating each of the approximately eight murders that happen each day. Prosecutors work under strenuous conditions, are overburdened by their caseloads, and regularly receive death threats. ¶6. (C) Local officials complained that Cali's already thinly stretched security forces are saddled with the additional task of combating major counterfeiting rings, who maintain intricate connections to drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and militia groups. Cali is Colombia's largest producer of counterfeit bills, owing to a well developed infrastructure based in legitimate paper making, graphic arts and typography, and Cali's strategic proximity to various criminal entities. Cali's security forces seized nearly 3 million USD in counterfeit money this year, and the Department of Administrative Security (DAS ) Colombia's equivalent to the FBI) has established a special team to investigate and dismantle counterfeiting and money laundering organizations. Both are supported by U.S. law enforcement agencies. -------------- Problematic Policies -------------- ¶7. (C) Government officials cited the absence of real punishments for minors as another obstacle to reducing the murder rate. Interlocutors told us Colombian law does not allow any person under the age of eighteen to be sent to jail. Instead, a minor detained by law enforcement authorities must be delivered to the head of his or her household, or, in the event the minor does not have family, turned over to the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF). Narcotraffickers capitalize on this virtual immunity to recruit minors to act as their personal henchmen. Contacts in the Police, Army, and Fiscalia complained that youths released after being detained for murder or other violent crimes often commit additional offenses soon after being freed. The ICBF has only basic infrastructure in Cali and cannot provide an attractive alternative to a life of crime for many of Cali's youth. -------------- Calls For Greater Social Investment -------------- ¶8. (C) Valle del Cauca Governor Angelino Garzon and Cali Mayor Apolinar Salcedo emphasized that Cali's endemic violence calls for greater civic outreach. Marginalized youth drawn into Cali's gangs live in poverty-stricken and densely populated neighborhoods with minimal access to education and employment opportunities. Drug addiction, prostitution, and armed violence have become a way of life. The continuing influx of displaced persons, numbering around 38,000 and generally from the violence-torn Departments of Choco and Narino, exacerbates these basic standard-of-living deficiencies. According to Garzon and Salcedo, Valle's already limited resources are compounded by a debt burden totaling 550 billion Colombian pesos (approximately 220 million USD). ¶9. (C) Monsignor Juan Zarasti, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cali, said that although the city's leaders are well intentioned, many of their policies foster criminality and do not effectively address the real cause of violence. A local human rights NGO echoed these sentiments, complaining that the government is too focused on increasing the police and military presence in the city but is failing to provide even basic social services. -------------- A Coordinated Approach -------------- ¶10. (C) The military, police, DAS, and Fiscalia have formed a joint security campaign called "Cali Segura" (Safe Cali). The program is a coordinated effort to decentralize security and justice services and gain the confidence of the local population. State institutions aim to encourage residents to respect the rule of law and cooperate with authorities in combating illegal militias. The program focuses on the most violent neighborhoods located in the eastern part of the city near the Cauca River, collectively referred to as "Agua Blanca." In a city of almost 3 million people, Agua Blanca houses over 1 million. As part of Cali Segura, the police and military provide 24-hour street patrols and security for school buses and community events. The Fiscalia is working to strengthen its witness protection program. Agua Blanca has a U.S.-funded "Casa de Justicia" (Justice House) where residents can voice legal grievances and seek legal advice, but the Casa de Justicia does not have an active law enforcement role. -------------- The Good News -------------- ¶11. (C) Despite escalating violence in the region, almost all other security indicators have improved this year, including kidnappings, extortion and theft. Local officials claimed that guerrilla and paramilitary groups have been pushed out of the city, and that the rate of displaced persons relocating to Cali, although still high, is decreasing. ¶12. (C) The Governor touted Valle del Cauca's diverse and expanding economy. Previously buoyed by powerful drug cartels, Valle's economy collapsed following their takedown in the mid-1990s. Although Valle represents the third largest producer of exports in Colombia, including sugar, coffee, corn based foods, pharmaceuticals, graphic arts, cement, electrical and industrial materials, paper, and leather goods, many of these will be affected negatively by a free trade agreement. Historically, Cali was a center of foreign investment, but that has been reduced as Medellin eclipses Cali. According to Governor Garzon, Valle's unemployment rate is beginning to fall. As a result of recent restructuring, the department is on track to pay its debt in full by 2010. Ana Lucia Jaramillo, Director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Valle del Cauca, said there are about 50 U.S. firms in Cali, and foreign investors are showing renewed interest, largely as a result of improved overall security. DRUCKER